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Introduction – The Hungarian transition
1.1 Introduction
On the eve of the last decade of the 20th century, the world witnessed the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the collapse of the socialist system in almost all of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE). This marked not only the end of central planning, but also the beginning of the
transition towards more market-based economies. A transition that appeared to be much
more complicated and long-lasting than expected. Together with the collapse of central
planning in 1989, CEE became an attractive destination for foreign direct investment
(FDI). Foreign firms are drawn to the new untapped sales markets, as well as the favorable
labor markets, characterized by low labor costs and high level of operational skills. FDI
might play an important role in the transition process and hereby also in bridging the gap
with Western economies. After all, foreign companies are expected to bring in modern
technology, know-how, and Western management techniques.
This study deals with the effects of foreign companies on two central aspects of the
transition process: the modernization of the manufacturing industry and the related changes
in the demand for labor. Our focus is on Hungary, since it has been the most attractive host
country for FDI in CEE1, partly as a result of active government policy that favored the
sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to strategic foreign investors. The effects of FDI on
Hungary’s industrial modernization and labor market are the most extensive and visible
among CEE countries, largely due to the fact that a major share of FDI entered the country
already during the first years of the transition. Hungary’s experience makes it an excellent
candidate to study these processes.
The modernization of production is one of the major challenges of the Hungarian
manufacturing industry. In 1989, a huge technology gap existed between Hungary and the
West. This was partly caused by forty years of central planning, and partly by non-system-
related factors. The import of Western technology in the 1980s could not really change this
situation. Therefore, one of the main challenges in 1989 was the modernization of produc-
tion equipment. The more so, since it is a necessary condition for the successful integration
with Western economies, especially since the break-up of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) led to the collapse of export markets in CEE countries and the USSR
successor states. FDI is expected to play an important role in this modernization process in
view of the modern technologies and organizational know-how which foreign companies
have and their financial means to restructure and modernize SOEs. But the modernization
effects of FDI might not be restricted only to the foreign subsidiaries in Hungary. Even
1
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more important might be the indirect effects of FDI on the modernization of the manu-
facturing industry, that is the diffusion of modern technology and organizational know-how
to domestic Hungarian companies. This diffusion is mainly through backward linkages with
domestic suppliers and subcontractors, and the assistance provided by foreign companies to
these domestic companies. In this study we will look at both the direct and indirect effects
of FDI on the modernization of the manufacturing industry in Hungary.
It goes without saying that modernization leads to far-reaching changes in the labor
market, both in quantitative (employment) and qualitative (professions, skills) respects. As
one of the goals of the socialist government was to abolish joblessness and ensure full em-
ployment, open unemployment practically did not exist prior to 1989. At the same time,
however, unemployment on-the-job was very high, as a consequence of labor hoarding and
the policy towards full employment. After the change of system, the economic value of
workers in terms of productivity and value added became superior to the social imperative
of employment per se. Undoubtedly, labor shedding was higher in foreign companies that
followed a more radical modernization and restructuring policy. On the other hand, foreign
investors have the financial means to set up new activities to generate new jobs.
What might be even more important, at least in light of the transition process, is the
qualitative changes on the labor market. The modernization of production leads to the de-
mand for different skills than those required under socialist rule. As new skills and profes-
sions emerge, other skills become less important, or even disappear, thus necessitating far-
reaching adaptation of the labor market and the educational system. The reallocation of
human capital is a fundamental aspect of successful modernization. Foreign companies can
play a role in the transformation of the labor market, especially in the intermediate period
when the education system has not fully adapted to the new requirements. They might pro-
vide in-house education and on-the-job training to fill the gap between supply and demand
of labor. Besides, they might take a leading role in the change of workers’ mentality and the
introduction of Western work ethics.
In view of the discussion above, the following problem definition is formulated:
What are the direct and indirect effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the manufac-
turing industry in Hungary, and what are the consequences of this modernization on the demand for la-
bor, both in qualitative and quantitative respects?
The objects of our study are important elements in the transformation process. At the same
time, however, the transformation process sets the context for this study. This far-reaching
transformation is a necessary consequence of the establishment of a more market-based
economy, following forty years of socialist rule. The legacy of the socialist system can thus
be seen as the occasion for both the transition process and this research. Moreover, the leg-
acy of the socialist system might be a barrier to the modernization of the manufacturing
industry, especially for foreign investors that have invested in Hungary through the acquisi-
tion of SOEs (that is in the privatization). Therefore, in the following sections (1.2 and 1.3)
we set the scene, by taking a closer look at the Hungarian transition and the legacy from the
past. In section 1.4 we elaborate on the possible role of foreign companies in Hungary in
the transition process, taking into consideration the barriers from the inherited structures.
Finally section 1.5 provides an overview of the layout of the book and the structure of the
study.
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1.2 The transformation process
Transformation from a centrally-planned to a more market-based economy, as is taking
place currently in Hungary and other former socialist countries in CEE and the former So-
viet Union, is an extremely complicated process. First, it entails the comprehensive change
of a whole society in a limited time span, including all its political, socio-economic and legal
elements. Second, the transition process is without precedent, making it a process of trial
and error (SER, 1993). Third, the question about transition is ‘transition to what’ (Van Zon,
1996).
The change from centrally-planned to more market-based economies is a field of study
in itself. Moreover, there is still a lively debate on how best to transform economies. In this
section we will therefore only discuss the main elements of transition. First we discuss the
transformation in Hungary and its achievements thus far (section 1.2.1). As one of the most
important elements in the economic transformation, the privatization of SOEs will be dis-
cussed separately in section 1.2.2, especially since this has proven to be an important vehicle
for foreign companies to invest in Hungary. Finally in section 1.2.3 we discuss the sharp
increase of unemployment in Hungary as one of the dramatic consequences of the transi-
tion.
1.2.1 Hungary: a gradual transformation?
The transition towards more market-based economies consists of a long list of required
reforms, which can be divided into four categories: stabilization, liberalization, institutional
reforms, and privatization (Van Brabant, 1993)2. Stabilization means reducing inflation, that
has appeared to be one of the main obstacles in the early transition years, and containing
domestic and external balances. Stabilization is of vital importance, since macro-economic
imbalances make it more difficult to gage the effects of implemented reforms. But the rela-
tionship between economic transformation and macro-economic stabilization is paradoxi-
cal, since at the same time, systemic changes are destabilizing (SER, 1993). Macro-economic
stabilization is strongly connected to liberalization, the second category of reforms (The
World Bank, 1996; Hoen, 1996; Knot & Sipkes, 1998). The most important element is the
liberalization of prices that have to reflect scarcities in markets. Together with privatization,
liberalization of prices are generally seen as the cornerstones of the transition process (Van
Zon, 1996). Other elements of liberalization are for instance the liberalization of foreign
trade, exchanges rates, and free entry in economic activities. Through liberalization, firms
are exposed to consumer demand, the profit motive and competition (The World Bank,
1996). As a consequence, prices are adjusted in line with true scarcities. A third category of
reforms are institutional reforms. Institutional reforms cover the establishment of clear
property rights, a sound legal and financial infrastructure, and effective government. Insti-
tution building is important in making markets work efficiently and supporting growth. So,
whereas stabilization and liberalization are important in the early stages of the transition
process, institution building is important in the longer term. The privatization of SOEs
forms a fourth category of reforms. This process lies at the heart of the transition process.
The importance of privatization lies in micro-economic restructuring and modernization.
We will discuss privatization separately below.
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It is generally acknowledged that the above four categories of reforms are necessary ele-
ments in the transformation towards more market-based economies. However, different
countries have different ideas about how to transform their economies. In this respect,
countries have been characterized as either implementing shock treatment, of which Poland
and the Czech Republic are well-known examples, or taking a gradualist approach, of which
Hungary is the classic example (Van der Lijn, 1993; Kosta, 1995). The difference refers
mainly to different opinions with respect to the speed and sequencing of reforms. In es-
sence it boils down to different opinions on which approach minimizes total welfare costs.
It is a misconception that the adherents of the gradualist approach proclaim a slow trans-
formation. Rather, they doubt the feasibility of a quick successful transformation.
Different factors might influence the path taken. Van der Lijn (1993) has pointed to the
fact that in general, the gradualist reformers view the legacy of the socialist system in less
negative light than advocates of shock treatment. As the ‘happiest barrack’ in the socialist
sphere of influence in Europe, where market elements were already introduced before 1989,
conditions were such that a more gradual approach was suitable for Hungary. This might
have played a role in Hungary for a more gradual approach. For instance, some 80% of
consumer prices were liberalized already before 1989. Likewise, the labor market in Hungary
was the most liberal of all CEE countries by the end of 1989. The macro-economic situa-
tion is a case in point as well. Compared to for instance Poland, Hungary was not in a deep
crisis in 1989. Either way, there has to be public support for the speed and way in which
reforms are implemented. In Hungary there was definitely no public support for a big bang
approach.
Table 1.1 Front-runners in the transition according to the EBRD transition indicators, 1998a
Hungary Poland Czech
Republic
Estonia Slovenia
Private sector share of GDP estimate mid-98 (%) 80 65 75 70 55
Enterprises
Large scale privatization 4 3+ 4 4 3+
Small scale privazation 4+ 4+ 4+ 4+ 4+
Governance & enterprise restructuring 3+ 3 3 3 3-
Markets and trade
Price liberalization 3+ 3+ 3 3 3
Trade & foreign exchange system 4+ 4+ 4+ 4 4+
Competition policy 3 3 3 3- 2
Financial institutions
Banking reform & interest rate liberalization 4 3+ 3 3+ 3
Securities markets & non-bank finan. inst. 3+ 3+ 3 3 3
a The numerical indicators represent the cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally-planned to a
market economy in each dimension and range from 1 to 4+, where 4+ resembles the situation we would
generally find in advanced industrial economies. Pluses and minuses indicate countries on the borderline
between two categories. For an exact interpretation of the numerical indicators see EBRD (1998, p. 27).
Source: EBRD (1998)
Indeed, one could label Hungary as a gradualist reformer since it was initially less far-
reaching and effective in its stabilization and liberalization policy. However, Hoen (1996)
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has pointed out that the Hungarian path to a market-based economy also contains elements
that are generally assigned to shock therapists. For instance, Hungary applied a tough bank-
ruptcy law (institutional reform), a typical shock therapy instrument that is an important
element in micro-economic restructuring.
Either way, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD, 1998), Hungary is one of the front runners in the transition process (table 1.1). In
fact, comparing Hungary’s progress in transition to the other countries applying for EU
membership in the first round of enlargement listed in table 1.1, Hungary has attained the
most progress in transforming its economy. Moreover, currently, some 80% of gross do-
mestic product (GDP) originates from private sector activities.
1.2.2 Specific characteristics of privatization in Hungary
Privatization is a central element in the transformation towards a more market-based econ-
omy. Moreover, it appeared to be one of the most difficult elements of the transition proc-
ess. Privatization, in its narrow definition, can be defined as the legal transfer of property
rights from the state to private agents (Lavigne, 1995). These private owners may be indi-
viduals including employees and management of the firms, and legal persons, including local
companies and foreign investors. A broader definition of privatization includes all measures
contributing to the de-statization of economic activity (Lavigne, 1995). In this sense privati-
zation may be consistent with a large state-owned sector, provided state enterprises are
managed according to market rules and exposed to competition. This broad definition also
includes the establishment of new private firms (greenfield), both domestic and foreign
owned.
Privatization in Hungary, in its broad definition, started already in the beginning of the
eighties. In ‘socialist’ Hungary a distinction could be made between the first economy,
which covered the state sector and the second economy, covering all private initiatives. For
some years already there was a large second economy in Hungary, which was estimated at
close to one-quarter of the aggregate household income in 1998 (Cséfalvay & Rohn, 1991)3.
Some of these private initiatives had the approval of the state, but formally they were not
allowed. As these private initiatives became a more important part of the economy (they
were complementary to the state sector, filling up the gaps between consumer demand and
production in SOEs) in the beginning of the eighties, some of these private initiatives were
legalized and even encouraged. Because they were not included in the 5-year plans however,
they formally still belonged to the second economy.
Another element of privatization, starting in 1988, is spontaneous privatization which
covers the uncontrolled process of the transfer of state-owned property into private hands
(narrow definition4). Spontaneous privatization is inherent to the political and juridical
power vacuum which existed in the first few years of the transition process. The main play-
ers in this privatization were managers with connections in the state machinery. In Hungary
this ‘nomenclature privatization’ was relatively less scandalous compared to other countries
(Bos-Karczewska, 1993). It was concerned mostly with the establishment of joint ventures
with Western partners, the birth of empty state holdings and fraud within state property,
rather than the transfer of state property into the ownership of managers. Spontaneous
privatization came to an end in the beginning of 1990. Because the government realized that
managers were an important source of capital, necessary for privatization, a legal framework
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for management buyouts was set up. From the beginning of 1993 it is also possible for em-
ployees to obtain shares in a state-owned company. Only 5-10% of the shares can be allo-
cated to employees. In smaller companies however, a larger share can be sold to employees.
At first sight, privatizing SOEs might seem an inevitable outcome of the change from a
centrally-planned to a market-based economy. In fact, the aims for privatizing SOEs differ
largely from country to country. These aims determine the way in which privatization actu-
ally takes place. Different aims can be identified: political, social, equity, efficiency, stabiliza-
tion and financial aims. In all the countries in CEE, different approaches to privatization
exist side by side. Nevertheless there are large differences between countries.
As from the early days of the transformation onwards, Hungary conducted a privatiza-
tion policy that was aimed mainly at the fiscal potential of privatization and therefore fa-
vored direct sales of SOEs to foreign strategic investors. In this it differed more or less
from other transition economies’ policies5. Privatization of big state enterprises is through
public offerings, individual sales or tenders. The latter is especially prevalent for the privati-
zation of strategic industries. Apart from the fiscal potential of privatization, there were
other factors that play a role in the preference for sale to foreign companies. First, the lack
of domestic capital, as most of the limited domestic savings were quickly absorbed by the
privatization of small enterprises, shops, firms, and the catering industry. Second, foreign
capital was needed to acquire foreign reserves, necessary to pay off the large foreign debt
that arose to finance the reforms in the 1980s (see below). Third, in implementing its priva-
tization strategy, Hungary consistently stressed the importance of bringing in new manage-
ment, technology and investment in order to revitalize privatized firms, and has therefore
been very keen to attract foreign investors (OECD, 1995). Partly as a consequence of the
privatization policy in Hungary, foreign direct investment has played a more important role
there than in any other economy in transition. For instance, in 1991, some 80-90% of the
proceeds received by the State Property Agency came from foreign companies (Lavigne,
1995).
Privatization in Hungary is led centrally, first by the State Property Agency and from
June 1995 by the State Holding and Privatization Company (APV Rt). Before the compa-
nies are actually sold, they are commercialized or corporatized. This means they are trans-
formed into a joint stock company. Furthermore, in the first four years, some pre-
privatization restructuring took place. The main reasons for this were to increase the sal-
ability to foreigners and to gain a better price. However, it turned out to be a costly matter,
costing more than it actually brought in extra revenues. In general, experience has shown
that far from bringing revenues to the state, privatization is costly even when assets are sold
rather than given away.
In the euphoric first years of the transition process, estimations about the speed of pri-
vatization were much too optimistic. It soon became clear that the privatization of the
lion’s share of the economy was one of the hardest parts of the transformation process and
that it would take much longer than initially expected. Privatization in Hungary started al-
ready in 1988 and proceeded, compared to other countries, at a fairly brisk pace until 1994.
However, the process slowed considerably in the beginning of 1994 and came practically to
a standstill in the first six months of 1995. This 18-month standstill was mainly caused by
the general elections and the change of government. Another reason was the delay in the
new privatization law, which was implemented in June 1995 after several amendments.
In the second half of 1995 privatization regained momentum. In the last months of 1995
some of the largest privatization deals in the CEE region were concluded, including five gas
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distribution companies, six electricity distributors and two power stations, 18% of the gas
company MOL, and another 37% of the phone company MATÁV. Hungary was the first
country in CEE to privatize part of its electrical and other (strategic) utility companies.
Concluding, we can say that privatization in Hungary has progressed well, especially
when compared to other countries in CEE. The privatization process was scheduled to be
completed by the end of 1998 (EBRD, 1998).
1.2.3 The emergence of unemployment
A sharp and steady increase in unemployment is one of the most critical outcomes of the
transition in Hungary. According to Commander and Coricelli (1995), labor shedding in
SOEs has progressed through roughly three phases along with restructuring and the output
collapse. More recently a fourth phase could be identified (Allison & Ringold, 1996):
1. Voluntary separations and ‘soft’ layoffs; In the first years of the transition firms adjusted
slowly to increasing fiscal constraints (i.e. the hardening of the budget constraints). This
involved for example cutting employment by attrition, early retirements etc. Many peo-
ple opted for early retirement, a move highly encouraged by the government. In this way
the rapid increase of unemployment could be evaded somewhat, and the latent danger of
social unrest could be tempered (Dorenbos & Van Hastenberg, 1998).
2. Involuntary separations and policy-based measures; As restructuring progressed, attempts to de-
crease overemployment and respond to economic contraction became increasingly in-
voluntary and policy-based, at the enterprise, as well as government levels.
3. Mass layoffs; Unproductive firms were forced into hard restructuring or liquidation. Espe-
cially the introduction of a very tight bankruptcy law in 1992, which led to the liquidation
of approximately 16,000 firms until 1995, left many people jobless.
4. Employment stabilization; Firms have adjusted to the new market circumstances, and output
has started to recover again. Contrary to the developments in other countries in CEE, in
Hungary the relatively modest output growth has been accompanied by large gains in
total labor productivity, which suggests a deep process of labor adjustment, including la-
bor shedding.
The emergence and sharp rise of unemployment is strongly related to the fall in output.
Output fell dramatically as a result of a combination of factors. However, in the literature
there is no consensus on the relevant and most important factors. The ILO (1995) refers to
three competing explanations. The first is that the apparent fall in output is largely a statisti-
cal artifact. This refers to the combined effect of the overestimation of statistics under so-
cialist rule, and the underestimation of the rapidly expanding private sector during the tran-
sition period. Until 1994 Hungarian statistics did not cover private enterprises smaller than
20 employees. Since 1994 it has been expanded to include enterprises with 10 workers or
more (ECE, 1996). One might expect that many new jobs are created in the new, but small
firms founded in the new economic environment. A second explanatory factor refers to the
effects of the collapse of the CMEA and the Soviet Union. This caused huge decreases in
exports and a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade, that were very favorable for the
Soviet satellite states in CEE. However, exports shifted towards other countries, mainly in
Western Europe, making up for most of the loss of exports to other CMEA countries. The
20
third, and according to the ILO, probably most valid explanatory factor is that the fall in
output is the direct and inevitable result of the transition process. Liberalization, combined
with restrictive stabilization, meant the end of the supply-constrained shortage economy.
Hereby came an end to the production of unmarketable products, and it led to the reduc-
tion of stocks as hoarding became unnecessary, and the liquidation of highly uncompetitive
activities (The World Bank, 1996)
The increase in open unemployment appears rather small compared to the huge loss in
output. Open employment rose quickly from 0.7% in 1990 to 13.5% in 1995, and it is now
rather stable at 10.4% (1997) (Allison & Ringhold, 1996; ECE, 1998a). Two factors are rele-
vant in this respect (ILO, 1995). First, because of the low level of restructuring in many
SOEs, labor hoarding is still a general practice. Second, as a result of rising unemployment,
many people have withdrawn from the labor market, resulting in a decrease in participation
rate (Dorenbos, 1999). Moreover, the decrease in the duration and level of unemployment
benefits have discouraged the unemployed from registering, and encourages a flight into the
black economy6, either in Hungary or abroad (Austria, Germany). The reduction of the
(official) economically active population has strong social and fiscal implications, including
an increase in dependency ratio and high premiums for unemployment benefits and pen-
sions.
Next to the decrease in participation rates, we have to make some additional marginal
notes on the accuracy of the unemployment figures. First, the local employment offices had
some teething problems as they were confronted with large scale unemployment for the
first time. This may have effected the accuracy of the figures presented as well. Second,
continuous alterations of the unemployment definition (mainly during the first years of the
transition) have made it difficult to compare figures, both for different years and between
the different countries in CEE. Registered unemployment in Hungary has decreased from
mid-1993 onwards. However, in view of the conclusion above, it is difficult to judge
whether this is really the outcome of an increase in employment.
1.3 Inherited structures
Because of the recent socialist past of Hungary, it is necessary to take into consideration the
industrial legacy. This legacy of the socialist system can be seen as a starting point (or as the
case may be, an obstruction) in the transition process, and therefore also in the processes
under study here, namely the consequences of FDI on the modernization of production
and the related changes on the labor market. For this study, a number of elements of the
industrial inheritance are important: socialist production methods, pre-1989 reforms, tech-
nological development, research and development (R&D), and the socialist labor market.
1.3.1 Industrial production under central planning
For a description of the basics of the Hungarian manufacturing sector we have to go back
to the Soviet Union of the late twenties. Stalin was impressed with Taylor’s scientific man-
agement and its practical implementation by Henry Ford. Therefore the economic model of
the Bolsheviks was very much influenced by their ideas. This in combination with the typi-
cal Soviet approach to the labor process and the scale of the management structure makes
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some authors even speak of Soviet Fordism (Murray, 1992). However, this does not seem
justified because of the totally different starting points. Fordist mass production in the West
is profit-based, whereas in socialist countries it is resource-based. Moreover, as a conse-
quence of the ‘shortage economy’ (Kornai, 1980), socialist countries had in fact problems
with maintaining the constant flow in the production process (Ladó et al., 1989), a vital
element of Fordist production.
In 1948, after the annexation as a Soviet satellite state, Soviet-style production methods
were also introduced in Hungary. Tight policy regulations from Moscow, allowed only for
very limited elbowroom for the organization of social and economic life. Therefore, after
World War II, forced industrialization took place to reform the underdeveloped economy.
Emphasis was on heavy industry because it was seen as the basis for further development.
Moreover, production took place independently of price and market influences; production
was based on meeting the goals of the plan, not to supply consumer demand. In this con-
text a situation could develop in which companies emphasize the fulfillment of the main
purpose of the plan: fulfillment or even overfulfillment of the quantitative production
norms. Objectives with regard to efficiency, quality and cost reduction, and therefore the
development and introduction of new technology, which were indeed included in the plan,
were taken to heart less and less. This led to the production of huge stocks of a limited
range of non-salable, standardized, input-consuming, qualitatively poor products, produced
in long series (Berend & Ranki, 1979). This Soviet production style strongly influenced the
development of the Hungarian manufacturing sector at least until 1968.
1.3.2 Pre-1989 reforms
As from 1968 onwards Hungary tried to implement more market elements into the econ-
omy under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM). The NEM was introduced to ensure a
more efficient use of resources (Galasi & Sziráczki, 1985) and to tackle the shortcomings of
the centrally-planned economy. SOEs gained more autonomy and became less dependent
on state budgets. This led to the creation of some competition between firms. Moreover, a
soft bankruptcy law was introduced (Knight, 1983), prices were partly liberalized, and in-
centives for workers to raise productivity were implemented. However it was not until the
eighties, when the reforms were given fresh impetus, that major changes in society began to
take place.
The reforms opened the door for the development of an extensive second economy
which was tolerated by the state and even partly legalized. The second more flexible econ-
omy could develop so prosperously because of the rigidity of the state sector, which could
not compensate for shortages in production, consumer goods, services and the like. Aware
of the fact that the first (state) economy could not deal with certain activities effectively, the
socialist regime not only allowed the growth of the second economy, but in some cases
even encouraged it. Approximately more than half of the population and more than 70% of
the employees received income from the second economy before the change of system
A vital element of the legalized second economy is the Economic Working Associations
within Enterprises (Vallalati Gazdasagi Munkako-Zossegek; VGM). These ‘partnerships of
employees’, in fact functioned as subcontractors of the SOEs to which they were con-
nected, and made use of the company’s production facilities. Manufactured products were
sold either to or through the state company. As opposed to the production methods in the
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state sector, indications for more integrated tasks can be found in these VGMs (Pahl, 1989).
In addition, employees organized their work themselves (Ladó et al., 1989). These VGMs
mainly functioned after official working hours, but partly overlapped with the members’
paid jobs in the first, state economy. For instance, Ellman (1989) reports that in the 1970s,
when the second economy had not yet evolved to its full extent, about 17% of the total
man-hours available were spent on second-economy activities.
1.3.3 Technological development and R&D
As a consequence of socialist production methods, Hungary was saddled with a huge tech-
nology gap vis-à-vis Western countries. Pre-1989 reforms could only reduce this gap in a
limited way, which means that the technology backlog in 1989 was (and still is) a serious
problem for Hungary. Low technological development in Hungary (as in other transition
economies) is partly inherent to the system of central planning and can partly be explained
by other factors. System-related factors are (Poznanski, 1985):
1. Risk reward explanation. In the West, technological development usually means an im-
provement of competitiveness and a rise in labor productivity, which in the long run re-
sults in a better profitability of the company. In a centrally-planned economy, the devel-
opment and introduction of new technology only means an extra risk for companies,
which can interrupt the constant flow of production. As was mentioned already, this
constant flow had first priority for SOEs.
2. Zero price explanation. SOEs can deploy means of production against zero prices. With that
a significant ground for technological development is blocked, as cost reduction is an
important consideration for technological development.
3. Closed economy explanation. A practically closed trade system like the CMEA blocks the way
for the import of technology which comes readily available as a result of integration in
the world economy. However, in the case of Hungary, this explanation is not entirely
satisfactory, because it opened its economy considerably before 1989.
Besides these system-related explanations, some other factors which have had a negative
influence on technological development in Hungary can be mentioned. For one, the exist-
ing R&D potential was highly inefficient. R&D was carried out in separate research insti-
tutes which were connected with certain branches of industry. But a serious shortcoming
was the actual use of the patent applications by innovative enterprises. This inefficiency can
be illustrated by the fact that in 1990 Hungary had a proportionally equal number of re-
searchers compared to countries like Sweden and Germany, despite the huge technology
gap between Hungary and these countries. However, the gap was not so wide for certain
sectors within the chemical industry and food processing in which Hungarian research has
made its mark (Thanner, 1992). Another factor negatively influencing technological devel-
opment was the very slow diffusion of new technologies among other companies. In such
an environment companies employing the latest technology functioned alongside those
which kept on producing using outdated equipment for years.
Pre-1989 reforms and the development of a second economy did not have any signifi-
cant influence on the situation described above. Although characterized by a high level of
product innovation, the second economy was characterized by a low technological level,
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even at the level of SOEs (Cséfalvay & Rohn, 1991). The only reform that has had a posi-
tive influence on technology in pre-1989 Hungary was the opening of its borders which
enabled Western technology to enter the country. Therefore, compared to other transition
economies, Hungary has in fact attracted a lot of Western technology at an early stage in its
attempt to improve the quality of its export industry. However, most technology entered
the country in an embedded way (by way of machinery and other contributions in kind).
Only a small part (to an amount of 3% of total domestic R&D expenditure) has come in
the form of licenses and know-how. This percentage is much lower than in Western coun-
tries (15-45%; situation in the early eighties) (Malecki, 1991). Moreover, the maintenance of
imported Western machinery was not always adequate, and the repair of machines could
not be done well, resulting in only a limited use of the expensive imported machinery.
1.3.4 The socialist labor market
The socialist labor market was fundamentally different from the one that is now developing.
In this section we take a closer look at the socialist labor market, taking into consideration
both (un)employment and the educational system.
Under socialism, labor was not a commodity, as the allocation of labor was not subject
to market mechanisms (Kornai, 1993). This means that workers were allocated by planners
to a job, enterprise, or region and were obliged to stay there. Bureaucratic control started
with education. Scholars were denied certain opportunities for further study and channeled
towards other vocations. Thereafter, they were assigned a place of work, or compulsorily
posted to one. The three most important methods of labor planning in socialist countries
are administrative (top-down/obedience), economic (pay) and moral (‘honored workers’
hero of socialist labor’) (Ellman, 1989).
After the end of the Stalinist period, the labor market became more of a market in So-
viet satellite states (Van Brabant, 1995; Jackman & Rutkowski, 1994; Ellman, 1989; Kornai,
1993). Except for a few jobs, which continued to be centrally allocated, workers enjoyed
some freedom in choosing jobs, skills, or professions, as well as the region where they
wanted to work, and were free to quit their jobs. In practice, however, bureaucratic control
remained important.
Despite geographical mobility being constrained by housing and endemic administrative
restrictions, labor mobility was not much lower than in Western Europe, both in terms of
turnover rates and moves between regions. For instance, the Lenin Steel Works in Hungary
had an annual turnover rate of more than 20% (Fretwell & Jackman, 1994). However, oc-
cupational mobility was restricted, since the system of wage-setting did not encourage
workers to acquire (other) skills, and many workers only had a narrow range of technical
skills (Fretwell & Jackman, 1994).
One of the goals of communist parties under socialism was to abolish joblessness and
ensure full employment. Consequently, Hungary grew to a situation of full employment, in
which employment was seen as a guaranteed and ‘acquired right’ (also called a job-rights
economy)7. In fact, Hungary was characterized by a shortage of labor. Shortage of labor is
inherent to every economy. Supply and demand of employees with specific skills, in towns
and villages and between different regions do not always match perfectly. Although these
structural shortages are found everywhere, there are some system-specific features in Hun-
gary and CEE. As fulfillment or overfulfillment of the quantitative plan objectives was the
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main goal for enterprises, additional workers were always useful. They formed a buffer for
future plan increases and unforeseen calamities. In addition, more workers led to higher
incomes for the managers of SOEs. Taking into account the full employment objective and
the social costs of unemployment, it was entirely rational for SOEs under socialism to em-
ploy workers whose marginal product is below their wage (Ellman, 1989).
Through employment, workers enjoyed a large range of social and other benefits. Next
to an extensive social security system, workers enjoyed free health care, insurance, etc. Be-
sides, many firms provide institutionally-owned apartments, and house their own doctor’s
office, holiday center, kindergarten, and day nursery. SOEs in socialist countries are there-
fore not just economic units, but function as mini-welfare states (Ellman, 1989).
These social characteristics of the labor market had some serious negative effects on
several vital elements of the economy:
1. As a result of labor hoarding, wages were very low. Although SOEs as a whole had soft
budget constraints, labor costs are characterized by hard budget constraints. Employing
more and more people leads therefore to low wages. As a consequence (together with
social pressures), labor participation rate was high, mainly due to a high participation rate
of women. For instance, in 1985 close to 85% of the Hungarian women aged 40-44 had
paid jobs, compared to 55% of women in West European countries (Kornai, 1993)8. On
the positive side, this resulted in a better position of women on the labor market and
better career possibilities than generally found in many Western countries in the seven-
ties and eighties.
2. A high level of unemployment on the job is another economic deficiency of the socialist
labor market. Because of labor hoarding, workers did not work intensively. This has led
to the strange situation where a ‘chronic shortage of labor is compatible with and ac-
companied by (..) an internal surplus of unemployment on the job’ (Kornai, 1993). This
also allowed for second-economy activities during working hours.
3. As a direct effect of labor hoarding, unemployment on the job, low wages, and life-time
employment, labor productivity was extremely low. Moreover, wages were not related to
productivity. The fact that wages did not increase in tandem with higher productivity
levels, produced a negative effect on labor incentives. Moreover, since there was no rela-
tion between skills and wage levels, workers were not encouraged to acquire more skills.
Most employees were narrow specialists with nontransferable skills.
The slow softening of the command economy and the evolution of the second economy in
Hungary have resulted in the emergence of a dual labor market that mainly flourished in the
1980s (Cséfalvay, 1993). Workers could choose between the state sector and the semi-
private sector. But often workers held jobs in both segments of the economy. In the sec-
ond economy wages tended to be higher, and were more related to productivity. Wages in
the VGMs, for instance, were 1.5 to 3 times higher than wages in the state sector. For some
workers their income in the second economy was even higher than what they earned from
their ‘normal’ job (Joffe, 1988; 1990).
The education system in socialist Hungary was characterized by a high quality of basic
education, resulting in high literacy rates and high levels of achievement in school mathe-
matics and science9. Moreover, many children were placed into specialized vocational
schools, that were often attached to specific enterprises, already at the very early age of
fourteen10. This has led to the education of a vast number of narrow specialists, since the
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Ministry of Industry determined the requirements for the skilled and unskilled workers
based on production targets for their enterprises. Moreover, adult education and training
was neglected, since workers were expected to remain in a certain enterprise throughout
their working careers. From the point of view of the workers, additional training was not
useful because of the distorted relation between skills and wages. A third feature that can be
mentioned is that access to higher education was based on the students’ parents’ high status
in the party hierarchy, rather than on the intelligence of students. Besides, a number of
subjects were practically ignored or devaluated in higher education. These include econom-
ics, management sciences, law, accountancy and finance. The shortcomings of the socialist
education system carry serious implications for the current economic reforms.
All in all we can say that the post-socialist government in Hungary inherited a mature
education and training system which was a legacy of central planning and political control
(Laporte & Schweitzer, 1994). Although many of the ‘inherited skills’ appeared to be unsuit-
able in the changing economic environment, the overall education level of the Hungarian
working population – in combination with low labor costs – was one of the factors which
attracted foreign investors to Hungary.
1.4 The role of foreign direct investment
From the above we can conclude that both the modernization of production and the trans-
formation of the labor market are central elements in the successful transition towards a
market economy. Moreover, as the past few years have shown, they are among the most
difficult elements of the transition, and have to be seen as two integrated steps in a process
leading to sustainable private sector development and successful integration with Western
economies. In addition, the modernization of production and the transformation of the
labor market are closely linked to other segments of the transition, like the privatization of
SOEs, the reform of the educational system and the change in mentality.
Direct investments of foreign companies might contribute extensively to establishing the
far-reaching changes in manufacturing production and the labor market. They have the
financial means and the know-how that can bring about the required changes. Moreover,
they can function as a catalyst for bringing about the necessary changes in the domestic
manufacturing sector. This is especially so in a country like Hungary, where foreign capital
has entered in large amounts (as compared to other countries in CEE), already from the
early days of the transition.
Thus far we have spoken about foreign direct investment as a collective term for all in-
vestments entailed in obtaining a controlling share in a foreign-based production facility. In
fact there are different ways to so. In light of this research we have made a distinction be-
tween two major modes of investment: investments in the privatization of SOEs and
greenfield investments. The former refers to the acquisition of an SOE, the latter refers to
the setting up of a whole new plant by a foreign owner. The underlying motivation for this
distinction is that investments in privatization have to cope with the inherited socialist
structures directly; in contrast, the remnants of this legacy is of less (indirect) influence on
greenfield investments. For instance, it is likely that privatized companies have to cope with
overmanning and largely obsolete production equipment, unlike greenfield companies.
However, both privatized and greenfield companies have to deal with the mentality of em-
ployees and customers, the education level, the ‘quality’ of domestic suppliers, the way of
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doing business in Hungary and the changing economic and legal environment. This also
indicates that the legacy of the socialist system, and the transition process that is currently
taking place in Hungary, offer different opportunities and obstacles to foreign privatized
and greenfield companies.
At the same time the mode of investment affects both the way and the extent to which
privatized and greenfield companies exert influence on production modernization and la-
bor-related changes. For example, the contribution of privatized companies towards tech-
nological modernization lies in modernizing the outdated or obsolete production equip-
ment, whereas the contribution of greenfield investments lies in the fact that they set up
their plants according to the latest technological standards. In addition, the indirect mod-
ernization effects of a privatized company might be more positive because of existing link-
ages with domestic companies. As for the effects of foreign investments on employment,
we might expect them to be more positive in greenfield operations as they create new jobs
by definition. In contrast, privatized companies have to deal with overmanning, resulting in
layoffs in the first place.
1.5 Structure of the study
In this overall introduction, we discussed the legacy of the socialist system and the current
transition process in Hungary as both the occasion and the context of this research, and
how the inherited structures may affect (or form an obstruction to) the effects of FDI on
the modernization of the Hungarian manufacturing industry and the related changes on the
labor market.
The following chapter, chapter 2, covers the theoretical part of this study. Here we apply
theories on internationalization and FDI to the special case of foreign investment in CEE.
Moreover we look at the literature about host-country effects of FDI. As the available body
of literature that deals with the specific context of transition economies is limited, we will
use theories that deal with host-country effects of FDI in developing countries as well as
developed countries and discuss to what extent these theories can be applied to the special
case of FDI in transition economies. These theories are vital for the assumptions on which
the empirical study is based.
Chapter 3 provides a description of FDI in Hungary. It deals with the attractiveness of
Hungary compared to other countries in CEE, the specific features of FDI in Hungary, and
the effects of FDI on the Hungarian national economy (macro data). Especially, we deal
with the geographical distribution of foreign companies and the sectors of investment, of
which the outcomes will be used for the selection of companies for our empirical research.
For the description of FDI in Hungary we use both statistical data and our own database
concerning foreign manufacturing companies in Hungary.
In chapter 4 we present our empirical research. Based on our findings in chapter 3, a
selection is made of the regions and sectors that are central in this study. We render an ac-
count of the samples of both foreign and domestic companies in Hungary, and the research
methodology. Moreover, some basic characteristics of the companies in our survey are pre-
sented.
In the chapters 5, 6 and 7 the empirical findings of this study are presented. Each chap-
ter respectively deals with the following central problem definition:
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I. What are the direct effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the
manufacturing industry in Hungary? Chapter 5.
II. What are the consequences of this modernization on the demand for labor, both in
qualitative and quantitative respects? Chapter 6.
III. What are the indirect effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the
manufacturing industry in Hungary? Chapter 7.
Chapter 5 deals with the modernization of the manufacturing industry. Our focus here is on
technological modernization, that is the modernization of production equipment. We ana-
lyze the contribution of both foreign privatized and greenfield companies to technological
modernization and how this modernization process has taken place. The findings are juxta-
posed with the behavior of domestic Hungarian companies as regards modernization.
Chapter 6 deals with the demand for labor. We look at this demand both in quantitative
and qualitative respects, in relation to the modernization process. The main issues in this
chapter are: layoffs of redundant workers, the creation of new jobs, the demand for skilled
and unskilled labor, vacancies which are difficult to fill, the role of in-house education and
training, recruitment and selection, the effects on labor productivity, and regional dimen-
sions in the demand for labor.
Chapter 7 studies the indirect effects of foreign investments on modernization. These
indirect effects are through the linkages with domestic companies, and the assistance pro-
vided to these domestic companies. We look at the extent of these linkages and the com-
modities this concerned. In addition, we locate the reasons for using domestic suppliers and
subcontractors, and what these linkages mean for the diffusion of modern technologies and
organizational know-how.
In chapter 8, the concluding chapter, the empirical findings of this study will be used in
trying to find an answer to the question whether foreign companies contribute to bridging
the gap between Hungary and Western market economies. Moreover, we elaborate on the
future direction of the Hungarian manufacturing industry in both the CEE and Western
European context, and the role of FDI in this.
NOTES
1 At the time when this research project started, Hungary was by far the most attractive destination for FDI
in CEE, not only per capita, but also in absolute terms. In the course of 1998, Poland surpassed Hungary as
the most attractive destination for FDI in absolute terms. However, per capita invested foreign capital re-
mains higher in Hungary than in any other country in CEE.
2 Privatization is often categorized under the heading of institutional reforms (see for instance The World
Bank, 1996). We choose to categorize privatization separately because it is a central element in the trans-
formation process, and because of the relevance of privatization for this study.
3 The extent of second-economy activities differed largely between sectors. For a more comprehensive over-
view of the second economy in Hungary see also Cséfalvay and Rohn (1991).
4 In this study we use this narrow definition of privatization, unless stated otherwise.
5 In other countries, such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia, privatization is partly through mass
privatization programs, that were set up out of political or social considerations. With mass privatization,
shares of SOEs are distributed for free to the population.
6 Where we referred to the second economy for activities that were not included in the central planning
during the pre-1989 period, activities that lie outside the official economic life in the new market environ-
ment are referred to as black economy activities.
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7 Some socialist countries (for instance the USSR in the 1920s and China in the 1950s) had in fact problems
maintaining permanent full employment because of the large-scale influx of peasants into the towns (Ell-
man, 1989). However, we found no evidence for this with respect to Hungary.
8 However, compared to other socialist countries, female participation rates in Hungary are not very high.
Comparative figures are for instance USSR 96.8%, Bulgaria 93.3%, Czechoslovakia 92.4%.
9 Based on the Educational Testing Service 1992. However, another study found that Hungarian thirteen-
year-olds rank high on the lnowledge of facts, but significantly lower on the integration and application of
knowledge to new situations (Laporte & Schweitzer, 1994).
10 In 1990-91, 75% of the secondary schoolchildren were in vocational or technical streams.
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FDI: theories on internationalization and
the effects on the host economy
2.1 Introduction
Throughout the world foreign direct investment has become more and more important the
last two decades, and has therefore contributed to the internationalization and globalization
of the world economy extensively. According to the World Trade Organization1 total FDI
flows have increased ninefold between 1982 and 1993, whereas world trade of merchandise
and services has only doubled in the same period (De Mello, 1997).
One of the new destinations of FDI is CEE, although FDI inflows have been relatively
modest up till now. However, Hungary has been able to attract a substantial amount of FDI
into its economy since the early days of the transition. In this chapter we lay the theoretical
foundations for FDI in Hungary and examine the effects of FDI on the local economy.
 First we look at theoretical perspectives on international production and discuss its rele-
vance for Hungary (section 2.2). In other words: why would a foreign company locate a
production facility in Hungary. Although we do not examine this question explicitly in the
empirical part of this study, the basics of international production are, in our view, essential
for the interpretation of the findings in this study. It may explain why foreign companies
behave the way they do, why some companies have a larger effect on the host economy
than others, and how investment is related to Hungary’s integration within the world econ-
omy.
In close connection with the theories of international production are the foreign entry
modes (section 2.3). Different motivations and corporate strategies might lead to different
entry modes. The mode of entry of a foreign company is considered the more important in
the case of an investment in Hungary. We argue that the foreign entry mode (that is
through privatization or in greenfield plants) determines the way in which and the extent to
which foreign investments exert their influence on the host economy.
These host country influences are the central theme in this study. First, in section 2.4 we
look at the effects of FDI from a macro perspective. We look at the effects of FDI on eco-
nomic development in the host country and what the effects of FDI are for Hungary’s
place in the international division of labor. Subsequently, sections 2.5 to 2.7 deal with the
effects of FDI from a micro perspective, discussing the three central themes in this research
as presented in the central problem definition in chapter 1:
1. the modernization of production, notably the modernization of production equipment
(section 2.5);
2
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2. the demand for labor, both in quantitative and qualitative respects (section 2.6)
3. the linkages with indigenous firms, and the diffusion of technological and organizational
know-how (section 2.7).
2.2 Internationalization: theoretical perspectives
2.2.1 Market imperfections
Contemporary dynamics and variation in the process of internationalization prevent the
development of an all-embracing theory. Companies have different internationalization
strategies and thus decide to invest in a particular country for entirely different reasons.
However, all foreign direct investments are strongly related to the existence of trade barri-
ers or market imperfections. If these did not exist, it would be possible to confine a firm’s
strategy to the export of goods produced locally, i.e. in the home country. There are two
types of market imperfections: those imposed by government regulations and those occur-
ring naturally (see table 2.1).
Government-imposed market imperfections are mainly intended to protect indigenous
industry from competition by foreign companies. Protection can be achieved by imposing
tariffs or so-called non-tariff barriers. The latter may take the form of quantitative restric-
tions and safety norms, for instance. Investment resulting from government-imposed mar-
ket imperfections is also referred to as tariff jumping. These foreign investments may also
form a threat to indigenous companies, but they offer advantages for the host economy as
well as trade, for instance by creating jobs.
Table 2.1 Reasons for internalization
Natural market imperfections Unnatural market imperfections
Structural (intangible assets) Government-imposed
· e.g. knowledge, know-how · tariffs
· non-tariff barriers
· foreign exchange control
Transaction costs · regulations on FDI
· buyer uncertainty
· difficulty in securing a con-
tract
Source: after Rugman et al. (1985)
Natural market imperfections fall under one of two headings: firm-specific knowledge
(know-how), and transaction costs. The reason for internalization of the latter is fairly
straightforward. Situations in which internalization of transaction costs can be attractive are
mainly related to uncertainty. This may be uncertainty about the market behavior of im-
portant suppliers, uncertainty about the quality of the goods and services to be bought, and
uncertainty about agreements.
The pricing of firm-specific knowledge is a more complicated issue. Caves (1982) refers
to firm-specific knowledge and know-how as intangible assets. Selling intangible assets on
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an arm’s-length market (that is selling them on a regular market under regular market con-
ditions) is highly unfavorable for a company, because (Caves, 1982):
1. Intangible assets are, at least to some degree, public goods. Knowledge can be put to
work elsewhere, with little extra cost. By internalizing intangible assets, an artificial scar-
city is created, through which the asset becomes highly profitable.
2. Transactions in intangibles suffer from impactedness combined with opportunism.
Trade in knowledge is a difficult matter because during negotiations the asset cannot be
revealed entirely. This would mean that a potential buyer would get the information for
free. To avoid risk, a potential buyer would underbid. Selling the asset on an arm’s-length
market is therefore highly unfavorable for a company.
3. One can never be sure how the knowledge will perform when the buyer uses it.
The more pronounced the market imperfections, the more reason a company has to main-
tain full control of its own activities. But the firm may still want to make agreements about
the protection and the use of firm-specific know-how, by means of a licensing contract or a
joint venture. As both options lead to a reduction of uncertainty and therefore lower trans-
action costs, these options might in some cases be favorable as well.
In Hungary (and other CEE countries), both structural and transactional market imper-
fections may be important factors in the decision to invest in these countries. An important
issue on the structural side is the advantage of simply being multinational, with all that it
entails in terms of capital, technology, know-how, management, and network (Hood &
Young, 1994). But a transferable firm-specific advantage need not be related to large size
(Dicken, 1992). Compared to CEE companies, many small and medium-sized firms may
also have some ownership-specific advantages (Dunning, 1988) that are exploitable in these
countries. Internalizing these structural market imperfections is an attractive option for all
companies, also because they can avoid high transaction costs in this way.
These transaction costs in Hungary are high compared to those in Western countries
because of market distortions, especially in the early transition years. Internalization of these
market imperfections is likely to yield significantly lower transaction costs, although some
are at the macro level and not readily internalized (Hood & Young, 1994).
2.2.2 Market orientation versus cost/supply orientation
Up till now we have considered why a firm would engage in foreign direct investment instead
of exports. We have not discussed why a firm would want to internationalize at all. A firm
has to have a reason to invest in a foreign country. Foreign companies locate their opera-
tions in a specific geographical region for one or two major reasons: market orientation or
cost/supply orientation (Dicken, 1992).
Firms open a facility in a particular overseas market to serve that market directly and to
be tuned in to that market. Market potential in Hungary is supposed to be relatively high,
especially in the medium and long term, when the recession has ended and consumer de-
mand has risen. It has to be noted that besides the fairly small Hungarian market, one can
also think of other markets in CEE which can be served from Hungary, where Hungary is
used as a bridgehead for exports or investments in the rest of the region. The extent to
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which this may occur depends not only on the companies themselves, but also on the earlier
mentioned unnatural market imperfections.
Cost/supply orientation of investments in Hungary is strongly related to the availability
of relatively cheap labor in combination with the relatively high level of education. There-
fore it can be attractive for European companies to move labor-intensive production units
to Hungary, in an attempt to improve competitiveness on Western markets. After the fall of
the Berlin Wall, Western Europe obtained its own border region: an area characterized by
cheap labor close to a market with great purchasing power. After all, delivery time and flexi-
bility are decisive factors in competition these days. This means that production or assembly
lines have to be situated close to sales markets. The former CEE countries that border the
EU, including Hungary, are therefore favorable production locations for EU sales markets.
In this, CEE has an advantage over low-cost production sites in South-East Asia.
However, the share of labor in total production costs for many industries has decreased
sharply during the last 30 years. Even if a firm can achieve the same productivity in CEE as
in its home country, its lower unit labor costs may easily be wiped out by other cost disad-
vantages. These other cost disadvantages are considered high in Hungary and CEE, for
instance because of the bureaucracy, mentality of workers, changing regulations and the
extra costs for setting up local production. Labor costs are, however, more important in
labor-intensive industries like the clothing and footwear sector and the automotive industry.
This may explain the relatively high investments in these sectors in CEE.
In fact, in many cases the distinction between market and cost considerations is not clear
because both play a role in the investment. A local production facility in Hungary can for
instance be attractive because it offers a foreign company better knowledge of movements
on the home market and information about (potential) consumers. Because of lower pro-
duction costs in Hungary on the other hand, export to more expensive Western Europe
becomes an attractive option.
Figure 2.1 The product life cycle framework applied to international markets: a US perspective
a Less developped countries.
Source: Dicken (1992)
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The combination of both motives of investment can also be found in the theories of inter-
nationalization of companies by Vernon (1966) and Dunning (1980, 1988). The theory de-
veloped by Vernon (1966) postulates a relation between the product life cycle and interna-
tional trade on the one side and international investments on the other (see figure 2.1).
Vernon developed his theory with reference to the internationalization of American industry
in the postwar period. Nonetheless, elements of his theory can be applied to investments in
CEE. According to Vernon, companies in the first phase of the product life cycle are capa-
ble of serving the global market only from the United States. Such companies lose this
strong export position as products enter later phases of the product life cycle, as the de-
mand outside the United States grows, and protection of firm-specific knowledge becomes
more difficult. During the fifties and sixties, many American companies invested in Europe
to protect their export-based market positions. They did this because, as a product matures,
it can be manufactured on a larger scale and at much lower costs outside the United States.
Hence, according to Vernon’s theory, companies are forced to establish foreign production
plants due to both market and cost considerations.
The distinction or rather the coincidence of market and cost considerations can also be
found in the OLI paradigm of Dunning (1988) explaining foreign direct investments. OLI
stands for Ownership-specific advantages, Location-specific factors, and Internalization-
specific advantages. In fact, this theory posits that it will only be of interest for a firm to
produce in a certain country when the market has something to offer, when a country of-
fers favorable conditions for production, and when it is favorable for a company to per-
form activities under its own control (Wever, 1994)
Ownership-specific advantages correspond roughly to the natural market imperfections
mentioned above which may be structural or transactional in nature. Location-specific fac-
tors are defined by Dunning as ‘those which are available, on the same terms, to all firms
whatever their size and nationality, but which are specific in origin to particular locations
and have to be used in those locations’ (Dunning, 1980). Location-specific factors include
for instance, the abovementioned market potential and factor costs, which are both gener-
ally positive in Hungary’s case. There are, however, also some negative location factors in
Hungary which can cause a company to refrain from investing in the country. In this re-
spect, one can think of political instability, the frequently changing regulations, the bureauc-
racy, and the poor state of communications and physical infrastructure.
Much research has been conducted into the motives of foreign companies to buy or to
set up production facilities in Hungary and other countries in CEE. Although the distinc-
tion between the two considerations is not always absolute, we can conclude that market-
oriented investments are the dominant form in CEE (Dirksen, 1993; Marton, 1993; Van
Rietbergen & Van Hastenberg, 1993; Konings, 1996). Meyer (1998) points out that market
considerations are more often the most important motive for investment, whereas costs
considerations are more often the second motive for investment.
2.3 Foreign market entry modes
We have already referred briefly to the different modes of entry of foreign companies (also
referred to as mode of investment). In fact, companies have a wide range of possibilities for
entering overseas markets, ranging from export entry modes to local production. Table 2.2
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gives an overview of the different ways to enter a foreign market. It is evident that all of the
modes in table 2.2 can be found in Hungary. For example, until the mid-1980s, exports and
the sale of licenses constituted the dominant form of foreign involvement. This was mainly
because legislation concerning FDI and the political situation made direct investment not
very favorable in the pre-1989 period. Historically, however, many of the more substantial
arrangements between foreign investors and governments or enterprises were variants of
category 2f. Investment entry modes have become popular only after the change of system.
Table 2.2 Foreign market entry modes
1. Export entry modes
(a) indirect
(b) direct agent/distributor
(c) direct branch/subsidiary
2. Contractual entry modes
(a) licensing
(b) franchising
(c) management contracts
(d) turnkey contracts
(e) contract manufacturing/international subcontracting
(f) collaboration agreements
3. Investment entry modes
(a) joint venture: new establishment/acquisition
(b) wholly-owned/majority-owned: acquisition
(c) wholly-owned/majority-owned: new establishment (=greenfield)
4. Corporate coalitions and strategic alliances
Source: Hood & Young (1994)
Instead of looking at these entry modes in a static way, a more dynamic approach seems
suitable, especially when considering companies that enter a particular overseas market out
of market considerations. A company may start with indirect exports, then set up a sales
office or appoint a direct agent and finally choose to produce locally. In other words, foreign
companies proceed from market penetration towards production space. This sequence can
also be found in the spatial expansion model of international firms by Håkanson (1979).
It turns out that FDI in Hungary conforms to Håkanson’s model quite well, partly be-
cause of the dominance of market-based investments in Hungary. Besides, the risks attached
to direct investment were considered high during the initial years of the transition. There-
fore, the overnight opening of the market in 1989 has caused many firms to serve the market
initially by way of indirect exports (Van Berendonk, Oostveer & Associates, 1992; Marton,
1993; Van Hastenberg, 1993; Barta, 1994). A local trading office is mostly an expansion of
these indirect export activities (Marton, 1993). In the early years of the transition the bulk of
the ‘investments’ (by number of companies) in Hungary consisted of trade offices. Especially
in the case of Hungary, this option opens up many possibilities. Their function is (or was)
not only to coordinate sales and search for new clients or new markets. The establishment of
a trade office also allows a firm to survey the market, get in touch with potential joint ven-
ture partners, get the feel of the investment climate, and look for possibilities for local pro-
duction. Above all, this behavior shows the careful way in which Western companies set foot
35
in the new market. Later, when the market is considered favorable a company may decide to
produce locally, either by investing in the privatization of SOEs, or by investing in a
greenfield plant.
Of course not all FDI in Hungary fit in with this model. Cost-related investments do not
follow the model by definition, since they do not serve the local market. But these cost-
based investments generally follow a careful investment strategy as well, especially in the
early years of the transition, starting with only a limited investment, and expanding their
activities later. Besides, there are enough examples of market-based investments that did not
start by serving the market through exports. Especially larger multinational companies have
the financial means to take greater risks. When an SOE with a large market share or even a
monopoly in the local market is offered for sale, it might be worthwhile to take the risk by
investing right away ahead of competitors.
In the following we will shortly discuss the investment entry modes of foreign companies
in Hungary. In this discussion a distinction is made between modes of investment that are
related to the privatization of SOEs and greenfield entry modes. This distinction is consid-
ered an important explanatory factor in studying the effects of FDI on the modernization of
production and the demand for labor. The dividing line is whether or not a foreign company
has to deal with the legacy of the socialist system directly. We can distinguish five entry
modes, which will be discussed separately below.
Investment in the privatization of SOEs:
1. Joint venture acquisition
2. Acquisition of an SOE
Greenfield investments:
3. 100% greenfield investment
4. joint venture greenfield investment
5. ‘semi’-greenfield investment (both 100% and as a joint venture)
JOINT VENTURE ACQUISITION
When a foreign company buys only part of an SOE2, we speak of a joint venture acquisi-
tion. The remaining shares mostly stay in state hands, although sometimes they are sold to a
private Hungarian investor. For a long time, investment by way of a joint venture with a
local partner was the only way to invest in Hungary, since FDI was possible from 1972 on-
wards. From the beginning of 1989 (before the change of system) it has become possible
for foreign companies to establish 100% subsidiaries. However, the joint venture remained
the most popular mode of investment and even nowadays, a large share of foreign invest-
ments still consists of joint venture acquisitions.
The popularity of the joint venture investment mode in Hungary, especially in the early
transition years, is due to a number of factors. One policy-related factor is that the govern-
ment was afraid of a clearance sale to foreign companies, turning state monopolies into
foreign-owned monopolies. Therefore, often a foreign company could only buy part of an
SOE. Besides there are a number of reasons why foreign investors enter by way of a joint
venture. A joint venture offers quick access to the market and knowledge about the local
market at limited expense. Especially in the early transition years, the local partner’s knowl-
edge of the market was of great, if not decisive, value (COB/SER, 1993). For that matter, in
many cases the local partner was formerly a trading partner (Van Berendonk, Oostveer &
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Associates, 1992; Van Hastenberg, 1993). Limiting the (financial) risks is another reason for
the choise of a joint venture. A joint venture can give an investor a foothold in the market at
relatively low cost. For multinational companies, Hungary (and CEE) was a market they
could not afford to ignore. However, in the early transition years, the risks attached to in-
vestment were considered high. A joint venture was therefore a suitable option. This also
goes for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) with less financial strength. SMEs are
affected by the ongoing process of internationalization too. Many SMEs have invested in
Hungary, mostly by way of a joint venture. As described earlier, Western SMEs have owner-
ship-specific advantages which can be exploited in these markets. Besides, geographical
proximity is a major consideration to invest in Hungary and not in, for instance, Asia (Vos,
1994). Hungary’s proximity offers logistic advantages for export-based investments. Besides,
it allows better control and management by the parent company over the foreign subsidi-
ary3. And, despite more than 40 years of communism, it entails relatively few cultural differ-
ences.
With the privatization process coming to an end, only a few new joint ventures are estab-
lished. Moreover, there is a tendency of foreign companies to buy out their local joint ven-
ture partners as the risks attached to the investment decrease with the continuing transfor-
mation process, and the local partner is hardly needed4. Often the buyout of the local part-
ner is carried out in stages.
ACQUISITION OF AN SOE
When a foreign investor buys a state-owned company we speak of an acquisition. In this
research we consider at least 80% foreign ownership as a benchmark because sometimes it
is not possible to buy a company for 100% since part of the shares is reserved for the em-
ployees of the company. In practice, however, the foreign investor can act as if he is the
sole owner of the company.
The advantages of a takeover compared to a greenfield investment are that the buyer
obtains production capacity, manpower, market knowledge, a sales market, a distribution
network, and possibly a trade mark. This package facilitates the firm’s entrance to the mar-
ket. Generally speaking, acquisition of an existing company has an advantage over greenfield
investment (Wever, 1994). This seems also to be the case in Hungary. Market knowledge, a
distribution network, and the possibility to enter the market quickly (reducing the risk) seem
to be the most important reasons for buying an existing company in Hungary. Further-
more, by acquiring an existing company, the buyer obtains local staff members. This factor
can be decisive for the success or failure of a company, as shown above in the description
of the joint ventures.
100% GREENFIELD INVESTMENT
This type of investment refers to the case where a foreign company establishes a whole new
plant instead of buying an existing one. This type of company is mainly to be found in the
agglomeration ring around Budapest and in the northwestern counties. Greenfield invest-
ments have gained importance only from 1992 onwards, partly because of legal matters and
partly because of the higher risks attached to this kind of investment.
Often a company only chooses greenfield investment when it is not possible to acquire
an existing company or when there are specific reasons which deter acquisition. With regard
to Hungary, deterrents might include the expense of modernizing an existing factory, a bad
image (which can be a critical issue for service-oriented companies), or because the buyer
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has to guarantee jobs for surplus employees. Of course, there are more creative ways to deal
with redundancy. For instance, surplus employees can be transferred to a greenfield plant,
preferably near the existing company, that produces raw materials, semi-manufactured arti-
cles or packaging materials for the acquired company. This strategy has been used in some
PHILIPS plants in CEE.
For companies that invest in Hungary out of cost considerations, producing only for
exports, these deterrents might outweigh the benefits of acquisition. They have no interest
in the sales markets, distribution channels, local market knowledge and the like that come
along with the acquisition. Therefore, greenfield investments are often companies seeking a
cheap production location for the labor-intensive manufacturing of products or compo-
nents.
JOINT VENTURE GREENFIELD INVESTMENT
In the case where a foreign investor establishes a new plant together with one or more do-
mestic partners, we speak of a joint venture greenfield investment. These domestic partners
can be either private persons, private organizations or SOEs. In this case, as in 100%
greenfields, the company is established in a newly built factory. Only a minor share of FDI
has come by way of joint venture greenfields.
The setting up of a joint venture greenfield instead of a joint venture acquisition might
be motivated by the fact that the joint venture is engaged in an activity which is new for the
local partner, or because the foreign company does not want to be involved with the state.
Moreover, an important motive lies in the fact that a joint venture greenfield does not have
to deal directly with problems related to the legacy of the socialist system, considered an
important independent variable in our research. On the other hand a company has the ad-
vantage of incorporating local knowledge, and reducing the risks attached to the investment.
Some Japanese investments use this strategy, for instance the SUZUKI investment in
Esztergom. They started operations on a former Soviet army base together with ITOCHU
CORPORATION, which is a normal practice when SUZUKI invests abroad, and a small share
of the International Finance Corporation. Initially they started with a 40% share of
AUTÓKONSZERN, a local Hungarian company. The idea behind this is that it is always better
to work together with a local company. Since then the share of AUTÓKONSZERN has de-
creased step by step to zero presently. Most of its shares have been transferred to small
shareholders.
‘SEMI’-GREENFIELD INVESTMENT (JOINT VENTURE OR 100% FOREIGN-OWNED)
As will be shown in chapter 4, where we deal with the entry modes of the foreign compa-
nies in our sample, a number of companies can not be classified under one of the above-
mentioned categories within greenfield entry modes. This concerns companies which set up
a new, previously non-existing company, but utilize an actual existing, but empty factory
instead of building a new one. Looking at the main presupposition in this study, that is
whether or not a foreign company has to deal with the legacy of the socialist system di-
rectly, this type of investment can best be classified as a ‘semi’-greenfield investment. The
difference with an acquisition is that they do not have to cope with existing equipment or
practices. The difference with a greenfield is that these semi-greenfield companies start their
production on existing premises. Most of these companies start as a joint venture, where
the local partner (whether a state company or a private domestic company) provides the
premises of the joint company.
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A nice example is the investment of OPEL. They started as a joint venture with RÁBA, a
producer of engines, trucks, trailers and the like, which was at that time still a state com-
pany. The negotiations already started in the beginning of 1989. At that time investment by
way of a joint venture seemed the best (and only) way. Originally, RÁBA would get 34% of
the shares and OPEL 66%. RÁBA operated a site and factory in Szentgotthard (Vas county)
including infrastructure (road, rail) and power supply, which were unused. Besides this 20%
in kind contribution, RÁBA had to bring in some cash into the joint venture (14%). RÁBA
thought that the state would pay for this, but after the political changes at the end of 1989
the state refused. The government (by means of the State Development Institute) then
stood surety for a $ 20 million cash input during three years, equivalent to the 14% remain-
ing shares. After the three years, OPEL would buy these shares. In practice it was a low in-
terest loan, much cheaper than if they (OPEL) had to borrow on the capital market. So after
three years the joint venture changed into a 80/20% joint venture. By the end of 1994,
OPEL bought out the in kind contribution of RÁBA, changing the plant into a 100% subsidi-
ary of OPEL. So apart from the building, which had to be refurbished to install the produc-
tion line, the company was able to furnish the plant with the most modern technologies.
2.4 Effects of FDI on economic development in the host economy
Before we go into detail on the effects of FDI in Hungary in a micro perspective in the
following sections, this section first provides some general insights on the host-country
effects of FDI. Especially in countries in transition like Hungary, these effects can be sub-
stantial and of major importance for a successful economic transformation. In fact, this has
been one of the considerations for Hungary to adopt a policy that was aimed at attracting
foreign investments into the country. On the other hand overall dominance by foreign
firms is almost certainly undesirable from a host-country viewpoint5. There are real dangers
of becoming a branch plant economy (Dicken, 1998).
In this section we first look at the relation between FDI and the overall economic devel-
opment, and its implications for Hungary’s integration in the world economy and place in
the international division of labor. We take a general look at the effects of FDI on a micro
level and present a framework for the central themes of this research that will be discussed
in sections 2.5 to 2.7.
The literature on the role of FDI in the specific context of transition economies is rather
limited. One of the few authors that offers some possible scenarios is Dunning. Dunning
(1993) refers to three possible models or scenarios of development in CEE and the possible
role of FDI: the developing country model, the reconstruction model and the systemic
model.
The developing country model hypothesizes that CEE countries may develop in line
with industrializing developing countries, notably Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan
and Singapore (ranking from little to substantial FDI inputs). However, one can argue
whether or not the assumptions underlying the developing country model are valid in the
case of transition economies, especially for the more ‘developed’ ones like Hungary. It
could be argued that the centrally-planned economies are maldevelopped, rather than unde-
velopped (Kornai, 1993). The socio-economic situation in most CEE countries was sub-
stantially better than in even the most prosperous developing countries: the population of
Hungary (and of most other CEE countries) was considerably better educated, medically
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cared for, and housed (Dunning, 1993). Moreover, Hungary’s R&D expenditure was com-
paratively high as we saw in the first chapter. In contrast, the commercial, transportation
and communications infrastructure was not much better than many middle-income devel-
oping countries, and its industrial performance was questionable. Nevertheless, the exis-
tence of an extensive industrial sector – though in deep crisis and partly still in state hands –
offers opportunities for supplier linkages and technology diffusion, as the transformation
process proceeds, and indigenous companies adapt to the new situation in their country6.
Besides, investments are not primarily cost-related as is the case in most developing coun-
tries: (1) the majority of foreign investments in Hungary is aimed at exploiting market po-
tential; (2) the relatively favorable education level attracts foreign investors in need of skilled
labor, unlike the developing countries where there is a large pool of unskilled labor. A final
difference with general practice in developing countries that we want to mention here is
that profits are reinvested in Hungary, rather than repatriated to the home country.
The reconstruction model refers to the (re)development path followed by West Germany
and Japan after World War II. This model’s major drawback in terms of its appropriateness
to the specific situation of CEE is that CEE has a much smaller level of technological, or-
ganizational, and management capabilities than was found in West Germany and Japan in
1945. However, according to Ozawa (1994), in many respects, CEE is presently in a position
similar to that of Japan at the end of World War II. Japan’s experiences, in both the public
and the private sectors, are therefore undoubtedly relevant and applicable in many ways to
the challenge now facing CEE. According to Ozawa, Japan has gone through four basic
structural transformations since 1945, ‘a process greatly assisted by the Veblenian advantages
of being a latecomer in industrial development, because Japan has been able to avail itself of
opportunities to trade, interact with, and learn from the advanced West’7. According to
Ozawa, most CEE countries are moving from the second to the third phase: from scale-
based, energy/material-intensive industries, to less resource-intensive and more consumer-
oriented industries. In other words, the future course of CEE lies in shifting from a supply-
push to a demand-pull orientation.
The systemic model combines the more appropriate ingredients of the other two mod-
els. This systemic model suggests that the willingness and ability of foreign investors rests
mainly on the speed and extent to which CEE countries can reorganize both their eco-
nomic and legal systems as well as the ethos of their people.
Each of the three models indicates a different role for FDI. The reconstruction model
and systemic model point to large FDI inflows, the extent to which depends on the nature
of the systemic changes, and the rate and efficiency at which they are introduced. But where
the reconstruction model suggests high inflows from the beginning of the transition process
onwards, the systemic model suggests a much slower initial participation. The FDI inflow in
the developing country model depends on the pattern of economic development, the inte-
gration within the world economy, and the kind of foreign participation it is likely to induce.
Dunning suggests that Hungary, as one of the more developed countries in CEE in
1989, will follow a course more or less in line with the reconstruction model. In terms of
the inflow of FDI in Hungary, which was relatively high from the early years of transition
onwards8, this seems reasonable. We argue that the systemic model could be applied as well.
As one of the exceptions in CEE, the early transition years in Hungary did indeed show
substantial FDI inflows, but the larger investment projects, mainly in greenfield establish-
ments, gained momentum only from 1992 onwards, as large institutional changes were im-
plemented and the political environment was considered more or less stable. A similar
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course of business is presented by De Mello (1997), who argues that higher growth rates
may attract larger FDI inflows. With particular respect to the transition countries in CEE,
Michalak (1993) refers to contradictory objectives for both foreign investors and govern-
ments. For foreign investors political and economic stability is a precondition for invest-
ment. In contrast, one of the objectives of the attraction of FDI is that they may contribute
to the political and economic stability in their countries.
We have already concluded that the socio-economic and political situation in Hungary
differs from that in developing countries. Therefore, the developing country model as pre-
sented by Dunning would be less applicable to the specific case of Hungary. This develop-
ing country model refers to what is known as the modernization school in the literature on
the effects of FDI in developing countries. The classical modernization perspective argues
that export of capital to underdeveloped countries promotes economic growth by creating
industries, transferring technology, and fostering a ‘modern’ perspective in the local popu-
lation (Kentor, 1998). It therefore assumes that underdeveloped regions will follow the
same path of development trodden by advanced regions. Next to the modernization school,
a second, contrasting, line of thought has emerged, which is known as the dependency the-
ory. The dependency theory states that an economy controlled by foreign interest would
not develop organically. This means that linkages would not emerge spontaneously, profits
are exported, income inequality would grow and the economy would stagnate. Besides,
more radical movements within the dependence school, that based their ideas on the Wal-
lerstein world-system theory of the new left, argue that developing countries might opt for
discouraging development themselves (Farkas, 1997). They see technical dependence as a
means of world economic integration.
Kimbell compared the conclusions of the two schools with the effects of capital invest-
ment in Hungary (Farkas, 1997). He concluded that both theories are one-sided. Foreign
capital damages the potency of development and modernization by creating competitors for
domestic production. On the other hand, Hungary cannot isolate itself from the world
economy. The latter is unarguably true, but there are objections to the former argument as
well. After all, the enhancement of competition might be considered as one of the positive
contributions of FDI in the transition process.
Thus far we have only discussed the impact of FDI on overall economic development
and integration in the world economy. We have not yet discussed the effects of FDI. A lot
of empirical research on the effects of FDI on economic development in host economies
has been conducted. They come up with a wide range of possible positive effects of foreign
investment. Malecki (1997) identifies positive development effects in six areas:
1. linkages (backward and forward);
2. foreign currency earnings, reflecting higher added value retained in the host economy;
3. upgrading of personnel, including managers, technicians and skilled personnel;
4. technology transfer (‘genuine’ technology, as opposed to ‘mere ‘technology relocation’’);
5. conditions of work (relative to those in the rest of the host society);
6. environmental impacts.
Hungary has made great strides in attracting FDI. Foreign direct investment is expected to
play an important role in the new economic policy of Hungary, as well as the other former
centrally-planned economies. Although the aims may vary from country to country, Welge
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and Holtbrügge (1993; see also Khan, 1997) identify the following four objectives for the
attraction of FDI in the former socialist countries in CEE:
1. the improvement of the foreign exchange position through expanding export-oriented
industries and import substitution;
2. the achievement of spin-off effects through the modernization and restructuring of the
host economy by importing capital and technology and introducing market-oriented
management techniques in domestic companies;
3. the improvement of the quality and quantity of raw materials, manufactured products,
consumer goods and services for the domestic market;
4. the creation of new jobs, improved productivity, training for host country’s technical and
managerial personnel and the transformation of the country’s employment structure.
All four objectives are central elements in the transition towards a market-based economy.
In contributing to these developments, FDI assist in speeding the transition and fostering
economic recovery (UNCTAD, 1994). The (indirect) contribution of FDI to the transition
to a market economy lies in exerting pressures for institution building, privatization and
competition. Besides, all transition economies have an intense need for investment (Szanyi,
1997). The transition process, and more specifically the necessary modernization of the
production structure, requires large capital imputs. Because of the lack of indigenous capital,
foreign investments are an important source of capital.
However, the calculation of effects of foreign direct investments on the host economy is
fraught with difficulties, because it is a counterfactual situation. Moreover, the impact of
FDI on host economies is a dynamic process, which involves not only direct effects but
also indirect (multiplier) effects. Nevertheless, it is important to study these processes, as is
also acknowledged by Smith and Ferenèiková (1998)9.
The extent to which a foreign investor exerts influences on these four elements of the
host economy depends on both the nature of the foreign-controlled plant and the nature of
the host economy (Dicken, 1998). The former depends on the mode of entry, the motives
for investment, and the operational attributes of the plant. The latter is defined by for in-
stance the level of economic development, the size of the economy, technological base, and
social, political and cultural characteristics.
The following subsections provide for a theoretical discussion on three of the above-
mentioned areas in which the contribution of FDI is expected to be of great importance.
Recapitulating the problem definition presented in Chapter 1, we can divide it into three
parts:
I. What are the direct effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the
manufacturing industry in Hungary? (section 2.5)
II. What are the consequences of this modernization on the demand for labor, both in
qualitative and quantitative respects? (section 2.6)
III. What are the indirect effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the
manufacturing industry in Hungary? (section 2.7)
A schematic presentation of the different effects of FDI on the Hungarian local economy
and their interrelation, discussed below in sections 2.5 to 2.7, is presented in figure 2.2. The
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figure shows the three central elements in our problem definition in the context of the eco-
nomic transition and Hungary’s integration process in the world economy.
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Figure 2.2 Host-country effects of FDI in Hungary; a conceptual framework
2.5 Modernization of production
This section deals with the direct effects of FDI on the modernization of production, i.e.,
the modernization taking place inside the foreign-owned manufacturing facilities in Hungary
(part I of the central problem definition and figure 2.2). Although one might have a fairly
good picture of what ‘modernization’ refers to when related to foreign direct investments in
the manufacturing industry in Hungary, it is often not defined in the literature concerning
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the consequences of FDI in transition economies. Besides, modernization and FDI are
often treated as synonyms. Moreover, where some authors speak about modernization,
others (mainly economists) use the term (enterprise) restructuring to describe seemingly
similar processes.
One of the few definitions of (enterprise) restructuring which refers to the specific situa-
tion in CEE is given by Carlin et al. (1994). They define the term restructuring in a broad
way, to refer to actions taken to change the structure of the enterprise along the following
four dimensions:
1. internal organization (e.g., unbundling, shedding social assets);
2. employment (e.g., labor shedding, wage differentiation);
3. output (e.g., marketing, product mix);
4. investment (e.g., in wholesale networks, capital equipment).
In their case-study review, the authors refer to a company as ‘restructuring’ if it is under-
taking actions in the abovementioned fields which appear to be broadly consistent with the
development of a competitive market economy.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 1995) discriminates
between different ‘types’ of restructuring. Reactive restructuring is a reaction to the hardening
of budget constraints and is most clearly reflected in the form of labor shedding and real
wage cuts. Strategic restructuring refers to a change in export orientation, changes in the mix of
products and changes in management structures. Finally, deep restructuring generally involves
new investment that can deliver large improvements in enterprise behavior and growth in
the long run. This also involves the investment in new technology. Szalavetz (1996) makes a
distinction between defensive and offensive restructuring. The main difference between
both strategies is that defensive restructuring has a static and once-and-for-all character,
whereas offensive restructuring is dynamic as it leads to continuous changes and adaptations
to the market environment. Moreover, as opposed to the former, in the latter, the mod-
ernization of capital equipment has high priority.
As there is no proper definition of modernization of production in the literature, we
propose the following definition. With modernization of production we refer to:
any actions taken to bring about technological and organizational changes in a plant that lead to a situa-
tion that is more in line with that known in Western companies, in order to become competitive by inter-
national standards.
These technological changes refer to production technology and production equipment.
The organizational changes refer to changes in the organization of labor, the organization
of production, accountancy (finance), internal organization (including the introduction of
new departments like logistics, marketing, sales etc.), computerization/automation of pro-
duction and administration, etc.
Our above definition of modernization of production is more far-reaching than that of
enterprise restructuring. After all, enterprise restructuring does not by definition involve
major adaptations in the corporate organization and investment in new more modern tech-
nology. Because of the far-reaching character of the many changes that are required, we
prefer using the term modernization of production in this study, rather than enterprise re-
structuring.
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Several authors have referred to Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction when
dealing with modernization of production, the destruction of institutional structures in
post-socialist countries and the collapse in output (see for instance Barta et al., 1997; Stark,
1993). But destruction and creation in Hungary (and other CEE countries) is on a much
larger scale than Schumpeter ever envisaged (Barta et al., 1997). However, according to
Swaan (1996) the processes now taking place in CEE, differ fundamentally from the ideas
of Schumpeter and creative destruction witnessed in developed countries. In CEE, the de-
struction of inefficient state enterprises is only partly related to the entry of new ones. It is
much more closely related to the disintegration of the institutional structure in which they
used to operate. As a consequence, destruction is not necessarily related to efficiency.
Much more than in developed countries, the entry mode of foreign investments in Hun-
gary is expected to be a crucial factor in modernization, as is also stated by Farkas (1997).
As greenfield investments start from scratch, foreign owners can fit out and organize the
plant according to their own specification, using the latest technological and organizational
innovations. They are expected to organize their facilities like their plants in other parts of
the world, apply Western accountancy standards, and strive for flexibility in their organiza-
tion and production output. Moreover, they might apply leading edge technology, although
this need not always be the case. It might be suggested that a great deal of the investments
in Hungary is the result of a relocation of production capacity from a Western country to-
wards low-labor-cost Hungary. In this case, the investment might induce a physical transfer
of production equipment as well. Therefore, not all the greenfield investments might use
leading edge technology in their Hungarian plants10. Indeed, greenfield companies have to
cope with the legacy of the socialist system as well, though to a much lesser extent than
privatized companies. The legacy of the past has only an indirect influence on greenfield
investments, by way of bureaucracy, the direction and level of education, and the quality of
local suppliers.
Privatized companies have to cope with the inherited structures directly. This includes
largely obsolete production equipment, old or deviant technological standards, overman-
ning, personnel with limited range of skills, low productivity, long hierarchical lines and top-
heavy management, inflexible production methods, incompetent management, old prac-
tices, incorporated structures and the like. It goes without saying that it is impossible to
modernize all departments of the company at once. For instance, Kiss (1997) found that in
the Hungarian food and beverages industry, companies generally first started to reorganize
accounting and management systems, computerize the management of stocks and materials,
and modernize handling. The second step is to modernize production equipment, by ap-
plying automation and computer technology and introducing production technologies new
to Hungarians. This finding shows clearly that modernization of production is a dynamic
process, rather than a static given.
All the elements of change presented in our definition of modernization above are im-
portant in the process of economic transition towards a market economy, as is currently
taking place in Hungary. But it seems valid to conclude that it is impossible to investigate all
the elements of production modernization in a single study. Especially, since in this re-
search, the study of modernization of production in foreign-owned companies is not only a
goal in itself, but also serves as an explanatory factor in the changes taking place with re-
spect to the demand for labor. Moreover, we want to shed light on the diffusion of this
modernization towards indigenous companies as well.
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Therefore we choose to restrict the part of our research on modernization to techno-
logical modernization. This does not mean, however, that organizational modernization is
neglected in our research. The organizational changes will be dealt with indirectly, in the
part of this research on labor, and, to a lesser extent, in the part about linkages with domes-
tic companies. Moreover, there is no way that technological modernization can pay off,
with the simultaneous implementation of proper organizational changes (Jacobs, 1998).
Technological modernization is one of the main challenges of the Hungarian manufac-
turing industry and therefore often referred to as one of the major positive contributions of
FDI in Hungary and CEE. As we referred to already in the first chapter, the technological
backlog with Western countries was one of the outcomes of forty years of central planning.
For the recovery of the Hungarian economy and the successful integration within the world
economy, technological modernization is a prerequisite. Transfer of technology by means
of FDI may take place in different forms. According to Witkowska (1997), this may take
place:
1. in an embodied form, that is in the form of goods which are imported by foreign inves-
tors to the host country;
2. in the form of intangible assets if technology is a free good in the relations between the
parent company and its subsidiary;
3. through the human factor in the form of know-how when the foreign investor brings
specialists from abroad to carry out the investment project and to manage the firm.
FDI has traditionally been one of the most important channels of technology transfer as it
involves the physical relocation of entire production systems, combined in a single package
of capital goods and a number of the forms of disembodied technology11. Transfer of tech-
nology in CEE may take place in all of the abovementioned ways. In our empirical research
concerning technological modernization in chapter 5, however, we restrict ourselves to the
modernization of production equipment as this is the core element of the transfer of tech-
nology. Often, the modernization of production equipment is accompanied by a transfer by
means of intangible assets and through the human factor. We will examine the latter partly
in chapter 6, which deals with the demand for labor.
Because of the totally different starting conditions, it might be expected that in the case
of privatized companies, the contribution to the modernization of production differs largely
from that in greenfield investments. Where in greenfield plants the contribution to the
technological modernization seems to coincide with the investment as such, in privatized
companies the contribution to the technological modernization refers to a more dynamic
process. Often not all obsolete machinery will be replaced with modern ones all at once.
The foreign companies where all production equipment is replaced by new equipment
shortly after the takeover in one single move are also referred to as brownfield investments
(Meyer, 1998)12. So, actually, they only use the building and the brand names of the acquired
company13.
This process of technological modernization might differ between companies active in
different sectors. For instance, modernization in labor-intensive industries might be lower,
than in capital-intensive industries. Taking into account the low wages in Hungary, the re-
turns on investment in more modern machinery might be a hindrance to modernization in
labor-intensive industries. In addition, the low labor costs in Hungary have a negative effect
on the time of return on investments in automation, which might keep the foreign owner
47
from investing in the automation of some parts of the production. This was for instance
found by Smith and Ferenèiková (1998) in the VOLKSWAGEN auto-assembly plant in Brati-
slava (Slovak Republic), and by Farkas (1997) for assembly plants in Hungary. Considering
that there might be differences between companies in the level of technological moderniza-
tion and the speed at which the modernization process is taking place, their motives for
modernization probably differ as well.
Besides, technological modernization is a relative variable. Not all investment in new
technology and machinery might be leading edge technology. One might also expect foreign
investors to invest in used machinery from Western subsidiaries. This goes for both
greenfield and privatized operations. The crucial point here is that what leads to moderni-
zation of production equipment in one firm may not in another. There might be large dif-
ferences between different SOEs as to the ‘modernity’ of the installed machinery at the
time when the foreign partner invests in the company. Hence, we asked the companies
whether the newly invested technology was new for the firm, the industry, the region, Hun-
gary, or international standards (see also Kleinknecht, 1996; Brouwer, 1997).
Nevertheless, foreign capital has been especially attracted to industries where the tech-
nological standard is higher than the Hungarian average (Kiss, 1997). Therefore, it is im-
portant to take into account this point of reference as well. Hence, in the empirical research
the companies were asked to classify their production equipment ranging from totally ob-
solete (archaic) to state-of-the-art, both at time of entry and at present. This is also the con-
sideration for incorporating domestically owned firms in our study. By doing so, moderni-
zation can not only be studied relative to the situation in the initial phase of investment in
foreign companies, but also relative to the developments taking place in domestic compa-
nies. In other words, we can put the technological modernization in foreign companies in
perspective.
These observations and assumptions have resulted in the following three research questions
concerning (technological) modernization of production within the company:
1. To what extent do foreign and domestic companies contribute to the technological
modernization of the Hungarian manufacturing industry?
2. What are the motives for technological modernization, how is the modernization proc-
ess taking place, and what are the plans for future investments?
3. Is there a difference in modernization between companies active in different sectors and
companies located in different regions?
2.6 FDI and the demand for labor
This section deals with the changes with respect to labor, in relation with the modernization
of production, that is the second part of the central problem definition. Our main focus is
on foreign companies. Although we restricted ourselves in the preceding section to tech-
nological modernization, this section on labor is related to both technological and organiza-
tional modernization (see also II of figure 2.2).
The quantitative and qualitative changes on the labor market are both an inevitable out-
come of the transition, as well as a precondition for a successful transition. Both aspects are
central in the modernization process of companies (see also Szanyi, 1997). We will discuss
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the quantitative and qualitative demand for labor separately in sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 re-
spectively.
2.6.1 FDI and the quantitative effects on labor (employment)
The quantitative effects of FDI are of great social importance. First, there is the steep rise
in unemployment in Hungary, as one of the tragic outcomes of the 1989 change of system.
In the course of the first six years of the transition a quarter of all jobs have been lost (1.4
million) as the job market continues to contract (Barta et al., 1997), especially the manufac-
turing sector – the scope of this study – has been hard hit by the loss in employment. Sec-
ond, the impact of FDI on employment in absolute terms is considerable, as more than
20% of Hungary’s working population is employed at firms with foreign capital participa-
tion14.
Table 2.3 The range of potential effects
Direct Indirect
Area of impact Positive Negative Positive Negative
Quantity Adds to net capital and
creates jobs in ex-
panding industries.
Foreign direct invest-
ment through acquisi-
tion may result in
rationalization and job
loss.
Creates jobs
through forward
and backward link-
ages and multiplier
effects in local
economy.
Reliance on imports
or displacements of
existing firms results
in job loss.
Quality Pays higher wages and
has higher productiv-
ity.
Introduces practices
in, e.g., hiring and
promotion that are
considered undesir-
able.
Spill-over of ‘best
practice’ work or-
ganization to do-
mestic firms.
Erodes wage levels
as domestic firms
try to compete.
Location Adds new and perhaps
better jobs to areas
with high unemploy-
ment.
Crowds already con-
gested urban areas and
worsens regional
imbalances.
Encourages migra-
tion of supplier
firms to areas with
available labor sup-
ply.
Displaces local
producers, adding to
regional unemploy-
ment, if foreign
affiliates substitute
for local production
or rely on imports.
Source: UNCTAD (1994)
The impact of FDI on local employment is frequently regarded as being the most impor-
tant potential impact of all (Dicken et al., 1994). Foreign companies do not only create jobs
directly inside their own foreign plants, but also indirectly through forward and backward
linkages and multiplier effects in the local economy (see table 2.3). On the other hand, for-
eign firms might push indigenous firms out of the market through their more efficient pro-
duction methods, access to cheaper sourcing and because they can hold out longer due to
better access to capital. Hence, the net creation of jobs by foreign firms can be defined as
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the number of jobs created directly and indirectly minus the number of jobs displaced in
indigenous enterprises (Dicken, 1998).
In this research, however, we restrict ourselves to the direct employment effects of FDI.
First of all because it seems impossible to determine the net employment effects, for rea-
sons that were mentioned in section 2.4, and second, because we study them in relation to
the modernization process inside the foreign companies.
The literature on the impacts of FDI on host country employment is substantial. How-
ever, most of the studies treat FDI as a homogeneous entity. In a recent study on the im-
pact of FDI in the USA, Pigozzi and Bagchi-Sen (1995) concluded that the impact is at least
specific to entry mode. Generally, the impact on employment of acquisitions is not positive,
unlike greenfield investments that tend to generate more positive effects.
A similar assumption is made in this study. But we expect the differences between acqui-
sitions and greenfields to be even more pronounced in the case of Hungary than FDI in
more developed countries. Foreign companies that invested in the privatization of SOEs,
by acquiring part or whole of an SOE, have to cope with overmanning at the start of their
operations (see chapter 1). Labor shedding, as a result of organizational modernization, is
expected to be one of the first measures of the foreign management. This tendency is
borne out by a number of studies on FDI in Hungary (see for instance, Barta, 1994; Kiss,
1997; Welge & Holtbrugge, 1993). For instance at the Hungarian light bulb manufacturer
TUNGSRAM, employment fell from 17,000 to 13,000 in the year following the acquisition by
GENERAL ELECTRIC. Currently, the company’s staff remains at 10,000 employees.
In order to limit the effects of employment restructuring, some privatization contracts
contain employment obligations to preserve employment levels or to decrease them only
gradually. However, Kiss (1997) found penalty clauses in only 270 out of 2,000 privatization
contracts in the food and beverages industry. A different situation occurs when a foreign
investor buys only part of an SOE, that results in a joint venture with the state. As Carlin et
al. (1994) show when referring to a Hungarian case study, the joint venture route allows the
selection of the best employees from the SOE without the burden of layoffs or debts. In
the same manner some pre-privatization restructuring occurred in some SOEs (including
labor shedding), in order to get a better price for the company on privatization.
Although a negative effect on employment can be found in developed countries as well,
one wonders whether foreign investors in Hungary are to be fully blamed for firing redun-
dant employees when that surplus was caused by the artificial full employment inherited
from the socialist system. The layoffs are, in fact, a delayed outcome of the socialist system,
rather than the result of the foreign investors’ policy. In many cases, selling the company to
a foreign investor might have saved jobs for the remaining employees.
This legacy of the socialist system might not be the whole explanation for the negative
employment effects at privatized companies. As we concluded in the preceding section we
expect to find technological modernization in the foreign privatized companies. The effects
of FDI on employment are not only related to overmanning, but also to the introduction of
new, more modern equipment (Kiss, 1997). Therefore, we would expect to find a relation
between technological modernization and employment. After all, more modern equipment
is generally more automated with higher output, also known as the job-killer hypothesis
(Ewers et al., 1990). This will exert a negative effect on employment, assuming constant
output levels. But here again, we question whether the new foreign owners are to be blamed
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for this, since the transfer of modern technologies and equipment is one of the reasons why
the Hungarian government attracts foreign investors.
Consider, on the other hand, the case of a greenfield investment. The effects on em-
ployment are clearly positive, since the principals start from scratch and set up a new com-
pany. Some major new employers in Hungary are MAGYAR SUZUKI (1,400 employees),
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES (1,600), IBM (3,000), OPEL (930), and FORD (1,190). However,
greenfield companies generally tend to carry out cautious investment strategies in Hungary.
After the initial (rather small) investment, many greenfield firms make additional invest-
ments leading to job creation. This somewhat cautious investment strategy is related to the
greater risks connected to greenfield investments15. These risks are considered relatively
high in Hungary as opposed to investments in developed countries.
Greenfield companies are expected to utilize modern or even state-of-the-art technolo-
gies. This modern equipment often stands for capital-intensive production, as the degree of
automation is high. Especially the introduction of computer-aided technologies has a nega-
tive effect on job creation and/or employment. On the other hand one can argue that the
favorable labor costs are one of the comparative advantages of Hungary, indicating that
Hungary would attract companies in sectors that are characterized by labor-intensive pro-
duction processes, thus exerting a more positive effect on the creation of jobs.
2.6.2 FDI and the qualitative effects on labor
Where the quantitative effects of FDI on labor are important from a socio-political point of
view, the qualitative effects are of vital importance for the transition process taking place.
Next to modernization of industrial production, this transition process leads to a shift
within manufacturing industries and the emergence of a services sector. In response, there
will be a shift in the qualitative demand for labor, which in turn has implications for the
work ethic, vocational training, and education in general. The transformation of the labor
market is thus a lengthy process. Along with our empirical study, this section elaborates on
some aspects of this process.
We examine the qualitative aspects of the transformations on the labor market by look-
ing at the changes in the demand for labor within the companies studied, and the con-
comitant problems. Besides, we relate the changes in the qualification structure within both
foreign and domestic companies in Hungary to the technological modernization studied in
chapter 5. We suggest that the in-depth character of our study – in which we relate the de-
velopments concerning labor to other company characteristics – sheds an interesting light
on the transformation of the labor market. For a comprehensive study of the transforma-
tion of the labor market, looking at a supply side, we refer to Dorenbos (1999). Specifically,
we deal with the kind of labor foreign companies are looking for (skilled and unskilled la-
bor), the shortage of people with specific education or certain qualifications, the role of in-
house education and on-the-job training, and the recruitment policy and selection criteria
used for hiring employees.
THE DEMAND FOR SKILLED AND UNSKILLED LABOR
FDI is expected to play an important role in the transformation of the labor market. The
extent of this transformation depends largely on Hungary’s place in the international divi-
sion of labor. Does Hungary only attract companies that are looking for cheap, unskilled
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labor? Or does the relatively well-educated workforce play a role as well? The former would
eventually lead to an unbalanced division of labor. Skilled work would increasingly be con-
centrated in certain (Western) European locations, while CEE (including Hungary) would
become centers of routine, non-skilled work (Penn & Sleightholme, 1995). In that event,
foreign companies would have short-term strategies. The latter would lead to a much more
positive situation. Foreign companies’ contribution to the economic transformation in gen-
eral and the modernization of production in particular would be much greater. Moreover,
foreign companies would work out more long-term strategies.
The motives for investment form a starting point from which to study the effects on
worker qualifications. While discussing the motives for FDI above, we found that foreign
companies locate their facilities in a specific geographical region for one of two major rea-
sons (or both): market orientation and cost/supply orientation. It seems valid to conclude
that while looking at the demand for skilled or unskilled labor and its implications for the
European division of labor, only companies that invested because of the low labor costs are
of interest. The central question here is whether foreign companies only seek cheap unskilled
labor, or look for cheap skilled labor? Of course this question will have different outcomes
for different sectors, or may even differ within sectors.
The above treats the skilled/unskilled issue from a more or less static viewpoint. But it
might be interesting, especially in the light of the modernization process under study, to
look at the changes in the relative shares of unskilled and skilled labor in foreign companies.
The introduction of modern technologies might require a higher or differently qualified
workforce. Moreover, organizational changes, like the increase of the flexibility of the or-
ganization and the introduction of teamwork, might lead to the demand for higher qualified
staff. The changing demand for labor as a result of both technological and organizational
changes might be dealt with in two different ways: (1) a company may decide to fire un-
skilled workers and hire new skilled personnel; (2) a company may decide to train the exist-
ing staff. We will deal with in-house training in more detail below.
LABOR SHORTAGE
Obviously, a change in economic orientation such as what Hungary is experiencing cur-
rently leads to a different demand for labor. Especially in foreign enterprises, one might
expect the changes to take place at a much faster pace, than what the education system in
Hungary can cater for. This might lead to vacancies that are hard to fill. In this study we
consider these hard to fill vacancies as one of the indicators for the changing demand for
labor in a qualitative respect.
These shortages for certain types of qualified labor might indeed be a problem for for-
eign companies, especially since foreign companies tend to be highly geographically con-
centrated (see chapter 3) and workers geographically not very mobile. Moreover, creaming
off qualified workers from domestic companies is becoming more and more of a problem,
as many have left the state sector to work for foreign companies. These shortages might be
either among the skilled manual workers and management positions. Where the first is re-
lated to the technological modernization, the second relates to changes in the organization
of the company. These shortages in managerial positions might be an indication of the or-
ganizational modernization.
TRAINING
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Above, we already referred to the fact that the quality of the labor force in Hungary is an
attraction to foreign investors (Csáki et al., 1996). But we also mentioned that in-house
training of shop-floor and managerial personnel is one of the objectives of the Hungarian
government to attract FDI. Indeed, the relatively high education level of the Hungarian
workforce refers to the base educational level, especially in the technical professions. How-
ever, the introduction of new, more modern technologies requires new skills. Besides, or-
ganizational changes as a result of the introduction of Western management techniques will
demand different, often previously non-existing, skills from both shop-floor and white-
collar workers. Thus a change in work ethics is necessary. It might be expected that these
changes in foreign-owned companies take place at a much faster pace than adaptations in
the education system in Hungary. Therefore, the extent of in-house education and on-the-
job training is expected to be high in foreign-owned companies. In fact, most FDI in CEE
introduced ambitious training programs (Svetlièiè & Rojec, 1994). Between 50% and 100%
of the foreign companies in different CEE countries train their employees in the host
country. Moreover, companies that train employees abroad range from 25-79%, depending
on the country concerned. Let us now briefly go into the three different ‘areas’ of training,
that is, technology-related, organization-related and work ethics-related.
In general, training in foreign-owned companies, and mainly transnational corporations
(TNCs) is closely related to the transfer of technology, and the introduction of computer-
aided technologies (UNCTAD, 1994; Ewers et al., 1990; De Mello, 1997). The UNCTAD
report refers to the transfer of soft technologies in this respect. In general, workers are not
familiar with modern equipment such as CNC machine tools, lasers, or with production
logistics (Welge & Holtbrugge, 1993)16. For instance Farkas (1997) found that THYSSEN has
not found it easy to recruit staff skilled in operating CNC equipment for their plant in Hun-
gary. So, along with the modernization of production equipment in foreign privatized com-
panies, workers have to be trained in order to operate the equipment. Even when a com-
pany turns to the labor market, it is very hard to find employees with the required skills.
This also holds for greenfield investments, especially when they are in sectors that were
previously not found in Hungary. Most of the training of shop-floor workers will be on-
the-job, either in Hungary, or abroad at other subsidiaries of the firm.
Organization-related training refers to training that is addressed to the organizational
modernization in foreign-owned companies. Organization-related training refers to both
training of people in management positions, and training of shop-floor workers, in order to
bring about the required skills to operate in more flexible organizations and additional skills
for teamwork.
The problem of finding suitably qualified managers for their projects in CEE has been
identified by Western companies as a main factor preventing the speedy and effective im-
plementation of their business plans in CEE (Welge & Holtbrugge, 1993). However, unlike
the situation in developing countries, Western investors face no shortage of managers in
Hungary. What is lacking, however, is particular skills (Csáki et al., 1996). First, these con-
cern certain skills that were absent during the socialist era (for instance marketing and sales,
logistics). Second, the large majority of managers are accustomed to orthodox management
techniques. Only a few managers in foreign trade organizations, firms with foreign trade
rights or science-based cooperatives have sufficient knowledge of Western management
techniques. Management training involves imparting the required management skills. Or in
the terminology of Vaessen (1993): by taking the training of people for management posi-
tions upon themselves, foreign companies can immunize themselves against inadequacies or
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deficiencies of the external labor supply. Often, mainly within the larger multinational com-
panies, this training also includes on-the-job training in Western subsidiaries, as application-
oriented knowledge is especially needed and since they have no experience or training of
how to run a business in a competitive market environment (Welge & Holtbrugge, 1993).
Because of the acute shortages of suitable managers, Western companies have used expatri-
ates and biculturally qualified staff17 to a large extent in the early transition years. However,
expatriates are very expensive, and the pool of biculturally qualified staff is not inexhausti-
ble.
Training that is addressed to bring about the required skills in order to function in a
more flexible working environment is conducted for both shop-floor workers and people in
management positions. In international business it has become more and more important
for a firm to be able to react to changes in the company’s environment quickly (consumer
demand, consumers preferences etc.), and to keep stocks on a low level. This requires mul-
tiple skills of employees as they are expected to work in flexible teams. Training to acquire
these multiple skills tends to be relatively firm-specific and is performed mostly on-the-job
(Oman, 1994). So, human resources play a crucial role in flexible organizations. A compli-
cating factor in the case of Hungary is that, probably due to the past, Hungarians are unfa-
miliar with co-operation in teams (Dander, 1993). So before training employees in multiple
skills, employees first have to get acquainted with the concept of teamwork.
A third area of training that can be identified in the case of Hungary is related to chang-
ing work ethics and attitude of workers. To begin with, morale at work was terribly low in
centrally-planned CEE. Welge and Holtbrugge (1993) refer to three main sets of factors
that can explain work outcomes and job dissatisfaction: (1) macro-environmental factors,
for example obsolete central planning, waste and misallocation of human resources, and the
counterproductive wage system; (2) micro-environmental factors, for example technological
backwardness of machines and tools, discontinuities of the production process because of
missing supplies, faulty work organization, low workers’ participation; and (3) intra-personal
factors, for example lack of work ethics, low state or the misconceived nature of training, or
even passive attitudes towards work. Training of employees is one of the possible measures
foreign companies use to increase workers’ motivation and their commitment to the com-
pany.
Closely related to the work ethics in particular and training in general is the issue of tacit
or uncodified knowledge, that is hardly transferable unconscious knowledge. Swaan (1995)
argues that the skills that are lacking in former socialist economies are exactly the ones that
have developed in Western market economies in the form of tacit knowledge. This low
level of tacit knowledge is compensated in Hungary, as one of the more developed socialist
countries, by a relatively high level of codified knowledge, that is work/skill-related, techni-
cal knowledge. Swaan has pointed out that a lot of education in foreign companies is geared
to matters that employees are already acquainted with. This is because companies perceive
workers’ low level of skills as a lack of codified knowledge. However, workers’ biggest de-
fect is a lack of tacit knowledge. Of course it is very difficult to test that type of knowledge
empirically. Foreign investments in Hungary play a major role in transmitting tacit knowl-
edge, first and foremost out of self-interest, since it might be a decisive factor in exploiting a
company’s profitability.
The costs of training staff are often referred to as sunk costs. Sunk costs can be defined
as those costs that do not vary with output (unlike variable costs) and do not vary directly
with scale (unlike fixed costs). Hence, sunk costs represent a non-recoverable commitment
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to production in an industry (Clark & Wringley, 1997; Meyer, 1996). Clark and Wringley
refer to the costs of training as setup sunk costs18. One might argue that sunk costs attached
to an investment in Hungary are relatively high because of considerable training efforts.
Here we can link up with our earlier discussion where we related the demand for skilled and
unskilled labor to the short and long term strategies of FDI in Hungary. We concluded that
branch plants that mainly seek cheap, but also skilled labor are expected to carry out more
long term strategies in Hungary. The irrecoverable costs of training their staff in case of sale
or relocation of the subsidiary, provides an extra argument to support that conclusion.
RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION
In general, foreign companies tend to be very careful in selecting new employees (Dicken,
1998). This observation might be especially applicable to Hungary, where the economic
environment and related requirements of employees are rapidly changing. Employees’ value
in terms of output and value added have become more important with the creation of a
competitive market environment. Workers react differently to these changes, both with
respect to codified skills and uncodified tacit knowledge. Hence, the recruitment and selec-
tion of new employees form interesting objects of study in transition economies.
Like everywhere else, foreign companies in Hungary tend to pay higher wages than in-
digenous companies. Therefore they may well cream off workers from domestic firms and
possibly threaten their survival, a tendency that can be found in foreign subsidiaries all over
the world (Dicken, 1998). We do not expect our own research in Hungary to be any differ-
ent. First because of the large differences in the supply of labor, and the general shortage of
specialists and highly motivated people, and second, because foreign companies pay higher
wages, offer better career prospects and have a good image as employer. Earlier research
has come up with results that verify a brain drain of skilled labor from SOEs to foreign
companies (Carlin et al., 1994; Welge & Holtbrugge, 1993). Welge and Holtbrugge also
found indications that a large number of employees in foreign companies do not come
from SOEs, but from the second economy. The brain drain is thus compensated by a more
efficient use of the domestic intellectual potential. These findings indicate that the creation
of job opportunities in foreign companies might not have a (direct) positive effect on the
decrease of unemployment in Hungary.
The selection criteria for new employees are important to indicate the preference of for-
eign companies for employees in the context of the transition. Do they make a selection
according to the attitude of candidates or education or experience? Or, to put it differently:
do companies find it more problematic to educate personnel for a specific job themselves,
or do they find it more problematic to bring about the ‘westernization’ of workers’ mental-
ity. Case-study evidence at some larger foreign greenfield investments in Hungary has
shown that attitude is an important selection criterion, not only for unskilled workers. For
instance, at the FORD plant in Székesfehérvár, considerable stress was laid upon workforce
recruitment (Sadler & Swain, 1994). The first 120 employees were selected from 7,500 ap-
plicants via a complex multi-stage selection process. Attitude, rather than technical ability,
was a prime requirement. In general we can say that foreign companies have a preference
for young employees (see for instance Kiss, 1993; Sadler & Swain, 1994; Makó et al., 1997),
probably because of their pliability and because they have not worked under the old regime.
2.6.3 Productivity
55
One of the central goals of companies, especially in former SOEs, is the increase of labor
productivity, that was terribly low during the socialist era. Labor productivity is strongly
related to the processes that we look at in this study. It refers to both technological mod-
ernization, organizational modernization (including labor shedding), the change of workers’
mentality and the training of employees. An increase in labor productivity is a necessary
precondition for improving the competitiveness in privatized companies. As we have al-
ready discussed these processes extensively above, we will not further dwell on them here.
These observations and assumptions have resulted in the following five research questions
concerning the consequences of modernization on the demand for labor:
4. What are the effects of the modernization within both foreign and domestic companies
on the quantitative demand for labor?
5. What are the effects of the modernization within both foreign and domestic companies
on the qualitative demand of labor?
6. In what way and through what channels are new employees recruited, and what are se-
lection criteria used?
7. What are the effects of modernization and training on labor productivity?
8. Are there differences for different regions, and what role did the regional supply of labor
play in the location decision?
2.7 Linkages and the diffusion of technology and know-how
In political and scientific circles in both Western countries and CEE countries, there has
been much attention for the supposedly positive effects of FDI in transition economies.
However, they all mainly focus on the direct effects, that is the effects within the foreign
subsidiary. In fact this covers only part of the positive effects of FDI. The indirect effects,
that is the diffusion of technical and organizational know-how towards domestic compa-
nies, might be much greater than the direct effects, and might be even more important for
the (transition of the) Hungarian economy as a whole. These indirect or spin-off effects are
first of all seen through the demonstration effect. This means, by just ‘being there’ foreign
companies demonstrate a more modern style of business (see the dotted lines in figure 2.2).
In this study, however, we concentrate on these spin-off effects through the linkages with
domestic companies (see III in figure 2.2).
In this section we first look at some general concepts regarding linkages between com-
panies. Subsequently, we take a closer look at local linkages of foreign companies in the
specific Hungarian context. Finally, we deal with the implications of these linkages for the
diffusion of technological and organizational know-how to domestic companies.
We restrict ourselves to the backward linkages of foreign companies19. Backward linkages
refer to linkages with companies lower down the product value chain. Two reasons can be
given for our focus on backward linkages. First, backward or supply linkages are the most
important linkages in the case of foreign investments (Dicken, 1992). This counts pre-
eminently for Hungary and other transition economies, where the existing industrial struc-
ture is rather weak and undergoing transition. Therefore, it does not seem logical to look
for forward linkages to domestic Hungarian companies. Second, backward linkages are the
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only ones where we can find transfer of technology from a foreign to a domestic company.
Other linkages that might involve the transfer of know-how and technology are co-
makership relations20. As these linkages are of minor importance in our empirical study, we
will not deal with these linkages here.
Backward linkages can be either supplier or subcontracting relations. Supplier linkages
are linkages where one firm supplies fairly standardized commodities to another firm. Sub-
contracting can be defined as ‘a situation where the firm offering the subcontract requires
another independent enterprise to undertake the production or carry out the processing of
a material, component, part or sub-assembly for it according to the specifications or plans
provided by the firm offering the contract. Thus, subcontracting differs from the mere pur-
chase of readymade parts and components from suppliers in that there is an actual contract
between the two participating firms setting out the specifications for the order.’ (Holmes,
1986). This also has implications for the duration of the relationship (Bije, 1994). Close
‘synergic’ relations between firms and their suppliers and subcontractors do not only affect
flexibility but also enhance the process of continuous innovation. Both are key factors in
the competitive strength of companies nowadays.
Although outsourcing of activities is not a new phenomenon, it is generally believed that
it has increased markedly in the 1980s and that it is a more important part of modern cor-
porate strategy than ever. The main advantages of subcontracting and local supplies are
usually phrased in terms of flexibility and low costs (Bije, 1994). Suppliers offer the cus-
tomer (in our case the foreign company) lower production costs than that sustained in in-
house production, and the customer remains more flexible, because the customer does not
need to make additional investments. Moreover, a subcontractor or supplier might realize
scale effects when delivering or producing a certain product for more than one customer.
In order to benefit fully from these flexibility and costs advantages, geographical prox-
imity of suppliers and subcontractors is important (Oman, 1994). Proximity is an important
factor in realizing just-in-time delivery (JIT). The cost advantages of proximity are in the
reduction of transportation expenditure and savings on import duties. An additional ad-
vantage in the case of Hungary lies in the generally lower prices of raw materials and semi-
manufactured articles in Hungary than in Western countries.
From the above it may appear to be beneficial for foreign investors in Hungary to pur-
chase from local suppliers and subcontractors. However, the actual incidence of local link-
age formation by foreign companies depends on three major influences (Dicken et al.,
1994):
1. the particular strategy being followed by the parent company and the role played by the
foreign plant in that strategy;
2. the characteristics of the host economy itself;
3. time.
We will now look at these three factors in more detail, applying them to the specific context
of Hungary.
STRATEGY
Where strategy is concerned, we consider three elements important: size, sales markets, and
the mode of investment.
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Large multinational companies are not very likely to develop local supply linkages. They
are often highly vertically integrated, or they use worldwide suppliers because of cost bene-
fits. A large share of the investments in Hungary comes from these large multinational
companies. On the other hand, many SMEs have invested in Hungary. They are more likely
to use local sourcing. However, as these SMEs mostly originate from Austria and Germany,
they might well stick to their suppliers from the home country.
Besides, foreign firms that serve the host market are more likely to develop local supply
linkages than export platform plants. This holds especially for Hungary where production
costs tend to be lower than in Western countries. Serving the local market and using sup-
plies from the more expensive Western countries would have a negative effect on the local
competitiveness of the foreign company. In contrast, export platform firms tend to act
more like ‘cathedrals in the desert’. Often this involves greenfield assembly plants located in
customs-free zones or export processing zones (Malecki, 1997). Research at 117 foreign
firms in CEE and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) seems to support this
hypothesis (Szanyi, 1997). Export platform firms purchased on average 31% locally, as op-
posed to firms serving the host market (42%).
Finally, companies that invested in the privatization of SOEs are expected to have more
local supply linkages than greenfield investments. Greenfield investments have to build up a
local supplier network from scratch. On the other hand, with the acquisition, a foreign
company also obtains a local supplier network21. However, these existing linkages in acqui-
sitions may well have been passed over by the new foreign owner and be replaced by im-
ports as reported by Geenhuizen and Nijkamp (1998). In a study among 24 foreign firms in
the Székesfehérvár region, Makó et al. (1997) found that on average close to one-third of
supplies comes from Hungary-based companies. For greenfield companies this share was a
mere 22%, in contrast with privatized companies (77%)22. The difference between
greenfield and privatized companies concerning local sourcing was also found in other
studies. Éltetõ and Sass (1998) report that privatized foreign companies have established
strong links with the domestic economy. Greenfields act more like islands, especially when
located in customs-free zones23. A major exception to the rule are greenfield investments in
the food and beverages sector. These firms appear to have many linkages in the local econ-
omy (Institute for Privatization Studies, 1996b), probably due to the fact that they often
serve the host market.
CHARACTERISTICS HUNGARIAN ECONOMY
Generally, foreign companies tend to develop more local linkages in developed countries
than in developing countries. Government intervention is an important factor that can in-
fluence local sourcing. At first sight, Hungary seems to occupy an intermediate position.
However, there is a large difference between local companies, in terms of their adaptation
to the new situation, the quality of their products, and the terms of delivery. The home in-
dustry can only partly guarantee the required quality and price (Barta, 1994). This is also
stated by Hood and Young (1994), who contend that many companies are readily catego-
rized as ‘value subtractors’. This means that at world prices, the resources they consume are
worth more than what they produce. Moreover, JIT delivery might constitute a problem in
the case of Hungary, as this requires organizational skills that were absent before the change
of system. Things may have changed for the better now, but these changes take time.
Mainly as a result of greenfield investments in activities new to Hungary, it might be that
companies find it impossible to acquire certain components or semi-manufactured articles
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in Hungary. In this respect, one phenomenon that can be witnessed in Hungary and other
countries in CEE is that of suppliers following a multinational company in their investment
in the region. This does have a positive effect on the reduction of imports, and local multi-
plier effects, but it is disastrous for domestic companies that offer similar products.
The search and maintenance of good suppliers and subcontractors goes along with
transaction costs for the foreign company (Nelson & Winter, 1982). First, these involve not
only the establishment of contacts with potential suppliers. Once a potential supplier or
subcontractor is found, a foreign firm has to be able to make clear what skills are needed to
manufacture a certain product. Moreover, a foreign company has to be vigilant about the
quality of the supplies and the compliance with the agreements made. Swaan (1996) has
argued that these costs are high in former socialist countries, mainly due to the lack of tacit
knowledge in domestic Hungarian companies.
However it seems that foreign investors do not have a very negative opinion of local
suppliers. Research among British and German investors in CEE has shown that only 14%
of the cost-oriented investors mention unsuitable local suppliers as a barrier to investment.
Among market-oriented investors it is not listed among the 10 most important barriers
(Szanyi, 1997).
TIME
Time is a critical variable in establishing local supply linkages. First, it takes time for a for-
eign investor to identify appropriate domestic suppliers. Second, domestic suppliers and
subcontractors have to ‘tune in’ to the new customers’ needs. Especially in the case of
Hungary, time might be an important factor in local sourcing, since the country opened up
for business overnight, and most FDI entered the country relatively recently. Furthermore,
as the (local) business environment is changing rapidly, business people are confronted with
more uncertainty.
The linkages between foreign and domestic companies are the vehicles for the diffusion
of technology and know-how. This diffusion can be either passive or active. In passive dif-
fusion the existence of contacts with domestic companies allows diffusion of modern tech-
nologies etc. to take place. Here we can think of the normal exchange of information,
know-how, quality standards etc. that are necessary for the establishment of a normal sup-
plier or subcontracting relation. Especially in the latter case, the ‘normal’ exchange of in-
formation can be substantial, for instance, when a foreign company is engaged in the joint
development of a new component together with a domestic company.
With active diffusion we refer to the situation where a foreign company provides some
kind of assistance to a domestic company that goes beyond the normal exchange of infor-
mation, for instance by making modern machines available to the domestic company. It is
mainly the latter, the active diffusion, that we are interested in because of its much greater
impact as compared to passive diffusion.
There might be several reasons why foreign companies provide assistance to domestic
suppliers. Because of the generally favorable prices of commodities in Hungary, it might be
beneficial to provide technical assistance to a local supplier, as this may result in the pur-
chase of qualitatively good products at low prices. Organizational assistance might for in-
stance be attractive when trying to realize JIT delivery.
There are different sorts of assistance a foreign company can provide. Dander (1993)
refers to three main forms of assistance: (1) capital inputs (grants, concessional loans, debt
relief and commercial facilities); (2) assistance in goods/machinery; and (3) technical assis-
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tance (investment-related as well as free standing). Organizational assistance could be a
fourth form of assistance. As already pointed out above, modernization involves both tech-
nological modernization and organizational modernization. It might be difficult for domes-
tic companies to modernize the orthodox management techniques themselves. A foreign
company might therefore consider the provision of organizational assistance to a potential
supplier, thus guaranteeing constant quality and terms of delivery.
These observations and assumptions have resulted in the following three research ques-
tions concerning modernization of production in an indirect manner (through the linkages
with domestic companies and the assistance provided to these companies):
9. Do foreign companies in Hungary maintain linkages with domestic companies via sup-
plier or subcontracting relations, and if so, what is their purchase from domestic Hun-
garian companies?
10. For what reasons do foreign companies in Hungary maintain linkages with domestic
Hungarian companies, and what are the future prospects?
11. What are the effects of these linkages on the diffusion of modern technologies and or-
ganizational and technical know-how to domestic companies?
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we have laid out the theoretical foundation for studying the direct and indi-
rect effects of FDI on the modernization of the Hungarian manufacturing industry and the
related changes in the demand for labor. We have argued that the main explaining variable
for these processes is the entry mode of foreign companies. The entry mode in its turn is
the outcome of a mix of strategic choices of the firm, including the motives for investment,
the sales markets of their products and the sectors they are active in.
The differences between the effects of FDI for both privatized and greenfield
companies are expected to be higher than in developed countries. This is caused by the
legacy of the socialist system, and the fact that Hungarian is undergoing an economic
transition. At the same time however, the situation in Hungary differs fundamentally from
those in most developing countries. We expect that effects of foreign investments on the
modernization of the manufacturing industry and its diffusion to the local economy are
potentially higher in Hungary than in developing countries generally. Where privatized
companies have to deal with this legacy directly, greenfield investments are affected only
indirectly. This has its effect on the way in which both types of companies contribute to the
technological modernization and the transformation of the labor market. Furthermore
privatized companies are expected to have a higher radiation effect than greenfield
companies because of existing contacts and a better knowledge of the local Hungarian
economy.
NOTES
1 The successor organization of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
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2 Before a state-owned conglomerate is put up for privatization, it is often turned into a number of separate
economic entities, that are put up for sale separately. When we mention a foreign company acquiring only
part of an SOE, this refers to buying a share in one of these separate economic entities.
3 This goes for both export-based and market-based investments.
4 For a description of the motivations see Van Hastenberg (1993; 1996a).
5 Foreign companies may not only foster economic change, but also social, cultural and political change.
6 Section 2.7 will deal with local linkages and technology diffusion in more detail.
7 The four phases of Japan’s industrial upgrading can be summarized as follows:
-1960s):
Expansion of labor-intensive, low-skill manufacturing in textiles, toys, and other low-wage goods. Rising
wages and labor shortages soon made these industries less competitive.
Phase 2 ‘Non-differentiated Smithian’ industries (late 1950s to early 1970s):
Scale economy-based modernization of heavy and chemical industries producing non-differentiated prod-
ucts. Environmental costs of these pollution-prone, resource/energy-consuming industries became socially
intolerable.
Phase 3 ‘Differentiated Smithian’ industries (late 1960s to present):
Assembly-based mass production of consumer durables. Its export dependency came to cause trade fric-
tion.
Phase 4 ‘Schumpeterian’ industries (early 1980s onwards):
Mechatronics-based flexible manufacturing, small-lot, multi-variety production, along with new innovations.
8 A comprehensive overview of FDI in Hungary is provided in the following chapter.
9 Smith and Ferenèiková (1998) stress the need to examine the locally and nationally specific impacts of FDI
in transition economies along a number of trajectories that largely coincide with the objectives for the at-
traction of FDI listed above.
10 The relative character of foreign investors’ contribution to technological modernization is discussed in
more detail below.
11 UNCTC (1983): Transnational corporations in world development: Third survey, United Nations, New
York. Quoted from Dicken (1992, p. 391).
12 Others use the term brownfield for all foreign investments in Hungary (and CEE) in the privatization of
SOEs. See for instance Mako et al. (1997).
13 These brownfield investments differ from the semi-greenfield investments above, in that they have to cope
with the obsolete equipment, although they deal with it in a drastic manner.
14 See chapter 3.
15 This cautious investment strategy can also be found in the case of investments in privatization. This was
shown above in section 2.3 where we dealt with companies that start as a joint venture and later buy out the
local partner. Overall one can say, however, that ten years after the change of system, investment risks are
considered much lower than during the initial years of the transition.
16 For example, in some branches of industry of the former USSR, the supply of personnel that is able to
work in computer-aided automated production falls short of the requirements by more than 40% (Welge &
Holtbrugge, 1993).
17 This refers to managers who left the country in their youth and have acquired managerial business experi-
ence in the West.
18 They further distinguish accumulated sunk costs (or ‘normal’ costs of doing business), for example the
seniority of business, and exit sunk costs, for example early retirement pension entitlements of labor.
19 That is backward linkages from the viewpoint of foreign companies. From the viewpoint of domestic com-
panies this refers to forward linkages.
20 Co-makership refers to a situation where two separate economic entities work together on the development
and production of a new product, part or component.
21 However, the large state conglomerates were largely vertically integrated, as (practically) all stages of the
product value chain were incorporated within one single large SOE. Therefore, the local supply linkages of
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these privatized foreign companies are mainly with other parts of the former SOE that were privatized and
sold to other agents.
22 Some caution has to be borne in mind when interpreting this figure, as only 4 privatized companies partici-
pated in the research.
23 In their sample, 17% was located in a customs-free zone. In Hungary, any firm can establish its own cus-
toms-free zone, which entitles it to preferential tax and customs treatment. Currently there are about 200
such zones.
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Foreign direct investment in Hungary:
an overview
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we referred to FDI as being one of the most important elements in
the ongoing global internationalization. Moreover, we discussed in detail the impacts of
FDI on host economies. When looked at from a macro perspective we might argue that
these host country effects are, potentially, dependent on the magnitude of foreign involve-
ment in a certain country or region.
In this chapter we take a closer look at the developments in FDI in CEE, and more spe-
cifically in Hungary. To that end we first give a general overview of FDI in CEE, first to put
FDI in CEE in a global perspective and second to put the investments in Hungary in a re-
gional perspective (that is compared to other countries in CEE) (section 3.2). Section 3.3
follows up with a more detailed overview of FDI in Hungary. We shed light on the devel-
opment and magnitude of FDI inflows from 1988 onwards, the source countries, the sec-
tors of investment and the regional distribution of FDI. Finally in section 3.4 we concen-
trate on investments in the Hungarian manufacturing sector, which is the main focus of this
study. The selection of companies for empirical research presented in chapter 4 is based on
the findings in this chapter concerning the geographical and sectoral spread of foreign
manufacturing companies in Hungary.
3.2 FDI in Central and Eastern Europe
FDI in CEE is a relatively new phenomenon. Up to 1989 FDI was negligible. From 1989
onwards, FDI has entered the region in more substantial proportions, though initially not at
the anticipated amount (see for instance ECE, 1995; Gibb & Michalak, 1994; Meyer, 1998).
Indeed, many companies were attracted to the region already during the early years of the
transition, but the average amount of investment in these companies was rather small. For-
eign investors generally chose a cautious investment strategy, dictated by unstable political
and legal circumstances and a transition-related recession. This has also been the reason that
FDI in the region is largely concentrated in the countries that have made serious efforts at
reform and the introduction of market elements in their economies. The Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have been the front runners in the transition to a
market-based economic system, according to the transition indicator of the EBRD (1998).
Not surprisingly, these are also the countries that are eligible for EU membership in the
3
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first round of enlargement. Using the average transition indicator, UNCTAD (1998) found
a strong relationship between progress in transition and FDI for 17 countries in the region.
They found an overall rank correlation coefficient between FDI and the average transition
indicator of 0.91 for FDI stocks (as of end 1997) and 0.85 for 1997 inflows.
Although FDI in CEE has become more important in recent years, its share in world-
wide inflows and inward stock is still moderate (table 3.1). According to UNCTAD (1998),
in 1997 CEE received a record of $ 19 billion in FDI inflows. This is 44% more than in
1996, when FDI inflows stagnated, partly reflecting declines in privatization-related invest-
ments in Hungary and the Czech Republic (UNCTAD, 1997). In 1997, the Russian Federa-
tion was the leading recipient of FDI in the region, mainly in natural resources and infra-
structure development. Despite increasing annual inflows, CEE’s share in world inward
stock is still low, at $ 62.4 billion (1.8%).
Table 3.1 Share of FDI in CEE in worldwide FDI inflows and inward stock (%)
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997
Inflows .. 2.4 4.3 3.7 4.6
Inward stock 0.1 .. 1.3 .. 1.8
Source: UNCTAD (1998)
Before going into more detail on FDI in CEE, some comments have to be made on the
data. According to UNCTAD (1998), ‘FDI [..] comprise[s] capital provided (either directly
or through other related enterprises) by a foreign direct investor to an FDI enterprise, or
capital received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor.’ According to the IMF
balance of payments definition, there are three components in FDI: (1) equity capital, that
is the foreign direct investor’s purchase of shares of an enterprise, (2) reinvested earnings,
and (3) intra-company loans or intra-company debt transactions. Not all countries record all
three components of FDI flows. Moreover, it is much more difficult to find out the extent
of FDI components (2) and (3).
This may have been the reason why different sources report different data. The FDI
data from UN/ECE as presented in table 3.2 are based on balance of payment accounts.
They provide only a limited picture of foreign investment, since they cover only cash in-
flows. The figures exclude investment goods and other contributions in kind, as well as re-
investment of profits by foreign partners. Of course, this caveat pertains to most official
investment figures worldwide. However, in the case of CEE, investments in the form of
machinery, technical assistance, and know-how are thought to make up a large share of total
investment. When using other sources for FDI figures, the outcome can differ considerably.
For instance, the figures presented by Business Central Europe (BCE)1 are generally higher
than the ones derived from balance of payments statistics, as the former try to take into
account reinvested profits and distributions in kind (table 3.2)2. However, when studying
trends in foreign investment, or when comparing FDI in different countries in CEE, these
differences in data and/or definitions become less problematic.
We already referred shortly to the differences in inward FDI flows for different coun-
tries in CEE. In fact, the bulk of FDI in CEE has flowed into just a handful of countries
(table 3.2). The Central European countries and more recently the Russian Federation were
the most important host countries for investment, as their stock figures end 1997 indicate.
For a long time Hungary has by far been the most important recipient of FDI in the region.
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More recently, Poland, the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation have caught up. The
figures from BCE even show a higher stock figure for Poland than for Hungary3. More
recent figures from BCE report an inward FDI stock of $ 26.6 billion for Poland (as of
September 1998) and $ 22.5 billion for Hungary (as of June 98).
Looking at per capita investment, the picture is totally different. Hungary clearly appears
to have attracted most FDI by far, notwithstanding the high BCE figure for Poland4. In
fact, size-adjusted figures for Hungary per capita and according to GDP, are among the
highest in the world (Meyer, 1998). Measured per capita, FDI in the Russian Federation is
very modest. Other, notably smaller countries fare better. Especially Slovenia has attracted a
relatively high amount of investment per capita.
Table 3.2 FDI in CEE, 1997
UN/ECEa Business Central Europe (BCE)
Stock 1997 FDI per capita 
1997b
Stock 1997 FDI per capita 
1997b
bln $ $ bln $ $
Albania 0.3 102 .. ..
Belorussia 0.3 30 .. ..
Bulgaria 0.9 114 1.3 156
Croatia 1.1 250 1.3 284
Czech Republic 8.7 842 6.8 660
Estonia 0.9 634 1.2 823
Hungary 15.5 1,523 17.5 1,724
Latvia 1.4 547 1.8 729
Lithuania 6.5 176 1.0 270
Poland 8.6 222 20.6 533
Republic of Moldavia 0.2 37 .. ..
Romania 2.5 109 2.8 124
Russian Federation 14.3 97 10.3 70
Slovakia 1.0 195 1.4 260
Slovenia 1.1 557 2.4 1,208
The FYR of Macedo-
niac
0.1 28 .. ..
Ukraine 2.0 39 .. ..
a Stock figures calculated from stock end 1995 (1998-1995) (ECE, 1997) added with flow figures for 1996
and 1997 (ECE, 1998b). All figures are on cash basis, derived from national balance of payments statistics.
b Population data per July 1997.
c Population in 1996 (KSH, 1998).
Source: own calculations based on ECE (1997, 1998b); Business Central Europe (1998);
http://www.unece.org/stat/trend (population data)
A better picture of the local impact of FDI is provided in table 3.3, where we present the
share of foreign companies according to selected economic indicators for five countries in
CEE. Although the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are among the leading
recipients of FDI in the region, the economic impact of companies with foreign capital
participation is by far the highest in Hungary for all five indicators. Overall, the impact of
foreign companies is higher in the manufacturing sector than for the economy as a whole,
indicating the large amount of FDI in this sector. Here, the difference between Hungary
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and the other countries is even more striking. Foreign manufacturing companies appear to
have a dominant share in the nominal capital, output levels, export sales and investment.
However, they employ ‘only’ 37% of the working population in manufacturing, indicating
higher productivity levels in foreign companies compared to domestic companies. Measured
in terms of output levels, productivity in foreign manufacturing companies in Hungary is
more than twice that of domestic companies5.
Table 3.3 Share of companies with foreign capital participationa in the whole economy (1) and
manufacuring (2), 1994 (%)
Hungary Czech Rep. Poland Slovakia Slovenia
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Nominal capital (equity) 31.9 60.8 7.4 11.8 24.8 36.9 5.0 12.2 6.6 11.5
Employed persons 22.6 37.2 6.0 7.5 7.0 12.2 3.8 9.7 5.3 7.8
Output 38.6 55.4 9.4 11.2 12.4 18.7 7.0 12.8 10.7 16.9
Export sales 50.6 65.5 .. 16.4 22.7 29.1 .. 15.7 19.1 21.1
Investment 38.0 79.0 16.5 24.8 11.7 30.9 11.8 36.0 .. ..
a This includes all companies with a foreign capital share. Normally a 10% minimum capital share qualifies as
direct investment. However, according to the source, there are only a few exceptions to the 10% rule.
Source: Hunya (1996)
3.3 Main trends in FDI in Hungary 1988-1997
Hungary has thus been the most successful of the CEE countries in attracting FDI. In this
respect, three factors are of major importance. From the start of the 1989 transition proc-
ess, Hungary has conducted a privatization policy which was aimed at increasing the fiscal
advantages of privatization. To that end, the government favored direct sales of companies
to foreigners. Hard currency is important to the government, as Hungary still has a large
foreign debt. Besides the privatization policy, the exceptional position of Hungary within
the CMEA has played an important role. By 1968, Hungary had already introduced market
elements into its the economy. According to many authors (see, for instance, Boote & So-
mogyi, 1991), the direct effects of the many reforms have been relatively limited. Neverthe-
less, ‘goulash communism’ has apparently had a great influence on FDI, both in terms of
actual developments (before and after 1989) and the perception of potential foreign inves-
tors. This exceptional position within the CMEA and the international orientation – not
only towards CMEA countries but also more and more towards Western Europe – laid the
foundation for clear and relatively liberal laws on FDI. The legislation, which was intro-
duced in 1972 already, was amended (liberalized) significantly in 1988, i.e. before the 1989
change of system. This, of course, had a positive effect on investors’ confidence and their
perception of the risks of investing there.
Next to these three factors accounting for Hungary’s attractiveness as an FDI destina-
tion country we might mention a forth factor, that is not directly related to Hungary per se,
but is more of a general nature. The presence of a large number of foreign companies is in
itself a factor in the attraction of new investments. In other words, investment breeds in-
vestment (Csáki et al., 1996). In a similar respect, Geenhuizen and Nijkamp (1998) refer to
two critical thresholds in attracting FDI in the first years of the transition. One is a first
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investment by a forerunner, after which the country appears interesting and safe enough to
attract various followers, and the other is a point above which agglomeration economies
arise, causing FDI to increase rapidly. It might suggest that early FDI inflows in Hungary as
reported above have had a positive effect on subsequent FDI inflows in Hungary.
In this section we take a closer look at FDI in Hungary. We start by giving an overview
of FDI in Hungary from 1988 to 1997 (section 3.3.1). Next we look at the source countries
of FDI in Hungary (section 3.3.2), after which we examine the sectors of investment (sec-
tion 3.3.3) and the geography of investment (that is, the regional distribution of FDI) (sec-
tion 3.3.4).
3.3.1 FDI 1988-1997
Hungary already had a law which allowed foreign companies to establish a subsidiary in the
country from as early as 1972 (Kuiper, 1991). However, up to the 1989 change of system,
FDI in Hungary was rather limited. At the end of 1988 some 208 foreign companies were
registered, of which half entered the country in 1988 alone (Hamar, 1992). In contrast to
other countries in CEE, Hungary has attracted relatively high amounts of FDI in the first
years of the transition. At the end of 1989, 1,349 foreign companies were registered in
Hungary (Hamar, 1992) and the inward stock was $ 387 million (in cash) (Csáki & Macher,
1998).
Figure 3.1 FDI in Hungary, 1990-1997 (billion dollars)
Source: ECE (1998b)
In 1990, the first full year after the change of system, FDI was at $ 311 million still relatively
modest6. It is only after 1991 that substantial amounts of FDI flowed into the country an-
nually (figure 3.1). Although the FDI figures in figure 3.1 cover both investments in privati-
zation, greenfield investments and supplementary investment projects, we can conclude that
the course of the annual investment flows is dictated by the annual differences in privatiza-
tion revenues.
Privatization in Hungary started already in 1988 and proceeded comparatively smoothly
until 1994. However, the process slowed considerably in the beginning of 1994 and came
practically to a standstill in the first six months of 1995. This 18-month hiatus was mainly
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caused by the general elections and the change of government, as well as the delay in the
new privatization law, which was implemented in June 1995 after several amendments7. In
the second half of 1995 privatization regained momentum. In the last months of 1995 some
of the largest privatization deals in the region were concluded. This included five gas distri-
bution companies, six electricity distributors and two power stations, 18% of gas company
MOL, and another 37% of the phone company MATÁV.
After the low FDI inflow in 1994 and the record high inflow in 1995 ($ 4.45 billion),
annual FDI in Hungary has stabilized in 1996 and 1997. By the end of 1996 a total of 26,130
companies with foreign capital participation were registered in Hungary. Of these, 47.4%
were 100% foreign subsidiaries and 52.6% had both foreign and domestic capital (KSH,
1997). By the end of 1995, among the 200 largest companies in Hungary, 98 had a majority
foreign ownership (Institute for Privatization Studies, 1996a).
As the privatization in Hungary is drawing to a close, future FDI has to come from
greenfield investments and the expansion of existing establishments. Figures about the
shares of foreign capital that have entered Hungary through privatization and greenfield
projects are not readily available. Swain (1998) reports that investment in greenfield projects
has been more important in Hungary than in other countries in CEE between October
1991 and March 1993. During that period, 29% of invested capital in Hungary was in
greenfield projects, compared to 13% for Poland and 5% for the Czech Republic. In abso-
lute numbers, the impact of greenfield investments in Hungary is even more pronounced,
considering that investments in privatization were much higher during that period than
elsewhere in CEE. The investment in greenfield projects is highly geographically concen-
trated in the Budapest agglomeration, and the northwest of Hungary, notably Györ, Székes-
fehérvár and Szentgotthárd (Rechnitzer, 1998).
3.3.2 Source countries of FDI
As for the source countries of investment, geographical proximity and historical links ap-
pear to be key factors8. Germany is the number one investor in Hungary (table 3.4). Austria,
not a key player in global investment, is another important source country. Measured by the
number of establishments (as opposed to the measurement in capital inflows as in table
3.4), Austria’s position is probably stronger, as Austrian investments are generally relatively
small involving multiple investments of less cash-rich medium-sized enterprises. This is con-
firmed by Meyer (1998) who points out that proximity is generally more evident in the
number of projects than in the contribution of capital because proximity is more important
for small business than for large multinational enterprises. Both Germany and Austria are
also major players where the whole of CEE is concerned. In the period 1992-1994, FDI in
CEE accounted for close to 30% of Austrian outward FDI flows and 13% of German out-
flows (Hunya, 1996). Next to geographical proximity and historical links mentioned above,
political factors might also be of some relevance; especially in the case of Germany for
which CEE forms a prominent part of its periphery9.
In general we can conclude that West European countries account for the bulk of for-
eign capital, not only in Hungary but also in other countries in the region. A major excep-
tion is the United States, which is among the main source countries in several CEE coun-
tries. Investments from the United States are characterized by their size, i.e. mainly large
scale pro- jects by multinationals.
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Table 3.4 Source countries of FDI in Hungary and selected CEE countries (stock end 1997) (%)
Hungary Czech Rep. Poland Sloveniaa
Germany 22 28 12 14
United States 20 13 23 1
The Netherlands 13 14 7 2
Austria 10 7 4 34
France 8 8 9 7
Italy 6 1 9 7
United Kingdom 4 3 7 5
Belgium 4 .. 1 ..
Switzerland 3 11 3 4
Japan 2 .. .. ..
Rep. of Korea 1 .. 6 ..
Others 9 15 18 25
Total 100 100 100 100
a End 1996.
Source: UNCTAD (1998)
One of the major FDI contributors in the world, Japan, is almost absent in CEE. From the
four host countries considered in table 3.4, only Hungary hosts some Japanese FDI.
SUZUKI accounts for a large share of Japanese FDI in Hungary.
3.3.3 Sectors of investment
As for the spread of FDI in Hungary across the various sectors of the economy, large
differences are found between the number of organizations and the amount of invested capital
(table 3.5). By the end of 1996, almost half of the companies were active in trade. This clearly
shows the interest of foreign companies in entering the Hungarian market. Other sectors in
which many foreign companies operate are manufacturing, real estate, rental, and business
activities. The sectoral division of foreign investments measured by foreign capital inflow gives
the opposite picture as far as trade and manufacturing are concerned. Close to 40% of all foreign
capital went to manufacturing, while the trade sector received ‘only’ 12% of capital investment.
The recent privatization of some public utilities has attracted a large amount of foreign capital in
the electricity, gas, steam and water supply sector (14.3%). The difference between trade and
manufacturing, as far as the number of investments and the amount of invested capital are
concerned, shows that the average amount of capital invested in trade is much lower than in
manufacturing. This is hardly surprising because it takes more money to set up or take over a
production plant than to establish a trade office, the cautious investment strategy of foreign
companies in manufacturing in the early transition years notwithstanding.
A closer look at foreign investment in different branches of manufacturing reveals that
foreign investment is found in all branches (figure 3.2). Machinery and equipment is the most
important branch: more than one-quarter of all foreign manufacturing companies is engaged in
the engineering sector. This is not at all remarkable as the engineering sector is important in the
Hungarian economy as a whole. However, it does show that foreign companies are attracted to
the high technical skills of Hungarians, one of the country’s comparative advantages.
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Table 3.5 FDI in Hungary by economic activity, 1996 (%)
Sector Number of companies Foreign capital
Agriculture, hunting, forestry & fishing 3.2 1.2
Mining & quarrying 0.3 1.2
Manufacturing 16.5 39.2
Electricity, gas, steam & water supply 0.2 14.3
Construction 4.7 3.8
Wholesale, retail trade & repair 48.9 11.9
Hotels & restaurants 4.3 2.5
Transport, storage, post & telecommunication 3.1 8.9
Financial intermediation 0.6 9.0
Real estate, rental & business activities 14.9 7.4
Education 0.6 -
Health & social work 0.6 0.1
Other community & social activities 2.2 0.5
Total 100.0a 100.0b
a 26,130 companies.
b HUF 1,602.2 billion.
Source: KSH (1998)
With regard to foreign capital investment, the picture is somewhat different. Here too, the
engineering sector appears to be the most important. Next to the high number of foreign
establishments, investment in the automotive industry is mainly responsible for the expansion of
this sector. AUDI, SUZUKI, OPEL and FORD belong to the top ten foreign investors in Hungary.
Though only moderate in terms of the number of foreign organizations, a large share of the
foreign capital in manufacturing went to the chemical industry. The food and beverages sector
has received a substantial share in capital investment as well with the highest average investment
per company found in this sector. For a long time food and beverages has been the most
important as regards foreign capital investment. Privatization has been more rapid here than in
other sectors, with majority foreign ownership in all main branches as of 1995. Foreign
ownership is almost total in confectionery, vegetable oil production, soft drinks production and
the tobacco industry. The foreign interest in the privatization of the food sector has been strong
in branches with (1) stable domestic markets, (2) monopolistic or oligopolistic markets, (3)
relatively cheap production technology, and (4) production technology that is ‘synoptic’, and
easily reduced to repetitive patterns and automated (Farkas, 1997).
Foreign capital investments in the manufacturing industry in CEE as a whole resembles the
picture as outlined for Hungary above. The main sectors of investment in manufacturing in CEE
are food and beverages, machinery and equipment and the chemical industry (UNCTAD, 1998).
3.3.4 The geography of FDI
Foreign direct investment in Hungary has a very uneven geographical distribution, both by the
number of foreign establishments and invested capital (figure 3.4). Budapest has captured by far
the biggest share of foreign capital invested in Hungary. By the end of 1996, Budapest alone has
received 54% of all capital investments, and almost half of all foreign companies
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Figure 3.2a Number of organizations with foreign participation in manufacturing, stock end 1996
Source: KSH (1998)
Figure 3.2b Foreign capital invested in Hungary in manufacturing in billion forint, stock end 1996
Source: KSH (1998)
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were based there. Ever since the early days of the transition Budapest has attracted the lion’s
share of FDI. More recently, there has been a shift favoring the other regions in the country.
Investment in Pest county, which attracted the second highest amount of capital investment, is
very unevenly dispersed (figure 3.3 provides a map with the counties and macro regions in Hun-
gary). The lion’s share is found in a ring around Budapest (in the urban agglomeration). The
southeastern part of Pest did not gain much foreign investment. That area resembles the south-
eastern part of the country, both regarding economic structure and FDI. The northwest of
Hungary is also one of the more favorable locations for foreign companies. More specifically this
includes Vas and Zala (especially the western parts bordering Austria), Györ-Moson-Sopron,
areas along the Györ-Budapest corridor and Fejér. Especially the capital of Fejér, Székesfehérvár,
is developing as one of the major locations for greenfield establishments. These favorable loca-
tions for FDI are largely located on what is known as the innovation axes in Hungary, which
runs from the northwest to the southeast along Györ, Budapest, Szeged and from Budapest
to the Lake Balaton10.
Figure 3.3 Counties and macro regions in Hungary
The exceptional position of Budapest in Hungary, in relation to FDI deserves added com-
mentary. Foreign companies which invest in a certain country for the first time, often start
their activities in the capital city as a sales office. From there they expand their (production)
activities to other parts of the country. In Hungary, where foreign companies started to
enter the country in great numbers only after 1989, this can be an explanation for the con-
centration of FDI in Budapest. Next to this general factor, four reasons specific to Hungary
can be given for the attractiveness of Budapest as an investment location. First, the infra-
structure (both physical and communications) is much better than in the rest of the coun-
try, especially in the early days of transformation. Second, the wish of foreign companies to
locate (headquarters) in the proximity of the decision making centers and domestic organi-
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zations which are important for foreign investors. Especially in the early days of the transi-
tion, when the future held more uncertainties and investment risks were regarded to be
relatively high, this was a major consideration for companies to invest in or near to the
capital city.
The third factor why Hungary attracts investments in the manufacturing sector is related
to the already existing concentration of the domestic manufacturing sector and the prefer-
ence of foreign companies to invest by way of a joint venture or acquisition of an SOE
above the setting up of greenfield establishments. Budapest has always been the largest sin-
gle industrial agglomeration in Hungary, both for headquarters and branch plants (Barta,
1996), despite efforts since the 1960s to move industry away from the capital and the pro-
hibition to locate new branch plants in the agglomeration ring11. The policy had some ef-
fect, since between 1970 and 1985 the number of branch plants in Budapest decreased, but
started to grow again between 1985 and 1989. Paralleling this development was a sharp in-
crease in the number of industrial headquarters since 1980. This can be explained by the
disintegration of big enterprises, as a result of which branch plants became headquarters. In
1996, Budapest accounted for approximately 28% of Hungary’s industrial production. This
far exceeds its share in the industrial employment structure (16% of all industrial jobs can
be found in Budapest), indicating that the productivity in Budapest is higher than the na-
tional average (Barta, 1998).
Figure 3.4 Regional spread of invested capital (in billion forint) and number of companies in 1996
Source: KSH (1998)
Closely connected to the dominance of Budapest in the national economy is the fact that it
has a broad and diversified labor market, and the highest educated labor force in the coun-
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try. The capital hosts a large share of the country’s universities, institutes for higher educa-
tion and vocational schools. Moreover, as all ministries and other government institutions,
as well as a great number of company headquarters are located in Budapest, it is here that
we can find the largest pool of people with management and organizational experience.
Some of the factors explaining the attractiveness of Budapest for the location of FDI are
applicable to the northwest of Hungary as well12. The northwest of Hungary has always
been among the more prosperous regions in Hungary, with a relatively good infrastructure.
Here too we can find a concentration of manufacturing companies. Györ was, after Buda-
pest, second in Hungary in the number of company headquarters it accommodated. Thus,
through the investment in privatization the northwest has an advantage above the south-
west and east Hungary. In relation, the labor force is well educated. The labor market is
especially favorable for skilled manual workers. Finally, the northwest of Hungary is geo-
graphically well located in international respect, as it borders Austria, and thus the EU. This
is an important asset for medium sized Austrian (and German) companies that prefer to
invest close to the parent company, and for export-based investments in general.
Finally, we would like to stress that it is the combination of the factors mentioned that
contributed towards the prosperous development of the center and northwest of Hungary
during the transition and these regions appear to be the most favorable locations for for-
eign investment. Or, in the words of Ehrlich and Révész (1995): ‘the reason is not simply
that Budapest as the center, and the western periphery as the areas most directly linked to
developed Europe, are exploiting these features to meet the challenges of the transition.
They are historically the areas of Hungary whose inhabitants have the highest levels of cul-
ture, flexibility and multiple working skills.’
Comparing foreign investment figures with domestic data, a different picture emerges. When
the number of companies with foreign capital participation is related to the total number of
companies per county (situation in 1993)13, the differences between the various parts of the
country appear to be much smaller than they seemed at first. In itself, this is not surprising
following our earlier statement that investment in privatization is the most important entry mode
in Hungary. Only northeastern and northern Hungary host a relatively small number of foreign
companies. In comparison, Budapest is still one of the major hosts for foreign investment, but
not the most important one. The uneven spread of investment is partly due to the concentration
of economic life and population in Budapest and its surroundings. This is because economic life
in Hungary is highly concentrated in Budapest. With 41% of all companies in Hungary, Budapest
has by far the highest number of companies per capita: 23 per 1,000 inhabitants, compared to 8
per 1,000 for the rest of the country (1993 situation) (Nemes-Nagy, 1995). Surprisingly, Vas
county hosts relatively more foreign companies than any other county. This reflects the small
number of domestic companies in the county as well as its favorable location bordering Austria.
All in all we can conclude that FDI in Hungary is geographically concentrated. At the
end of 1996, three-quarters of the foreign companies and invested foreign capital were in
the center and northwest of Hungary. Given the exceptional position of Hungary within
CEE, we can conclude that this area hosts the highest concentration of FDI in CEE. FDI
contributes to the regional inequality in Hungary, although the FDI pattern only reflect
regional disparities in Hungary. In 1997, the government came up with incentives for for-
eign companies to invest in less developed areas where unemployment has been more than
15% for one of the two years before investment (Éltetõ & Sass, 1998)14.
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3.4 FDI in the Hungarian manufacturing industry: analyzing the Hoppenstedt
database
After this general overview of FDI in CEE and Hungary, we narrow our focus to FDI in
the Hungarian manufacturing industry. As the available statistical data fail to provide a more
detailed analysis, we will use our own database. This database allows us to give a more de-
tailed picture of the sectoral and geographical distribution of FDI and the related employ-
ment (sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3). But first we render an account of the setting up of this da-
tabase and its representativeness.
3.4.1 The Hoppenstedt database
In order to focus on foreign investments in manufacturing, data was obtained from the
company directory ‘Major Companies in Hungary 1995’, published by Hoppenstedt Bonnier
(1995). The directory lists 6,400 of the biggest companies in Hungary. From these, we selected
905 companies with a foreign capital share of at least 10%. Of these 905 companies, 460 are
engaged in manufacturing, which represents 12% of the foreign companies in manufacturing.
These 460 have a joint foreign capital of HUF 193 billion15 and employ 104,000 people16 as of
end 1993. The database was set up for the following reasons:
1. Reliable statistics concerning foreign direct investment in Hungary are difficult to find. This
problem becomes even more serious as the geographical or thematic level of analysis
becomes smaller. For instance, regional data about FDI in different industrial sectors are not
available. The new database gives information on the regional distribution of FDI in
manufacturing, which is not available from other sources. Moreover, using the database we
are able to generalize about regional specialization of foreign investments within
manufacturing in Hungary.
2. The database gives information about employment levels in companies with foreign capital
participation as well as its regional spread.
3. Last but not least, the database was set up to access information to be used for inquiries and
interviews with companies in the database. To our knowledge, there is no company directory
in Hungary that is suitable for making a selection of companies with foreign capital
participation. Therefore, it was necessary to compile one ourselves. The database provides
not only names and addresses of companies with foreign capital participation in Hungary, but
also the names of key persons in the companies.
For the geographical analysis, we divided Hungary into six macro regions instead of making a
division at the county level because of the relatively small number of companies and the relatively
large number of counties (19 and Budapest). The six macro regions are center, northwest (or
North Transdanubia), southwest (South Transdanubia), northeast (North Alföld), southeast
(South Alföld), and north (see also figure 3.3).
The database does not give information at the settlement level but at the company level.
Companies are assigned to the county where their headquarters are located. In itself, this might
be a disadvantage, but the same disadvantage also applies to the other data presented above. It is
actually a general problem with data about the geographical spread of companies. In the case of
Hungary, this means that the macro regions, center, and to a lesser extent, northwest, are
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overestimated in this database. During the socialist period the lion’s share of headquarters was
situated in these parts of the country. Furthermore, our earlier finding showed that foreign
investments are mainly acquisitions of SOEs that were concentrated in center and northwest
Hungary. Finally, the existing regional characteristics of the manufacturing sector make the
center and northwest favorable locations for foreign companies to set up their headquarters for
greenfield investments.
As the database was constructed from a directory of the biggest companies in Hungary, it
may be assumed that the data would include the biggest and most important foreign
investments. For that reason, the database may give a somewhat different picture than the one
presented above, which is based on total investment figures. With respect to the use of the
database to select companies for inquiries and interviews, this is certainly not a disadvantage and
could even be an advantage, since it excludes P.O. Box companies and other pseudo-
investments that were set up only out of tax considerations. Regarding the usefulness of the
database to describe foreign investments according to their geographical and sectoral
characteristics, however, this might be a problem. Therefore, in order to make a comparison
with the secondary data presented above, and to evaluate the representativeness of the database,
table 3.6 includes figures about the regional division of investments. The regional distribution of
FDI across all sectors (905 companies) resembles the picture presented in figure 3.4 above. The
dominance of Budapest is also revealed by this database. We may conclude that the database is
representative of the whole population as far as the regional distribution of foreign investments
is concerned.
Table 3.6 Regional distribution of FDI in Hungary by number of foreign investors
All sectors Manufacturing
Absolute % Absolute %
Budapest 546 60.3 187 40.7
Bp Agglomeration 590 65.2 213 46.3
Center 607 67.1 227 49.3
Northwest 121 13.4 87 18.9
Southwest 47 5.2 38 8.3
Northwest 37 4.1 30 6.5
Southeast 45 5.0 37 8.0
North 48 5.3 41 8.9
Total 905 100.0 460 100.0
Source: Hoppenstedt database
When considering investments in manufacturing only, the picture brightens up for the other
parts of the country. The explanation lies in the extreme concentration of non-manufacturing
activities in Budapest. More than 80% of investments outside manufacturing are located in
Budapest (compared to about 40% when only manufacturing is considered). The Budapest
agglomeration hosts a mere 46% of the number of investments in manufacturing, while the joint
share of central and northwest Hungary is 68%.
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3.4.2 Sectors of investment
Above, we have already discussed the distribution of investments in manufacturing across
various branches of industry. In this section, we will briefly discuss the sectors of investment as
well because first it will shed light on the general characteristics of the database, and second, the
branch structure used in the Hoppenstedt company directory differs from the one used by the
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH).
Table 3.7 Number of companies and capital investments (in million forint) in manufacturing by
sector
Companies Capital investment
Abs. % Abs. % Average
1. Chemical industry 45 9.8 12,672 6.4 282
2. Non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts 27 5.0 20,242 10.3 750
3. Basic industries, steel & light
metal working 50
10.9
5,704 2.9 114
4. Mechanical engineering &
construction of vehicles 84
18.3
26,766 13.6 319
5. Electrical & precision engi-
neering & optics 75
16.3
53,511 27.1 713
6. Ironmongery, musical in-
struments, sports, toys, etc. 30
6.5
4,900 2.5 163
7. Paper, wood & printing 41 8.9 11,360 5.8 277
8. Textiles 52 11.3 6,218 3.2 120
9. Food & beverages 56 12.2 55,750 28.3 996
Total 460 100.0 197,123a 100.0 419
a The figure differs from the one presented above in section 3.4.1 where we described the main characteris-
tics of the database. This figure is also corrected for 460 cases (42 missing cases). The difference is a con-
sequence of the correction on different divisions (macro regions versus sectors).
Source: Hoppenstedt database
Most foreign investments measured by the number of companies are engaged in mechanical
engineering and construction of vehicles (84), followed by electrical engineering (75) (table 3.7).
Together, they account for more than one-third of the number of companies with foreign
capital participation. In terms of invested capital their share in total investments is even larger
(more than 40%). It is noteworthy that capital investments in electrical and precision engineering
are twice as high as in mechanical engineering, mainly due to some large investments. Capital
investments in food and beverages, accounting for almost 30% of total investments, are the
highest although the sector received only a moderate number of investments. Average capital
investment is therefore highest in food and beverages.
3.4.3 The geography of FDI in manufacturing
Above we have already discussed the geographical distribution of FDI by number of
establishments in the manufacturing industry using the Hoppenstedt database. Measuring the
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geographical spread of foreign investments by the number of establishments is only one
approach. A better way, and of more importance for their local impact, is to measure the
geographical distribution by the spread of invested capital and employment levels. As table 3.8
suggests, this gives a somewhat different picture. When measuring FDI by capital investments, it
appears that they are highly concentrated in the center macro region and to a lesser extent in the
northwestern part of the country. Together they make up 80% of the invested capital.
Moreover, the table shows a large difference in the average invested capital, ranging from
HUF 500 million in the center to HUF 205 million in the southeastern part of Hungary. This can
be explained by the abovementioned relative concentration of headquarters in the center and
northeast macro regions. Employees working in companies with foreign capital participation are
more evenly spread, mainly due to a lower concentration in the center. This means that
employment effects of foreign investments, at least as far as manufacturing is concerned, are not
as concentrated in the center and northwest macro regions as is often thought, especially when
taking into account that some of the employees assigned to the center macro region work in
branch plants located in other parts of the country.
Table 3.8 Capital investment (in million forint) and employees in manufacturing by macro region,
1993
Foreign capital Employees
Absolute % Average Absolute %
Center 113,460 58.8 500 50,728 48.8
Northwest 40,805 21.2 469 20,917 20.1
Southwest 11,990 6.2 316 9,852 9.5
Northeast 6,951 3.6 232 7,095 6.8
Southeast 7,588 3.9 205 5,472 5.3
North 12,128 6.3 296 9,879 9.5
Total 192,923 100.0 419 103,943 100.0
Source: Hoppenstedt database
In order to get a picture of the regional spread of foreign investments for each of the nine
sectors of manufacturing, location quotients17 were calculated for each of the six macro regions
(figure 3.5). To give a more complete picture, the figure also shows the absolute number of
companies18. The central part of the country hosts the highest number of foreign companies in
all nine sectors. The northwest ranks second for all sectors. The chemical industry, basic and
steel industries, and paper industry show a fairly equal relative spread among the macro regions.
When we look at the relative representation of the sectors in the different macro regions
(location quotients), we see that only in the case of electrical engineering, the center macro
region has attracted an above-average share of investments. Investments in ironmongery, textile
industry, and food and beverages (sectors 6, 8, and 9) are relatively underrepresented.
Because of the presence of natural resources, the southwest macro region has an
overrepresentation of non-metallic mineral products, while the (basic) steel industry is over-
represented in the north. Northeast and southwest macro regions attracted a relatively large
number of foreign companies in food and beverages. In both parts of the country almost one-
quarter of the foreign companies invested in this sector. The northeastern part of the country
attracted a relatively low share of foreign companies manufacturing non-metallic mineral prod-
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Figure 3.5 Location quotients and absolute number of investments in manufacturing by macro region
Source: Hoppenstedt database
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ucts. Likewise, the northern part attracted a fairly low share of electrical engineering companies.
3.5 Conclusion
FDI in CEE is still moderate when viewed from a global perspective. Nevertheless, its share
in worldwide inward FDI stock is growing. Factors that play a role are the recent opening
of the region to FDI and the cautious strategy of foreign companies. The latter is caused by
the transition-related recession in the whole of CEE, unclear and weak legislation on FDI,
and the meager transition efforts of many CEE countries. There appears to be a strong
relation between the differences in the progress in transition between countries and the
inflow of FDI.
As one of the countries that already has progressed a long way on the transformation
path, Hungary has emerged as the main destination for foreign capital in CEE. More spe-
cifically we found three transition-related factors that may explain the country’s attractive-
ness to foreign companies: (1) the privatization policy that favored direct sales to foreigners;
(2) the market-oriented ‘goulash communism’ before 1989; and (3) relatively clear and lib-
eral laws on FDI, already from 1988 onwards.
One of the aims of this chapter was to provide an overview of the sectoral and geo-
graphical characteristics of FDI in Hungary. Next to its general relevance for this study, this
overview provides information that will be used in the following chapter where we deal with
the data collection for the empirical research. The outcomes of this chapter are used for
selecting regions and sectors for the study. Budapest is no doubt the main destination area
of foreign capital. The northwest of Hungary is a second major area that has attracted rela-
tively large amounts of FDI, especially where investments in the manufacturing industry are
concerned. In fact we might conclude that Budapest and the northwest of Hungary host
the largest concentration of FDI in the whole of CEE.
In terms of foreign capital the manufacturing industry is the most important within
which the food and beverages sector, the engineering sector and the chemical industry are
the main destinations. However, the chemical industry has become more important only
recently. FDI in this sector was only moderately important in our own database based on
1993 data (compare also KSH, 1994; Van Hastenberg, 1996b).
NOTES
1 A monthly publication from The Economist Intelligence Unit.
2 For an overview of fallacies and methodological problems with FDI, see Van Rietbergen (1994), UNCTAD
(1998) and EBRD (1998).
3 The figure for Poland from BCE ($ 20.6 bln) is more than twice that from UN/ECE ($ 8.6 bln). Another
remarkable difference between the two sources is that the figures for the Russian Federation and the Czech
Republic quoted in BCE are lower than the ones presented by the UN/ECE, whereas the figures for all
other countries are higher.
4 This is also indicated by the FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product, which is highest for
Hungary (33%). That is notably higher than the figure for Estonia, the second runner-up with 20%. The
average for CEE is less than 6% (UNCTAD, 1998).
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5 As companies with foreign capital participation account for 37.2% of employment and 55.4% of output,
domestic companies employ 62.8% of the employees and produce 44.6% of output. So, (37.2 : 55.4) : (62.8
: 44.6) = 2.1.
6 Relative to the inward flows in the following years in Hungary. Compared to other countries in CEE and
the then USSR the figure is high. Total inflows in 1990 in CEE were $ 461 million, leaving a mere $ 150
million that was invested in all other countries in CEE. Besides, the USSR was hit by $ 400 million of de-
sinvestments (ECE, 1998b).
7 One of the major changes in this law is the establishment of a new privatization agency, the Hungarian
Privatization and State Holding Company (APV Rt) under direct control of the Ministry of Finance. In the
APV, the two former privatization agencies were joined together: The State Property Agency (SPA), which
was in charge of the sale of state-owned enterprises to third parties and the Hungarian State Holding Com-
pany (HSHC), which was set up for the administration of companies in strategic sectors which would stay
under state control, and those which were only to be privatized in the long term.
8 This goes not only for Hungary, as we will see below. Moreover, the Scandinavian countries have been
important source countries for foreign direct investment in the Baltic states (Meyer, 1998).
9 However, the political argument is important only in an indirect way, as it can not be a relevant factor for
single investors. Ever since the fall of communism, the German government has made great strides in put-
ting CEE on the EU agenda. Moreover, Germany is the leading country in providing financial and other
support. It might be suggested that these political actions have had some effect on the investment behavior
of German companies.
10 Originally, Cséfalvay (1994) refers to the innovation axes as the areas along which the greatest number of
private companies with limited liability per capita are located. The geographic location of these new inno-
vation axes is molded by the fact that today’s sector of private owners has evolved, to a large extent, out of
the stratum of early entrepreneurs established during the era of the liberalized command economy which
was strongest in Budapest and in the Northern Transdanubian region in the 1980s. The author continues by
noting that the establishment of foreign companies follows a similar geographical pattern. These innovation
axes contrast with the energy and heavy industry axis in the pre-1989 era, which ran from the northeastern
regions through Budapest towards the southwestern regions covering Miskolc, Salgótarján, Budapest, Ta-
tabánya , Székesfehérvár, Veszprém and Zalaegerszeg. In contrast, Barta (1989) refers to an industrial axis,
including Györ-Moson-Sopron, Veszprém, Komárom, Pest, Nógrád, Heves, and Borson-Abaúj-Zemplén).
For more information on regional differentiation in Hungary, see for instance, Nemes-Nagy (1994; 1995),
Nemes-Nagy and Ruttkay (1994) and Kennis and Schluter (1994).
11 To compare, in 1940, the dominant position of Budapest was even more pronounced, as two-thirds of
industrial production came from Budapest (Barta, 1989). Moreover, by 1970, half of the industrial workers
in Hungary were employed in plants with headquarters in Budapest (Barta & Conti, 1994).
12 Here we only discuss the factors in the attractiveness of the whole northwest to FDI. In later chapters we
will discuss the location-specific advantages of different cities/agglomerations in more detail.
13 For a more elaborate analysis see Van Hastenberg (1996b)
14 Despite a general policy of the Hungarian government to decrease tax holidays for foreign companies, so as
to create equal opportunities for both domestic and foreign companies.
15 There are 42 missing values. The figure of HUF 193 billion is corrected for 460 companies.
16 Figure is corrected for 460 companies (25 missing values).
17 A location quotient is a measure of the relative representation of a particular sector in a particular area,
compared to the relative representation of that sector in the whole area. When the location quotient is 1,
the sector in question is equally represented in the area concerned as in the whole area. When the location
quotient is 2, the sector in question is represented twice as much in the area concerned than in the whole
area.
18 Location quotients for the distribution of invested capital are not calculated. The low number of companies
in some sectors in a number of areas, combined with the fact that for 42 cases no figures for invested capi-
tal are available, would lead to an inaccurate presentation.
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Data collection and basic company
characteristics
4.1 Introduction
Available data do not allow for an in-depth analysis of the effects of FDI on the moderni-
zation of production (both direct and indirect) and on the demand for labor. In order to
find answers to the research questions posted in the second chapter we had to collect our
own data. We chose to interview staff at both foreign firms operating in Hungary and do-
mestic Hungarian companies. By conducting interviews, we did not only obtain insight into
these issues but we were also able to study the relation between modernization and labor on
the company level. As was already pointed out in the preceding chapter, the selection of
companies for the interviews was one of the reasons for setting up a database of foreign
manufacturing establishments in Hungary.
This chapter starts with a description of the fieldwork, including the selection of the
companies (section 4.2), and the organization of the interviews (section 4.3). In section 4.4
we give a brief description of some basic characteristics of the companies in the sample,
such as entry modes, motives for investment, source countries, year of establishment, com-
pany size, and profitability.
4.2 Selection of companies
4.2.1 Foreign companies
The Hoppenstedt database that we referred to for a description of the foreign companies in
the manufacturing sector in the previous chapter was used to select the companies for the
interviews. We focused on a limited number of the foreign companies. First, we selected all
the foreign manufacturing companies with at least 20 employees. A minimum staff of 20
employees suggests that companies are seriously committed to their manufacturing under-
taking in Hungary as regards organization of production and labor, in contrast to companies
of say 5 employees.
The remaining companies were selected on the basis of two criteria: location (region),
and sector of activity. In setting these criteria, two guidelines were followed. First, there was
the need to select a sufficient number of foreign companies for interview. Second, there
had to be enough diversity between the companies active in different sectors and located in
different regions. Consequently, the following selections were made concerning:
4
82
1. Location (region): the companies had to be located in the center or northwest macro re-
gion. This includes Budapest and the counties of Pest, Györ-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Vesz-
prém, Komárom-Esztergom, and Fejér. The motivation behind the selection of compa-
nies in central and northwest Hungary is threefold. First, these regions host the lion’s
share of foreign investment in Hungary as seen in the previous chapter. This was an im-
portant consideration since we had to be able to select enough foreign companies for
the interviews, all the more reason in view of more selection criteria. The second moti-
vation was that, despite this concentration in FDI, there had to be enough diversity be-
tween these regions. The unique position of Budapest and its surroundings has already
been discussed. The border regions (Györ-Moson-Sopron and Vas) have also attracted a
lot of FDI compared to the rest of the country. In contrast, the counties of Veszprém
and Komárom-Esztergom did not attract a lot of foreign capital. A third consideration
was more of a practical nature. During the limited time we were in Hungary we wanted
to conduct as many interviews as possible. This could best be done by limiting the geo-
graphical scope of our study.
2. Sector of activity: the companies had to be active in mechanical engineering, electrical engi-
neering or the food and beverages sector. Here again, the main motivation was to find
enough companies in our database and enough diversity between the three sectors. The
three selected sectors are the ones most endowed with FDI (see chapter 3). Moreover,
these three sectors within the manufacturing industry are sufficiently different in terms
of the nature of activities. This goes also for mechanical and electrical engineering.
Whereas the first is mainly labor intensive and producing in small batches, the second is
mainly capital intensive, engaging in mass production.
Taking into account the abovementioned criteria 110 foreign companies were selected from
the database (table 4.1). Next to the selection criteria mentioned above, we wanted to select
companies by their mode of investment because this is the most important explanatory
variable in our research. We expected to find different outcomes regarding technological
modernization, the demand for labor, and the intensity and nature of contacts with domes-
tic companies for foreign privatized companies and greenfield investments. Consequently,
entry mode would be an important and legitimate selection criterion. However, the Hop-
penstedt company directory did not contain this information. Besides, as we will see below
(section 4.4.1), the mode of investment is not a static issue. Therefore, in most cases the
mode of entry could only be ascertained during the interviews.
Our aim was to carry out 50 interviews with foreign companies. Rather than give a repre-
sentative picture of foreign companies in these sectors and regions in Hungary, the aim of
this study was to conduct a satisfactory number of interviews at companies active in differ-
ent sectors, located in different regions and with different modes of investment, enabling us
to compare the outcomes for each of these three variables both qualitatively and quantita-
tively. Therefore, from these 110 companies, we took a disproportionate stratified sample1.
Looking at the outcome in table 4.1, this means that our sample would have an overrepre-
sentation of companies in mechanical engineering and the food and beverages sector, and
companies located in the northwest of Hungary. Moreover, as most companies invested by
means of an acquisition of an SOE (see chapter 3), this means that there would be relatively
many greenfield companies in our sample. We figured that these 110 companies would be
enough to get a satisfactory number of companies in each subgroup.
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Table 4.1 Selected population of foreign companies from the Hoppenstedt database
Sector
Mechanical
engineering
Electrical
engineering
Food &
beverages
Total
Region
Center 20 45 17 82
Northwest 10 7 11 28
Total 30 52 28 110
SAMPLE OF FOREIGN COMPANIES
In the last few years, a lot of foreign companies have been inundated with queries and visits
from foreign researchers, students, and journalists. The Budapest-based companies have
been the most affected, since these foreign ‘information seekers’ generally choose the line
of least resistance. As Budapest is the pulsating center of Hungary, where most foreign
companies are located, or at least their headquarters or representation offices2, there is no
real need to go into the countryside in order to get information. The same goes for some
large greenfield production plants of multinational companies in the northwest – like
SUZUKI, OPEL, AUDI and IBM – that have gained a lot of attention in the Hungarian and
international media, and are the subject of study in a lot of scientific work. We expected
that both Budapest-based foreign companies and large foreign greenfield investments in the
northwest would have developed some aversion to giving interviews.
Nevertheless, we were able to fulfill the targeted number of 50 interviews. Contrary to
our assumptions, there were only a handful foreign companies that would not participate in
the research. Because we had set a target of 50 interviews, and because our selection of
companies was disproportional, statistically response levels could not be calculated. Never-
theless, the willingness of companies to cooperate in our research, and the number of inter-
views conducted allowed us to meet each of the set criteria. We were able to carry out
enough interviews in Budapest and at the large greenfield production plants as mentioned
above. Contrary to smaller companies in Budapest, most smaller companies located in the
northwest of Hungary – though taken by surprise when we approached them for an inter-
view – were actually very pleased to participate in our research.
We were able to carry out a somewhat equal number of interviews according to all three
selection criteria (figure 4.1). As for sectors, the numbers are fairly equal. With respect to
region, there is a small difference between the number of interviews conducted in the cen-
ter region and the northeast of Hungary. Considering the geographical spread of the com-
panies in our first sample (table 4.1) this is not that surprising. With respect to mode of
investment, we were able to hold more interviews at privatized companies than at greenfield
companies. Several reasons can be given for this. First, since the Hoppenstedt database
does not provide this information, we were not able to select companies by mode of in-
vestment beforehand. Second, in terms of the number of establishments, there are far more
foreign privatized companies in Hungary than greenfield companies. Nevertheless, in order
to carry out enough interviews at greenfield investments, during the final stage of the field-
work we directed our attention on arranging interviews at companies which we knew from
other sources (newspapers, other studies etc.) were greenfields.
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Figure 4.1 Number of interviews at foreign companies by mode of investment, region, and sector
4.2.2 Domestic companies
Besides foreign companies, we held interviews at domestic companies. Our aim was to
study the domestic companies as a control group for the foreign companies. By questioning
domestic companies as well, we are able to compare our findings from both foreign and
domestic companies and to put them into perspective. To achieve this purpose we planned
20 interviews at domestic companies.
The same selection criteria were used for domestic companies. Only the criterion con-
cerning mode of investment was modified. Three types of domestic companies were identi-
fied: privatized domestic companies, greenfield domestic companies, and state-owned com-
panies. However, as with foreign companies, this information was unavailable in the Hop-
penstedt company directory. At the time the interviews were conducted (the beginning of
1997), privatization was almost completed. The companies which were at that time still in
state hands, would either be privatized in the near future, stay in state ownership or would
be liquidated shortly. Therefore it was not realistic to include these companies in our re-
search. Hence, a distinction between privatized and greenfield domestic companies was
used.
In selecting domestic companies from the Hoppenstedt company directory, we selected
at random domestic companies that followed our criteria about size, location and sector.
Next, we verified by telephone whether they met our criteria. Moreover, during the later
stage of the fieldwork these criteria were narrowed to those regions and sectors for which
we did not have a satisfactory number of interviews. Despite a slightly different selection
method than that for foreign companies, the domestic companies in our research were
taken from a disproportional stratified sample as well.
SAMPLE OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES
We were only able to hold 13 interviews at domestic companies during our fieldwork, partly
because it was difficult to find companies that satisfied our selection criteria, and partly be-
cause of the refusal of many companies to participate in the research. The failure of com-
panies to meet our selection criteria was due to the following: a) a recent staff reduction
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through which a company no longer met the minimum of 20 employees; b) the company
closed down recently; c) during the phone call it appeared that the company was either in
the hands of the state or recently sold to a foreign strategic investor; d) the company was
undergoing privatization.
As for the unwillingness of companies to participate in the research, some companies
gave reasons, others did not. With others, it was so difficult to make an appointment, that is
was clear that they did not want to participate in the research. Some other companies had
recently undergone a tedious privatization. These companies were finally privatized and sold
to Hungarian owners, but for a long time it was not clear if these companies were to be sold
to foreign strategic investors. Under those circumstances, the management did not find it
appropriate to have a foreigner visit the company, envisaging that it would only ferment
trouble among the employees. More in general for many companies we simply had the dis-
advantage of being a foreign researcher from a foreign university, despite the fact that con-
tacts with these companies were made by a Hungarian student and despite our cooperation
with a Hungarian research institute (for further details on the organization of the interviews
see section 4.3).
Figure 4.2 Number of interviews at domestic companies by region and by sector
Because of the low response levels, it was not possible to interview an equal number of
companies in each of the selected regions and sectors (figure 4.2). Moreover, we were not
able to interview any domestic greenfield company, probably due to a combination of the
following 3 reasons: 1) the low response levels; 2) the limited number of domestic
greenfield companies in Hungary; and 3) the high likelihood that domestic greenfields are
still very small and therefore do not meet the minimum requirement of 20 employees.
4.2.3 Implications of the foreign and domestic samples for the research
Both the method of sampling used, and the number of cases (interviews) have repercus-
sions for the analyses in the following chapters, and the interpretation of the results. We will
shortly discuss these repercussions here.
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First of all we have to state that the research is intended to be primarily qualitative. Dur-
ing the interviews we were first of all interested in the processes under study, and the sur-
rounding circumstances. However, the number of interviews, 50 at foreign companies and
13 at domestic companies, allows for some simple quantitative analysis as well. Especially
since we used a disproportionate stratified sample, we are able to make comparisons be-
tween companies operating in different sectors, located in different regions, and in the case
of foreign companies different entry modes. However, by diversifying more than two of
these variables, the number of cases in each cell becomes too low to allow any firm conclu-
sions.
Moreover, we are not able to relate our findings to the whole of northwest and central
Hungary or the whole of Hungary (as for the three sectors). In this respect, this study is
exploratory in nature, not only because of the rather limited number of cases in our sample.
The main reason is the disproportionate sample comprising foreign privatized and
greenfield companies. First, there are no figures on the number of privatized and greenfield
companies in Hungary, let alone for the manufacturing sector. Second, we used our own
definition of greenfield companies (and therefore also for privatized companies), in relation
to whether or not they have (had) to deal with the legacy of the socialist system directly.
Finally, since we were unable to conduct interviews at domestic greenfield companies,
the foreign and domestic companies in our survey can only be compared to a limited ex-
tent. Strictly speaking, we are only able to compare foreign privatized with greenfield com-
panies, and foreign privatized companies with domestic ones:
Foreign greenfield Foreign privatized
Domestic privatized Foreign privatized.
The mode of investment (by foreign companies) and the type of company (where domestic
companies are concerned) are the main explanatory variables in our research. However, as
these variables do not have a bearing on all the issues under study in this research, we can
(also) make a comparison between foreign (greenfield and privatized) and domestic compa-
nies.
Summarizing, we can conclude that the research is mainly qualitative in nature. The
method of disproportional stratified sampling allows for some simple statistical analysis.
However, the quantitative analysis is mostly only indicative in nature.
4.3 Organization of the interviews
The interviews were taken during a 3-month visit to Hungary from February till April 1997.
We were based at the Center for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in
Budapest. From there, the companies were approached for an appointment by telephone.
This seemed to be the fastest and most convenient way to approach the companies. A
Hungarian student from the Economic University in Budapest was hired to assist with ar-
ranging the appointments and if necessary to carry out the interviews in Hungarian. In
some cases, where the managers asked for additional information about the research and
the questionnaire before agreeing to an interview, we send it to them.
For the interviews we used a structured questionnaire with both open and classified
questions (see annex 1 and 2). For reasons of comparison, the questionnaires for foreign
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and domestic companies were practically the same. The questionnaire consisted of 6 sepa-
rate parts:
1. a checklist containing some basic information from the Hoppenstedt company directory
to be verified with the interviewee;
2. a section with some general questions about the company and the background of the
investment (or in the case of domestic companies the privatization of the company or
the motives for establishment);
3. a section with questions on technological modernization;
4. a section with questions on labor;
5. a section with questions on contacts with domestic companies (in the case of FDI) or
contacts with foreign companies (in the case of domestic companies);
6. some concluding statements on the central topics in this study.
Considering the themes of our research, it was preferable to speak with the general man-
ager, production manager, personnel manager, or if this was not possible with the PR man-
ager. Since in most cases the names of key managers were listed in the Hoppenstedt com-
pany directory, it was fairly easy to get in touch with the right person. At foreign compa-
nies, we preferred to speak to a foreign manager, because they were expected to have a
more objective opinion about the (changes in the) company, and be more able to relate the
situation in the Hungarian plant to their companies in the West. However, in a large num-
ber of the foreign companies, the management is largely or fully Hungarian.
Interviews were conducted in English, German or Hungarian. Therefore a total of six
different questionnaires were used: in three different languages for both foreign and do-
mestic companies. Whenever possible, the interview was conducted in English or German.
An additional Hungarian questionnaire or an oral explanation by the Hungarian student was
used sometimes. In a limited number of cases, mainly with domestic companies, the inter-
view had to be held in Hungarian, since the interviewee was unable to speak English or
German. The interview was then translated by the student into English. On average the
interviews took about 1 hour and 15 minutes. A fast interview would take about 45 minutes,
a slow one 2 hours or longer.
4.4 Basic characteristics of foreign and domestic companies in the survey
In this section we provide some basic characteristics of the companies in the survey using
information from the checklist and the first section of the questionnaire dealing with some
general information about the companies. First, we deal with the entry modes in more de-
tail. Second, we look at foreign investors’ motives for investment. Third, we look at the
source countries of investment (for foreign companies only) and the year of establishment
/ privatization. Fourth, we deal with the size of the companies, both by their number of
employees and annual sales. Fifth, we discuss the profitability of the companies in the sur-
vey, and their ranking among other firms.
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4.4.1 Entry modes of foreign companies
In section 4.2 we already gave a description of the mode of investment of the foreign com-
panies in our survey. In this section we look at the mode of investment on the basis of the
more detailed classification used in section 2.3. In addition, we look at the dynamics in the
mode of investment of foreign companies. After all, a foreign investment is not a static
phenomenon, although the relatively short time that foreign companies are operational in
Hungary has brought about relatively modest changes up till now. To clarify the dynamics
in the investment modes of foreign companies we distinguished between the type of in-
vestment at time of the establishment of the company and the type of investment at the
time the interviews were held (table 4.2). Most changes in the mode of investment are within
the two broad modes (privatized and greenfield companies). The table shows a shift from
joint ventures to fully foreign-owned companies, both in privatized and greenfield compa-
nies. This is an indication for the cautious but aggressive investment strategy of foreign
companies in Hungary. Moreover, it shows a growing trust in the transition process and the
macro-economic developments in Hungary. For example, from the 17 foreign investors in
our research that started as a joint venture acquisition, 6 have been transformed into a
100% acquisition. From the 11 companies which remained joint ventures, 4 have increased
their equity share since the establishment.
Table 4.2 Mode of investment of surveyed foreign companies at time of establishment (t0) and at
the time the interviews were held (t1)
Mode of investment
t0 (establishment) t1 (interview)
Privatization 31 29
Acquisition 14 18
Joint venture acquisition 17 11
Greenfield 19 21
Greenfield investment 6 10
Joint venture greenfield investment 6 4
‘Semi’-greenfield investment 7 7
Total 50 50
At the time of establishment, 31 companies in our survey can be characterized as an in-
vestment in privatization. Currently this number has changed to 29. Apparently, two com-
panies have changed from a privatized company to a greenfield company. The first is
ESKIMO, a UNILEVER investment in Veszprém. They bought a state ice cream factory.
Within one year the old building was replaced by a new one, and the plant was furnished
with equipment using the latest technologies. The company was mainly interested in ac-
quiring a local brand. Besides, proximity to a dairy (supply) and the main sales market for
ice cream in Hungary (Lake Balaton) has played a role in the acquisition. So where the initial
entry mode was an acquisition, the current entry mode can be characterized as a greenfield
investment. The second is the investment of DR. OETKER which started as an acquisition,
having bought a subsidiary of GYÖRI KEKSZ. Actually, the brand name of GYÖRI KEKSZ was
bought for baking additives, together with the license for the production of DR. OETKER
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products and the sales markets and the like, but they leased the plant with the machines.
After some time they decided to build a greenfield plant on the other side of the street were
there was a vacant field, keeping the same employees. Unhygienic circumstances in the old
leased building prompted the move.
In the following chapters, where we present our empirical findings, we will not deal with
the five different entry modes as presented in table 4.2, but use the broader distinction be-
tween privatized and greenfield foreign companies. First, because based on the main as-
sumption – that is whether or not companies have (had) to cope with the legacy of the so-
cialist system directly – we expect the differences between the two main entry modes to
override differences between their respective sub-categories. The second reason is of a
methodological nature. The rather limited number of companies under survey forces us to
work with as few as possible separate categories in the analyses. Otherwise, it will not be
possible to do any quantitative analysis, next to our qualitative findings.
The above has shown that the entry modes of foreign investments in Hungary can not
be treated as a static issue. However, for reasons of comparison we consider the entry mode
– which is the most important independent variable – in the following empirical chapters a
constant factor. The situation at t1 was used, that is the situation at the time the interviews
were conducted3. This requires an adjustment for the two companies that were described
above, that started as privatized companies, but are currently greenfield plants. Therefore,
for these two companies, we consider the moment of the establishment of the greenfield
company as t0 in our analyses. Accordingly, where we refer in this study to entry mode or
mode of investment of the companies under survey, we refer to the situation at the time the
interview was held (t1), unless stated otherwise.
4.4.2 Foreign companies’ motives for investment
In the survey we asked companies why they decided to invest in Hungary. Next to the two
main motives mentioned in chapter two, we added ‘strategic reasons’ as a third motive.
However, when a strategic reason appears the main motive for investment, it is always con-
nected with either market or cost considerations. Strategic reasons may in that case be the
cause for precipitating the actual investment. For instance, when related to market consid-
erations, the willingness to be ‘in the market’ and to gain a position in Hungary ahead of
other competitors might be a valid motive for an investment in Hungary, especially since
the country opened up overnight, and SOEs with a monopoly position in the Hungarian
market are put up for sale. When related to cost considerations, the possibility of buying a
company that is suitable for outward processing might quicken the actual investment.
Table 4.3 shows that both market considerations and low production costs are important
motives to invest in Hungary. The Hungarian market was most frequently mentioned as the
most important motive. Low production costs was mentioned more often as a second mo-
tive of investment. Therefore, our findings are in line with earlier research. Moreover, table
4.3 shows clearly that for the majority of the foreign investors, there is more than one mo-
tive that plays a role in the investment. This is especially valid for companies for which
strategic reasons or the Hungarian market is the main motive.
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Table 4.3 Motives of foreign companies to invest in Hungary
Most important
Hungarian market 24
Second most important
Production costs 12
Strategic reasons 6
Production costs 19 Hungarian market 2
Strategic reasons 7
Strategic reasons 7 Hungarian market 5
Production costs 2
Total 50 34
We found that the motives for investment differ from one sector to another (table 4.4). As
for food and beverages, the prospect of tapping the local market is by far the main reason
for investing in Hungary. However, for companies engaged in mechanical or electrical engi-
neering the picture is more diverse. In electrical engineering, both market and cost consid-
erations are important. In mechanical engineering, the main motive is related to production
costs.
Table 4.4 Main motive for investment by sector
Mechanical engineering Electricial engineering Food & beverages
(N=16) (N=17) (N=17)
Hungarian market 18.7 41.2 82.4
Production costs 56.3 52.9 5.9
Strategic reasons 25.0 5.9 11.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
4.4.3 Source countries and year of establishment
The source countries of the foreign investors in the survey more or less follow the general
picture of total FDI in Hungary. Most companies in our survey are German, followed by
Austrian investors (figure 4.3). Apart from some large multinationals (like STOLLWERCK,
TEMIC TELEFUNKEN, SIEMENS, OPEL, AUDI and DR. OETKER), investments from these two
countries also include a relatively large number of medium-sized companies. Investors from
the USA are smaller in number, though their average invested capital is expected to be
much higher (it includes for instance large investments of GENERAL ELECTRIC, IBM and
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES). However, we did not ask the companies for the amount of capi-
tal invested. Investments of Dutch companies are ranked fourth, including UNILEVER,
AMSTEL, and PHILIPS. From the United Kingdom, which is the home base of a lot of multi-
national companies, 4 investments are included in our survey. Investments from other
countries include Japan, Switzerland, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and Cyprus.
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Figure 4.3 Source countries of foreign companies in the survey (numbers in brackets refer to the
number of companies)
In light of the present study, the year of establishment is important. Especially in the case
of privatized companies (both foreign and domestic), the year of establishment determines
the period a company has had to modernize production and to bring about changes related
to labor.
The majority of the foreign companies in our 1997 survey were established between 1989
and 1993: 18 out of 21 greenfields and 26 out of 29 privatized companies (figure 4.4). For
privatized companies this means that they have had enough time to modernize their plants,
or at least have made a good start with it4.
Two greenfield plants were set up already before the changes in 1989: one in 1983 and
the other in 1985. Both investments are joint venture greenfields, that is newly established
companies together with one or more local partners.
Figure 4.4 Year of establishment of surveyed companies
Overall, the domestic companies in the survey were established somewhat later than foreign
companies. From the 13 domestic companies in our survey, 5 were privatized only in 1994.
Another 3 were privatized in 1993. Two reasons explain why for privatized companies, do-
mestic companies were established later than foreign companies. First, the privatization
policy in Hungary favored the sale of SOEs to foreign strategic investors. Second, the ne-
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gotiations for privatization generally took longer in the case of privatization by domestic
owners.
What does this mean for the analyses of modernization and labor in the following chap-
ters? In general there has been enough time for the companies in the survey to modernize
production, or at least make a good start with it (as might be the case for companies estab-
lished after say 1993). The year of establishment does not constitute a problem for the
analyses, although we have to remember that domestic companies, in general, are estab-
lished a little later than foreign companies.
4.4.4 Size of the companies
We measured the size of the companies both by their number of employees and their an-
nual sales in 1996. The establishment is the unit of measurement5. The companies in our
survey together employ 36,300 people: 30,196 in foreign companies (of which 10,000 alone
are employed by GE TUNGSRAM), and 6,104 in domestic companies. On average, a foreign
company employed 604 people, while a domestic company employed 470 people.
Looking at the breakdown of employment by company in different classes we see large
differences in size (figure 4.5). The survey contains companies with 20 employees, as well as
some major employers that engage 1,000 people or more. A somewhat equal number of
companies (both foreign and domestic) were questioned in each of the classes presented.
Figure 4.5 Size distribution of surveyed companies in 1996 (number of employees)
Another way of determining the size of companies is their annual sales figures (figure 4.6).
Here also, we see a somewhat equal number of companies in each category. We have to
note here, however, that not all foreign companies were willing to reveal their sales figures
for one reason or another. Among these are some of the larger investments in our survey
(that are also among the largest investors in Hungary). Most of them would probably be
classified in the higher classes (more that HUF 5 billion). For domestic companies there
were no missing data.
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Figure 4.6 Annual sales in 1996 of surveyed companies (in HUF billiona)
a N=40. 10 companies would not give their sales figures. These included some of the major investors in
Hungary, including GE TUNGSRAM, OPEL, and AUDI. The average exchange rate in 1996 was $ 1 =
HUF 151.85. This means that HUF 1.0 bln is equivalent to $ 6.6 mln.
Among the foreign companies, large differences are found. The smallest foreign companies
reported annual sales of equal to, or less than HUF 100 million (equal to $ 6.6 million). In
contrast, two companies reported annual sales of more than HUF 20 billion. This includes
MAGYAR SUZUKI (HUF 30.0 bln) and IBM (HUF 60.7 bln). In general, the domestic compa-
nies under survey are smaller than foreign companies. Half of them are to be found in the
smallest class (up to $ 3.3 million).
4.4.5 Profitability and ranking
FOREIGN COMPANIES
In the early transition years, investments in CEE including Hungary were characterized by a
relatively large number of companies seeking short term profits. These companies were
mainly active in vague trade activities, and profited from the very favorable tax holidays that
were introduced by the government to attract foreign companies. In a number of cases
these investments were even not more than a P.O. Box company (Van Hastenberg, 1993).
In recent years, these kinds of activities have come to an end, as their aim was either ful-
filled or their activities were not profitable anymore.
Nowadays, most investments in Hungary are of a different nature. Investors no longer
seek short term profits per se. Improvements have been introduced in the organization.
Investors appear to have mid-term or even long-term goals.
Assuming that the majority of the companies under survey are of the latter kind, we ex-
pect a vast number of these companies to be still in the investment phase. This, in its turn,
would have a negative effect on operating profits. Moreover, companies that sell a major
share of output on the Hungarian domestic market have to cope with an economic reces-
sion and falling consumer demand that are a direct result of the transformation6.
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The surveyed foreign companies were asked if their Hungarian establishment was profit-
able, breaking even or loss making. Despite our assumptions, over three-quarters of the
establishments in the survey appeared to be profitable at the time of the interviews. One
factor is that most companies under survey have been in Hungary for several years already.
Close to one-fifth of the companies was breaking even. For some of them, it is the compa-
nies’ policy to produce break even figures in the Hungarian subsidiary. These investments,
that are the result of a transfer of labor-intensive production units, produce solely for the
parent company. Profits are made at the parent company, not at the Hungarian subsidiary.
For some other companies, the fact that they are still in the investment phase is the reason
for not being profitable (yet). This also goes for the three companies that are producing at a
loss. High investments in expansion of production capacity and/or upgrading of the pro-
duction lines, often lead to a negative company result. However, these companies expect to
become profitable in the near future.
Only one company indicated that the market is another factor in point. It might be as-
sumed, however, that this counts for more companies in the survey that sell on the domes-
tic market. This particular company had to cope with a declining market, and as a result its
price setting did not incorporate inflation. Moreover, because of inflation, the production
costs are increasing, leading to margin erosion. Under such conditions, growth of the com-
pany can only be achieved with high capital expenditure.
We also asked the companies how they judge the present situation in their company
compared to other companies in the same branch in Hungary. From the 50 foreign compa-
nies in our survey, 42 indicated that they are among the better companies. For a number of
these companies this is hardly surprising, since they are the only ones active in a certain
branch. In general one could say that this outcome may be very positive, but on the other
hand it is also logical. As we already found in our theoretical chapter, a foreign company has
to offer something special, to counterbalance the natural advantage of domestic companies.
Another 8 companies see themselves as an average company in the branch concerned.
These are mostly smaller investments from medium-sized foreign companies that have to
compete with foreign investments by large multinational companies in Hungary.
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
From the 13 domestic companies in our survey, 9 indicated that they were profitable. An-
other 4 were breaking even. This is similar to our findings at foreign companies. Besides, 6
companies indicated to be among the better companies in the particular branch in Hungary,
and 7 companies see themselves as an average company. Therefore, in their eyes, their po-
sition is only slightly less favorable than foreign companies.
Nevertheless, one has to admit that these findings are somewhat surprising. After all, the
general idea about domestic Hungarian companies is that they are less competitive than the
foreign companies that invested in their country, that they use obsolete equipment to a
large extent, and that they have not adopted a Western style of entrepreneurship yet.
4.5 To conclude
This chapter gave a description of the fieldwork in Hungary, rendered an account of the
choices made, and gave a brief description of some basic characteristics of the companies
under survey. We held interviews at 50 foreign companies and 13 domestic companies. The
95
companies in our survey engage in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering or food
and beverages, and are located in the northwest or central part of Hungary. By using the
method of disproportionate stratified sampling, we are able to compare the findings for
different modes of investment, different sectors, and different regions not only qualitatively,
but also quantitatively. However, the research is primarily qualitative in nature; quantitative
results are mostly indicative in nature.
In the following three empirical chapters we try to find answers to the research questions
raised in chapter two, using information from the interviews at the survey companies.
Chapter 5 deals with technological modernization, chapter 6 sheds light on the demand for
labor and in chapter 7 we study the linkages between foreign and domestic companies and
its effects on the transfer of technology and know-how.
NOTES
1 For a description of taking stratified samples see for instance Moors and Muilwijk (1975) or Blalock (1981).
2 For instance OPEL, that has a production plant in Szentgotthard, has an (representative) office in Budapest,
covering both Hungary and Southeast Europe. The same goes for other large multinationals, like PHILIPS
and UNILEVER, that have production plants in several locations in Hungary, but with their headquarters lo-
cated in Budapest.
3 In the following chapters we study the processes taking place in the companies between the time of estab-
lishment (t0) and the time of the interviews (t1).
4 This also goes for the two privatized foreign companies that were established only in 1996. In fact, these
two companies were in majority foreign ownership already in 1988 and 1992 respectively, while the current
sole owners had only a minority equity share at that time. Apart from this, we have to mention that these
two companies have undergone far-reaching organizational and technological changes between 1996 and
the time of the interviews.
5 For domestic companies this often coincides with the size of the whole enterprise.
6 Only recently have the first countries shown a growth in their national products. However, at the end of
1997, Poland was the only country in the region that was expected to boast a gross national product (GNP)
greater than in 1989. Although one of the better countries in the region, Hungary’s GNP in 1997 was ex-
pected to reach only 90% of its 1989 level (The Economist, 1997). Moreover, by the end of 1998, Hungary
and Poland were the only two countries in the region where gross industrial production was above its 1989
level (BCE, 1999).
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Technological modernization
5.1 Introduction
One of the profound positive effects of FDI is in their contribution to the modernization
of the production structure. This is especially valid in the case of the transition economies
in CEE and therefore also for Hungary. As a consequence of forty years of communism,
Hungary was saddled with a huge technology gap compared to Western countries. Pre-1989
reforms (which started in 1968 under the New Economic Mechanism) could only reduce
this gap in a limited way. However, there were some positive exceptions among the SOEs,
since Hungary imported Western technology in relatively great numbers (as compared to
other socialist countries) in the eighties. But at the time of changeover to a market-based
economy the general picture was one of a somewhat obsolete manufacturing sector.
By using the empirical evidence provided by the interviews, we will study the contribu-
tion of foreign companies to the technological modernization of the Hungarian manufac-
turing industry in this chapter. We will give answers to the following three research ques-
tions of this thesis:
1. To what extent do foreign and domestic companies contribute to the technological
modernization of the Hungarian manufacturing industry?
2. What are the motives for technological modernization, how is the modernization proc-
ess taking place, and what are the plans for future investments?
3. Is there a difference in modernization between companies active in different sectors and
companies located in different regions?
In order to answer these questions, the following outline is used in this chapter. After a
short introduction on the methodology used, a general comparison is made pertaining to
technological modernization in foreign privatized, foreign greenfield and domestic privat-
ized companies shortly (section 5.2). Next technological modernization in all three types of
companies is dealt with in separate sections in more detail (sections 5.3 to 5.5). In the con-
cluding sixth section, we summarize the main conclusions in this chapter.
5
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5.2 Methodology and general findings
5.2.1 Methodology
In our research on technological modernization, we asked the respondents to classify their
production equipment both at time of establishment1 and at present. Four classes were se-
lected beforehand: totally obsolete (archaic), somewhat obsolete, accepted international
standard and state-of-the-art. The managers we spoke to, did not have any problems with
the classification of their company’s production equipment according to the selected
classes. In our analysis of technological modernization we derived the percentage of obso-
lete equipment by lumping together totally and somewhat obsolete equipment. By compar-
ing the outcome both at time of establishment and at present we can say something about
the technological modernization. Moreover, we calculated the decrease in obsolete equip-
ment between the two points in time. This figure, however, can not give more than a rough
indication of modernization. After all, a company that started with a high percentage of
obsolete equipment can register a higher decrease than a company that started with only a
limited proportion of obsolete production equipment.
Besides, the managers were asked for the current average age of the main production
equipment. This way the other three measures can be put in perspective. The four chosen
indicators together give a good picture of the state of a company’s equipment at time of
establishment and at present, and consequently of the contribution to technological mod-
ernization.
In order to determine the differences in technological modernization for different types
of companies, companies in different sectors and located in different regions, different sta-
tistical analyses were used. First in our general comparison between the three types of com-
panies we used one-way analysis of variance. However, since the sample is rather limited,
analysis of variance becomes unreliable when we analyze the differences across the different
types of companies, by sector and in different regions. For instance, as regards privatized
companies in different sectors, the sample of 29 privatized companies is split in three
groups. Moreover, all three sectors contain a different number of companies. In these cases
the F-curve becomes unreliable. Therefore, two other statistical tests were used to calculate
differences: the Mann-Whitney test for two independent samples (as in macro regions) and
the Kruskal-Wallis test for three independent samples (as in sectors). Both tests are reliable
in analyzing smaller samples of differing size.
Since our sample of domestic companies is very small (13 companies) we did not apply
statistical tests to show up differences between companies operating in different sectors and
located in different regions. For domestic companies we only used the four indicators de-
scribed above.
In our statistical analysis we use three significance levels:
· p £ 0.10 (°)
· p £ 0.05 (*)
· p £ 0.01 (**)
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5.2.2 Foreign and domestic companies: general findings
Let us start by presenting some general findings on technological modernization, and ana-
lyzing the indicators as represented in the preceding section. We compare our findings for
foreign privatized and greenfield companies, and for foreign privatized and domestic pri-
vatized companies.
In chapter 2 it was stated that we expected to find large differences between foreign pri-
vatized and greenfield companies. Privatized companies have to cope with the socialist in-
heritance to a much larger extent than greenfield plants, with largely obsolete production
equipment as one of the main elements. For both greenfield and foreign privatized compa-
nies, we calculated the percentage of obsolete equipment (comprising totally obsolete and
somewhat obsolete) both at the time of establishment and at present. Besides, we calculated
the decrease in obsolete equipment between the two points in time, and the current average
age of the main production equipment. Differences between foreign privatized and
greenfield companies are analyzed using analysis of variance.
Table 5.1 Technological modernization in foreign companies by mode of investment
% Obsolete equipment
N Foundation Present Decrease
Current average
equipment age
Foreign sample total 50 38.6 19.4 19.2 6.9
Privatized companies 29 56.4 28.4 28.0 8.5
Greenfield investments 21 14.0   7.1   6.9 4.7
Difference
Analysis of variance    **    **    **    *
Our statistical analysis confirms the initial hypothesis that foreign companies can not be
seen as a homogeneous group with respect to their contribution to technological moderni-
zation. Significant differences were found for all four indicators (table 5.1). The starting
levels of privatized and greenfield companies differ significantly from one another. Privat-
ized companies have to cope with on average 56.4 % obsolete equipment when they start
their operations in Hungary. In contrast, greenfield companies start with ‘only’ 14% obso-
lete equipment. But privatized companies have done a lot to modernize their plants, result-
ing in a sharp decrease in the percentage of obsolete equipment. Nevertheless, at present
there is still a difference between privatized and greenfield companies. On average, privat-
ized companies still make use of 28.4% obsolete equipment compared to 7.1% for
greenfield companies. Besides, the average age of the main equipment in privatized compa-
nies is almost twice that of greenfield companies.
The age of equipment in greenfield companies is a somewhat misleading measure, since
it largely depends on when the investment was made. For instance the average age of
equipment in the IBM plant – founded in 1995, and enlarged with a second much larger
factory building where started production only in November 1996 – is 1 year. In contrast,
the average age in the AUER plant, an Austrian candy manufacturer which set up a produc-
tion plant in Budapest in 1989 is 6 years.
In general, managers found it more difficult to give an estimation of the average age of
equipment than to classify equipment in the four selected categories. Especially in the case
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of privatized companies, the new owners were mostly unaware of the exact age of the ac-
quired machines. Besides, the big difference in the age of the different machines is a com-
plicating factor. Many privatized companies work with brand-new equipment and equip-
ment which is 10 years or 20 years old, or even older.
Next, our sample allows for a comparison between foreign and domestic privatized
companies. We assumed that they both have to cope with obsolete equipment at the start
of their operations to a large extent. Besides, we expected to find more technological mod-
ernization in foreign-owned companies than in domestic-owned companies.
Our analysis largely confirmed our assumptions (table 5.2). Significant differences were
found for all four indicators. Both foreign and domestic privatized companies have to cope
with largely obsolete production equipment at the start of their operations. However, our
findings show that domestic privatized companies started with more obsolete equipment
than foreign privatized companies, the difference between them is almost 20 percentage
points. This finding confirms the often-heard remark that the best SOEs are sold to foreign
investors, leaving the companies in a worse condition in state hands or for privatization to
domestic owners.
Table 5.2 Modernization of production in privatized companies
% Obsolete equipment
N Foundation Present Decrease
Current average
equipment age
Foreign privatized 29 56.4 28.4 28.0 8.5
Domestic privatized 13 75.9 71.6 4.3 14.6
Difference
Mann-Whitney U      *    ** ** **
The gap between foreign and domestic companies has widened further after operations
began. In contrast with foreign privatized companies, domestic privatized companies have
hardly been able to decrease their share of obsolete equipment. As a result, at present the
average age of the main equipment is almost twice as much in domestic companies as in
foreign privatized companies (14.6 versus 8.5 years old).
In this first analysis we found significant differences between all three types of companies in
our survey with respect to their contributions to the modernization of production in Hun-
gary, and between the share of obsolete equipment at present. Privatized companies have to
cope with obsolete equipment at the start of their operations. But where foreign privatized
companies have managed to decrease the share of sub-international standard equipment
considerably, domestic companies have not. Foreign greenfield companies are in a totally
different situation as they can furnish their plants according to their own wishes, using the
latest technologies. Therefore, we can conclude that foreign greenfield and foreign privat-
ized companies both contribute to the technological modernization considerably, though in
a totally different way.
With this in mind, we will discuss the technological modernization in all three types of
companies separately and in more detail below. For each of the three types of companies
we deal with issues related to research questions 2 and 3. That means that we will discuss
how this modernization process is taking place, what the motives are for investing in more
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modern production equipment, and what the plans are for future investments. Moreover,
we look for differences in technological modernization for companies operating in different
sectors, and located in different regions.
5.3 Technological modernization in foreign privatized companies
5.3.1 Technological modernization
Privatized companies have to cope with on average 56.4% obsolete equipment at the start
of their operations: 38.3% somewhat obsolete and 18.1% totally obsolete (archaic) (figure
5.1). But most privatized companies have done a lot to modernize their plants, resulting in a
major reduction of obsolete equipment. From the 29 foreign privatized companies in our
sample, 28 have invested in new equipment after establishment. At the time the interviews
were held ‘only’ 28.4% of equipment was obsolete: the stock of somewhat obsolete equip-
ment reduced to 23.5% and totally obsolete to 4.9%. The new investments have resulted in
both an increased share of equipment of international standard and state-of-the-art equip-
ment.
Foreign investors that invested in the privatization deal with obsolete equipment in dif-
ferent ways. The way they do can be deducted from the combination of investors’ differing
strategies and differing technological starting levels, as is illustrated in the following cases. A
foreign investor may for instance (have to) opt for a gradual but steady technological mod-
ernization (see the example of UNILEVER below), replace the existing technology all at once
(SCHÖLLER and ESKIMO) or hardly change anything at all (KRACHT).
Figure 5.1 Production equipment in foreign privatized companies
UNILEVER bought a major share in a margarine factory in Budapest in 19922. The company
was owned by UNILEVER before it was nationalized in 1948, and it produced under the li-
cense of UNILEVER afterwards. UNILEVER’s policy is one of taking over local brands when-
ever possible. Besides, along with the local margarine brand Delma, UNILEVER started the
production of Rama (the same brand name UNILEVER uses to sell margarine on the Ger-
man and Austrian markets). Production is aimed solely at the local Hungarian market. After
the acquisition the company invested heavily in new equipment. Half of the investment was
allocated to increase production capacity. The other half was for the replacement of obso-
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lete equipment: to improve efficiency and the quality of the products, modern machines
were necessary. The Budapest-based plant has now become one of the better UNILEVER
plants in the world. However, the company still uses some of the old machines. For in-
stance although the wrapping machine for the cubes of Rama margarine is 40 years old, it
still works very well. This strategy, where the new foreign owner modernizes production at
a steady pace, but to some extent still makes use of the acquired machinery can be found in
the majority of the foreign privatized companies.
A totally different case is the investment of the German company SCHÖLLER that re-
placed all the existing equipment shortly after the acquisition. Therefore, it can be charac-
terized as a brownfield investment (see chapter 2). They bought an ice cream factory in
Törökbálint (a town near Budapest), which produced the local brand Leo, the market leader
at that time. It was the brand and the market share of Leo that they were interested in, and
not the company as such. Looking back it would probably have been better to invest in a
greenfield plant as the interviewee stated: “we took over many bad things which we still
have to cope with, like for instance the structure of the building”.
A different strategy was followed by another ice cream producer. ESKIMO, a UNILEVER
plant, too bought an existing factory in Veszprém (near Lake Balaton which is the most
important sales market). Already at the beginning it was clear that the factory would be re-
placed by a greenfield plant. But because of the strong competition from SCHÖLLER they
had to bridge over one season. If they had not done so, they would have missed peak sales
in the summer, and probably some of their stake in the market. Therefore, in this first year,
they replaced only some of the worst machines. At the end of the summer of 1992 the
factory was demolished completely and on the same location a new greenfield plant was
established. The local brand name, the adjacent dairy and the proximity to the main sales
market in Hungary were important factors in the investment decision, and not the building
or the technology which were totally obsolete.
In contrast to the examples above, a limited number of companies made hardly any in-
vestments in the modernization of production equipment, although the state of the equip-
ment was found wanting. One example is the German KRACHT, which bought a Hungarian
company manufacturing hydraulic pumps, electric gears and machine parts. The company
produced for the German parent company under license from 1983 onwards and was in-
volved in outward processing. When the state company was liquidated in 1992, the German
company decided to buy it. At that time all the machines were more than 10 years old. In
the meantime only limited investments have been made: to achieve greater accuracy, for
noise reduction and to replace dilapidated obsolete machines. The main reason for the re-
strictive policy and the limited modernization is the lack of money. The plant is kept short
by the parent company, which prefers to invest in Germany rather than in Hungary. The
Budapest-based plant is partly involved in outward processing for the company which
means that labor-intensive production is transferred from the German company to the
plant in Hungary. The low labor costs more than compensate for the lower productivity of
the old machines. The plant manager indicated, however, that more replacements should be
made in the near future.
FOLLOW-UP INVESTMENTS: NEW OR USED EQUIPMENT?
Thus far we have only discussed whether or a not a company has invested in new equip-
ment after the establishment and the motives for doing so. Here, ‘new’ means ‘new for the
subsidiary’. In fact this can either mean entirely new equipment, or used equipment that was
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bought from other companies, or that came from other (Western) subsidiaries of the com-
pany. The latter is referred to often in the case of FDI in CEE. Through the transfer of
production (equipment) they could extend the life cycles of products for which there is no
longer any market in the West. In our research we found no evidence for this phenomenon.
Nowadays competition in Hungary is tough and consumer demand has become more dis-
cerning in the post-socialist period (pertaining quality), matching Western standards.
Figure 5.2 Follow-up investment in foreign privatized companies (N=28)
However, investment in used equipment is a common phenomenon in privatized foreign
companies (figure 5.2). For ‘only’ 35% of the companies was follow-up investments in new
equipment. But the number of companies that have invested only in used equipment is lim-
ited to two companies. Most companies (57%) invested in both new and used equipment.
However, the extensive investment in used equipment does not imply that a large share of
the equipment is obsolete. For instance, the equipment in the two companies that invested
solely in used equipment was of international standard. Overall, investment in state-of-the-
art and international standard equipment is predominant.
New equipment was mostly bought abroad, although some was bought in Hungary. The
price difference with equipment made in Western countries is enormous. For instance, one
of the companies in our sample gave a domestic company the task to develop a new ma-
chine for producing wrapping material. The locally manufactured machine was only 10% of
the price of a German-made machine and of the same quality.
As regards follow-up investments, foreign privatized companies (notably the larger mul-
tinational companies) make use of their international network to a large extent. This might
explain the high rate of used equipment in follow-up investments as noted earlier. The
equipment used is from either the parent company or other Western subsidiaries. In the
case of a transfer of production capacity this is clear. Moreover, multinational companies
use equipment from their European subsidiaries which became available after rationalization
of production and/or overcapacity in the West for the Hungarian plant. It should be
pointed out that this does not concern written-off machinery, but often relatively new ma-
chines. In the case of a big multinational in the food industry, a more aggressive strategy
was followed. The company bought an almost new, but bankrupt plant in Spain, and closed
it immediately because of overcapacity in the West. The equipment went to subsidiaries in
several Central European countries, where they could start producing immediately for the
local markets. Normally it takes about nine months to have new machines at one’s disposal.
Some managers indicated that they invested in used machinery which they bought from
bankrupt SOEs. As we stated above, equipment in SOEs was not always obsolete. Liquida-
tion of an SOE offers the opportunity to buy relatively good machinery at bargain prices.
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MOTIVES FOR AND RESTRICTIONS TO MODERNIZATION
Considering the high proportion of obsolete equipment found, one would expect that the
replacement of obsolete equipment would be an important argument for investing in new
machinery. However, a quick look at figure 5.3 does not verify this assumption. The re-
placement of obsolete equipment was mentioned by only 5 foreign privatized companies
(17.9%). The necessity to replace old machinery may be due to several reasons. In a number
of cases managers indicated that the equipment was so obsolete that they could not work
with it, as we found for instance in the example of SCHÖLLER. Besides, obsolete equipment
needs a lot of maintenance and the risk of it falling apart is so high that it makes economic
sense to replace them. Others indicated that obsolete machines were not able to produce
the large quantities required: in these cases replacement is often preferred above investment
in additional capacity.
In fact, the motives for investment are very much interrelated. The replacement of ob-
solete equipment can be a reason in itself, but it can also be a means to improve efficiency
and to improve the quality of the products. Both these last two motives were mentioned by
the majority of the managers.
Figure 5.3 Motives for follow-up investments in foreign privatized companiesa
a N=28. Managers could give more than one motive. For instance, 78.6% of the managers of foreign privat-
ized companies that invested in new equipment after establishment indicated that higher quality was an im-
portant argument for investment.
Even in Hungary where labor costs are relatively low, the cost/efficiency argument is im-
portant. This is an indication of the inefficient production in SOEs and high costs con-
nected to this. But it is also an indication of the tough competition, not only in export mar-
kets, but also on the domestic market, since a lot of the companies in this research sell a
major part of their products on the local Hungarian market. Fierce rivalry is also reflected
by the need to improve quality, a point mentioned by almost 80% of the privatized foreign
companies. In the sectors studied, product quality is often directly related to the equipment
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used. In mechanical and electrical engineering, accuracy is an important element in the qual-
ity of the products. For instance, in the production of small electrical instruments, surface
mounted device technology (SMD) enables precision manufacturing. In fact, the use of
SMD is a prerequisite for the competitive production of small modern electronic instru-
ments. But also in the food industry there is a direct link between the technology used and
the taste (read quality). For instance a process leading computer (PLC) is used to mix the
exact proportion of the different ingredients, add ingredients at the right time and to con-
trol the whole production process in for instance chocolate or ice cream production.
Capacity expansion was mentioned by nearly 40% of the companies, an indication of the
active investment strategy of foreign companies in Hungary and their optimistic sales pro-
jections. This is also reflected in the turnover, which grew sharply in foreign privatized
companies3.
But there are in the specific case of Hungary also factors that make companies refrain
from investing in more modern equipment. One reason, mentioned by only a few managers
at foreign privatized companies is that investment in automation is not profitable because
of low labor costs. A case in point is for instance the investment of UNITED BISCUITS in
Györ4. The manager reported that they have not invested in automation, since labor costs
are low and the costs of investment in capital equipment are high, because they are bought
in the West. Therefore, it is hard to recover the costs in investment, especially since labor
costs make up only 10% of the cost price. However, in contrast, there are other companies
which invest in automation. In two companies the foreign owner or foreign partner (as in
joint ventures) is the one who blocks investments in technological modernization.
FUTURE INVESTMENTS
Although foreign privatized companies have done a lot to modernize their plants thus far,
the vast majority indicated that they were planning further investments in the near future
(two years following the interviews). From the 29 companies in our sample, 26 planned
further investments. For 2 other companies, future investments in extra capacity will de-
pend on market developments. Only 1 company had no plans to invest in new equipment
in the next two years. The manager of this company indicated that they have made enough
investments to get by for the coming years, but they intend to invest in brand-new technol-
ogy after 2000.
Future investments are often a continuation of the (necessary) technological moderniza-
tion, aimed at an improvement of their competitiveness both in domestic and export mar-
kets. Besides, in one-third of the companies future investments are in extra capacity, which
is an indication of the optimistic outlook, further intensifying the company’s involvement in
Hungary.
5.3.2 Differences: sectors and regions
Thus far we have dealt with the impact on the modernization of production in Hungary for
all foreign privatized companies. However, it might well be that there are differences be-
tween the starting levels of companies and the ensuing technological modernization be-
tween companies operating in different sectors and companies located in different regions.
As for sectors, it turns out that mechanical engineering companies on average have the
worst starting level (table 5.3). But what is more important, they modernized the equipment
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to a much smaller extent than companies in the other two sectors. The result is that at pre-
sent, mechanical engineering companies have more than twice the amount of obsolete
equipment than companies in the food and beverages sector, and three times more than
electrical engineering companies. Hence, we found a significant difference with the other
two sectors at the 0.01 level. Not surprisingly, the main equipment is much older.
The reason for the relatively poor condition of production equipment in privatized me-
chanical engineering companies probably lies in the labor-intensive nature of the produc-
tion, where handwork is an important element, and where single piece production and pro-
duction in small batches are the prevailing production forms. As a result, most foreign
companies in this sector came to Hungary because of the large savings in labor costs that
could be made (in relation to high professional skills). Investments in new technology and
automation can only partly reduce the labor intensity of production. Combined with low
labor costs, returns on investment take a long time, and therefore investments in new tech-
nology are financially rather unattractive. The example of MTD HUNGARIA is a good illustra-
tion in this respect. The company relocated the assembly of small agricultural machines
from Germany to Hungary, where wages are still at one-tenth the level in Germany. The
assembly is done by hand, which takes three times as long as in Germany where the assem-
bly is automated. Since it is still cheaper to do it manually, investment in automation is not
profitable. Nevertheless, most companies indicated that some investments have been made,
as indicated in table 5.3. First, because they had to give in to market demand, which requires
higher accuracy and more flexible responses to fluctuations in demand. Second, because the
dilapidated machinery was no longer functioning.
Table 5.3 Technological modernization in foreign privatized companies, by sector and by region
% Obsolete equipment
N Foundation Present Decrease
Current average
equipment age
Sector
Mechanical engineering 10 61.0 44.2 16.8 11.5
Electrical engineering 6 49.2 14.2 35.0 5.6
Food & beverages 13 56.2 19.5 36.7 7.4
Difference
Kruskal-Wallis n.s. ** n.s. °
Region
Center 16 59.4 26.1 33.3 6.8
Northwest 13 52.7 28.0 24.7 10.7
Difference
Mann-Whitney U n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
The production equipment in companies in electrical engineering and the food and bever-
ages sector is less obsolete than in mechanical engineering companies. But what is more
important, is that they have managed to decrease the share of obsolete equipment consid-
erably. In contrast to mechanical engineering, production in these sectors is mostly in larger
batches, and the role of technology is more important, or even a prerequisite for competi-
tive production (for instance through SMD technology, see above).
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As for regions we expected to find some differences between the center and the north-
west regions, at least with respect to the starting positions of companies. The manufacturing
sector in Hungary has been dominated by Budapest from the early years of the twentieth
century onwards. However, the manufacturing sector in the northwest of Hungary is also
generally considered to be of a relatively high level. Therefore, we would expect the starting
levels of privatized companies in the center region to be slightly better than those of com-
panies that bought an SOE in the northwest.
However, we could not find any significant differences between companies located in
the center region or the northwest of Hungary. In fact, the differences between the shares
of sub-international standard equipment are very low. Only the present age of equipment
differed to a certain extent, though it is not supported statistically.
5.4 Technological modernization in foreign greenfield companies
5.4.1 Technological modernization
In contrast to privatized companies, greenfield investments do not have to cope with largely
obsolete equipment that accompany the acquisition. Therefore, one might conclude that
greenfield companies contribute to the modernization of production by definition. How-
ever, as we found in section 5.2.2, greenfield companies use obsolete equipment as well.
When operations began they utilized on average 14% obsolete equipment: 10% somewhat
obsolete and 4% totally obsolete (figure 5.4). The equipment in one company accounts for
the latter figure (see the example of APV below). This indicates that not all plants were fur-
nished with the latest new technology. Of the 21 greenfield plants in our research, 14 solely
utilized equipment which match or surpass international standard. The other seven
greenfield plants in our survey, to some extent, make use of sub-international standard
equipment. Of these 7 companies, 4 have made further investments in improving their
equipment since establishment. Overall, 19 of the 21 greenfield companies in our survey
invested in new equipment after the setting up of the plant. As a consequence, the share of
obsolete equipment decreased to 7% at the time when the interviews were conducted. To-
tally obsolete equipment was no longer used.
Figure 5.4 Production equipment in foreign greenfield companies
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Within greenfield investments, a distinction can be made between plants that only make use
of new equipment and are mainly set up for an expansion of production capacity, and plants that
make use of used equipment, whether or not with supplementary new equipment. These
investments mainly involve a transfer of production capacity from the West. We will illustrate
these different types of greenfield investments shortly on the basis of selected cases.
Some good examples of new modern technologies which entered the country in
greenfield plants that are set up with the aim of an expansion of production capacity are found in
the automotive industry. Although the production of passenger cars was absent in Hungary
before 1989, 4 major worldwide manufacturers have set up production and assembly plants
in the northwest of Hungary: OPEL in Szentgotthard (Vas), SUZUKI in Esztergom
(Komárom-Esztergom), AUDI in Györ (Györ-Moson-Sopron) and FORD in Székesfehérvár
(Fejér). All these companies work with the latest technologies. OPEL, for instance, set up a
plant for the production of engines for several car models and the assembly of the Astra for
the local market. Between 1991 and 1997, OPEL invested DM 750 million in the Hungarian
plant, which makes OPEL one of the major foreign investors in the country. Currently the
plant produces more than 300,000 engines and assembles over 11,200 cars per annum5. At
the start of production in July 1992 the engine plant was the most modern OPEL engine
plant in the world. Additional investments after its establishment were all in the engine
plant, further increasing its capacity and flexibility. Furthermore, a new cylinder plant was
established which uses a technique which was new in Europe. This plant was built to elimi-
nate the bottlenecks at the first plant. The production line is able to produce 4 types of
cylinders at the same time and it can change in one second from the production of one type
to another.
Another greenfield company using state-of-the-art technology is IBM STORAGE
PRODUCTS in Székesfehérvár. IBM started its production of hard disk drives only in No-
vember 1995. The factory was built by VIDEOTON (a large state-owned enterprise which
was privatized and taken over by Hungarian owners) on the VIDEOTON INDUSTRIAL PARK.
Hardly a year later a second factory was built by VIDEOTON next to the first one. Besides,
IBM invested $ 110 million in the production lines. The production of hard disk drives re-
quires the use of state-of-the-art technology. Besides, since every 4-5 months a new product
is launched, the technology needs to be renewed or changed continually.
Another type of greenfield investment is induced by a transfer of production capacity because
of the lower production costs in Hungary. Mostly this concerns the shift of production
processes which are labor-intensive from Western Europe to Hungary. Since the invest-
ment in Hungary coincides with the closure of a plant or production unit in the West, often
(some of) the machines are physically transferred to the new plant. Therefore this ‘type’ of
greenfield investment differs from that of OPEL and IBM in the way that they make use of
existing (used) machines to a large extent. This explains the use of obsolete equipment in
greenfield companies as we found in figure 5.4 above. FISHER-ROSEMOUNT6, part of the
American multinational EMERSON ELECTRIC, transferred production from Germany and the
Netherlands to Székesfehérvár, where they started as a greenfield in a renovated building on
the VIDEOTON INDUSTRIAL PARK. At the start almost all equipment came from Western
European plants, but all the machines were less than one and a half years old. In addition,
some new CNC layers were bought in Hungary. Some extra equipment was bought, since
they needed a buffer: They had to build up production capacity in Hungary before they
could close their West European premises. The company is still expanding its activities in
Székesfehérvár, paving the way for further new investments.
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FOLLOW-UP INVESTMENTS: NEW OR USED EQUIPMENT?
In studying the contribution of foreign companies to the technological modernization, the
issue of follow-up investments is less important in the case of greenfield investments than
for privatized companies. Nevertheless, we found that the vast majority of the greenfield
companies invested in new equipment after their foundation. In more than half of these
companies, this involved only new equipment (figure 5.5). But, as in privatized companies,
investment in used equipment is common also in greenfield companies. In more than 42%
of the companies, follow-up investments were both in new and used equipment. In one
company, investment was only in used equipment. It concerns an investment of a German
company, that bought an empty, but already existing factory. The plant is furnished with
equipment from the parent company only, as the investment is a transfer of labor-intensive
production processes to low-labor-cost Hungary. Some 90% of the Hungarian plant’s pro-
duction is in outward processing for the parent company.
Figure 5.5 Follow-up investment in foreign greenfield companies (N=19)
These follow-up investments are mainly in state-of-the-art and international standard
equipment (as we also found at privatized companies above). However, greenfield compa-
nies invested more often solely in state-of-the-art equipment.
Used equipment came generally from other Western subsidiaries or the parent company.
This equipment became available either because the greenfield plant in Hungary is the result
of a transfer of production capacity to Hungary, or because of overcapacity in the West, or
because of rationalization in Western subsidiaries. Only one greenfield company reported
that they bought some equipment from a liquidated SOE in Hungary.
MOTIVES FOR AND RESTRICTIONS TO MODERNIZATION
From the 21 greenfield companies in our research 19 indicated that they invested in new
equipment after their establishment in Hungary. Because of a totally different starting posi-
tion as compared to privatized companies, one might expect that different motivations play
a role in follow-up investments. As figure 5.6 shows, we found similar motives as with for-
eign privatized companies, but the frequencies of each motive differed. The active invest-
ment strategy of most greenfield companies is reflected by the fact that both capacity ex-
pansion and the production of new products are important motives for the investment in
new equipment. Surprisingly, the improvement of quality and the costs/efficiency argument
are mentioned often as well. Tough competition on both domestic and export markets
forces the companies to improve the quality of the products and reduce cost constantly. In
this respect, they do not differ from any other company in the West.
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Figure 5.6 Motives for follow-up investments in foreign greenfield companiesa
a N=19. Managers could give more than one motive. For instance, 42.1% of the managers of foreign green-
field companies that invested in new equipment after establishment indicated that higher quality was an im-
portant argument for investment.
Restrictions to follow-up investments were not reported frequently, since most companies
made a lot of extra investments. Some managers at greenfield companies indicated that
there was no need for technological modernization, since the company was producing with
state-of-the-art or international standard equipment already.
FUTURE INVESTMENTS
As we already referred to above, a lot of greenfield companies are still in the investment
phase. This explains why we found the large share of the companies planning future in-
vestments. From the 21 greenfields in our sample, 13 were planning future investments.
This can be interpreted in two ways. Either it is an indication of the careful strategy related
to higher risks in setting up greenfield plants, or it is an exponent of their positive expecta-
tions, which exceeded their initial projections. For another 4 companies future investments
depend on the outcome of sales. In this light, it may not come as a surprise that the main
motives for future investments are an increase in capacity and the extension of the product
range. Moreover, a further improvement of efficiency and product quality is of some im-
portance as well.
5.4.2 Differences: sectors and regions
As we found above when discussing privatized companies, the mechanical engineering sec-
tor also takes an exceptional position within greenfield investments, positively and nega-
tively. At the time of establishment almost one-quarter of the production equipment in this
111
sector was obsolete (table 5.4). At present this share has diminished to 3.3%, making it the
‘best’ sector according to our mode of assessment.
Table 5.4 Technological modernization in foreign greenfield companies, by sector and by region
% Obsolete equipment
N Foundation Present Decrease
Current average
equipment age
Sector
Mechanical engineering   6 24.2 3.3 20.8 5.4
Electrical engineering 11 11.8 10.0 1.8 3.6
Food & beverages   4 5.0 5.0 - 6.3
Difference
Kruskal-Wallis n.s. n.s. n.s. °
Region
Center 11 13.2 4.5 8.6 3.9
Northwest 10 15.0 10.0 5.0 5.6
Difference
Mann-Whitney U n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
But where we found sector-specific reasons at privatized companies, at greenfield compa-
nies the low starting level as compared to companies in the other two sectors is caused by
two companies which dramatically influence the general average of the six companies in this
category. The first is APV UK. They invested already in 1985 by establishing a greenfield joint
venture representative office with some smaller independent Hungarian groups, because
they did not want to cooperate with an SOE7. Local production started in 1988, mainly with
very old machines which they got from the British parent company. They had to buy some
‘normal’ additional equipment to be able to produce at a reasonable level. Therefore, the
setting up of the production line in Hungary (before the change of economic systems), has
to be seen as a trial project of the British investor. Since then, a lot of additional invest-
ments have been made resulting in an average age of equipment of 3-4 years at the time the
interview was held. The other company in this category is FISHER-ROSEMOUNT (see also
section 5.4.1). Although the manager indicated that at the start of production all machinery
was less than one and a half years old, he classified a substantial proportion of this equip-
ment below the international standard. Further investments in new equipment after their
foundation has improved the capital stock in these two companies considerably.
Not surprisingly, as for regions, we found no differences between the greenfield compa-
nies in our sample.
5.5 Technological modernization in domestic privatized companies
5.5.1 Technological modernization
In contrast to both foreign privatized and greenfield companies, the contribution of do-
mestic privatized companies to the modernization of production is extremely modest (fig-
ure 5.7). Domestic companies were only able to decrease the share of below international
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standard equipment by 4.3 percentage points. At present, 71.6% of production equipment is
below international standard. Of this, 58.1% is somewhat obsolete and 13.5% totally obso-
lete. Not surprisingly, the average age of production equipment is high (14.6 years). These
findings do not only indicate that technological modernization at domestic companies is
low. It also puts the contribution of foreign privatized companies in sharp relief.
Figure 5.7 Production equipment in domestic privatized companies
Nevertheless, 10 of the 13 domestic companies in our survey reported that they have in-
vested in new equipment after the privatization of the company. This can mean two things:
Either the companies have made only limited investments, or their new investments were in
obsolete equipment as well. A closer look at figure 5.7 reveals that the first statement is a
valid one. The share of somewhat obsolete equipment decreased by 8.2 percentage points.
But apparently they were unable to make sufficient investment in new equipment, since the
share of totally obsolete equipment increased because of the further aging of some of the
obsolete equipment. Therefore, on average, the domestic companies show a slight increase
in both international standard equipment and state-of-the-art equipment. But one has to
admit that the latter is extremely low compared to foreign privatized companies (2.8%
compared to 17.5%).
FOLLOW-UP INVESTMENTS: NEW OR USED EQUIPMENT?
From the 10 domestic companies that have invested in new equipment after the privatiza-
tion, 5 invested solely in new equipment. In the other 5 companies, follow-up investments
were both in new and used machinery. In contrast to foreign companies, domestic compa-
nies could not invest in used equipment from their subsidiaries. For 3 domestic companies,
the used equipment came from liquidated SOEs. In general the follow-up investments were
less modern than at foreign privatized and greenfield companies. Equipment was most of-
ten up to international standard and modern compared to other equipment in the subsidi-
ary. This might be another explanation for our finding above that the decrease in obsolete
equipment was rather limited, despite the large number of companies that made follow-up
investments.
MOTIVES FOR AND RESTRICTIONS TO MODERNIZATION
Because investments in technological modernization have turned out to be rather limited,
we have to interpret the motives, as presented in figure 5.8, with caution. It would for in-
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stance be wrong to conclude that 60% of these companies have achieved a major increase
in efficiency and a reduction of costs.
Figure 5.8 Motives for follow-up investments in domestic privatized companiesa
a N=10. Managers could give more than one motive. For instance, 40.0% of the managers of domestic pri-
vatized companies that invested in new equipment after establishment indicated that higher quality was an
important argument for investment.
It would be most appropriate to compare the domestic companies with the foreign privat-
ized companies. Strangely enough, 40% of the managers indicated that the replacement of
obsolete equipment was an important motive for follow-up investments. Obviously this
concerned only very limited investments, since it is not reflected in a high decrease in ob-
solete equipment. The introduction of new products was mentioned by managers at do-
mestic companies much more often than at foreign privatized companies. In contrast, im-
provement of the quality was mentioned by only 40% of the managers at domestic compa-
nies as opposed to almost 80% at foreign privatized companies. This might indicate that
domestic companies try to outstrip their competitors by a strategy of market diversion,
whereas foreign privatized companies focus more on an improvement of the quality of their
products.
Concerning the limited technological modernization, there are more restrictions to tech-
nological modernization in the case of domestic companies. The main and only restriction
cited was the lack of money, which was mentioned by only 4 out of 13 companies. This is,
more convincingly, supported by the reaction of managers at domestic companies to the
statement: The lack of good financing possibilities is a major restriction to the modernization of our pro-
duction. More than 75% of the managers agreed with this statement, with 46.2% fully agree-
ing (statement i) 8. As for the lack of good financing possibilities two different interpreta-
tions are valid. For some companies it refers to the high interest rates in Hungary and other
unfavorable factors. For other companies it refers to the fact that banks are not willing to
give them a loan. However, concerning the latter, one can ask if the cause lies in the banks
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or in the companies themselves, whose equipment is for a large part obsolete. From the
point of view of financial institutions the medium and long-term profitability of these com-
panies is questionable.
The other interpretation of high interest rates and other unfavorable factors is a valid argu-
ment indeed. As opposed to companies with foreign capital participation, domestic compa-
nies are generally not able to finance their investments on Western capital markets where
interest rates are much lower. One can bring in the argument here that the cause for high
interest rates in Hungary is high inflation. But for a company that takes out a loan, this is
hardly a mitigating circumstance. With interest rates between 22 and 30% and profit rates
on equity of on average 10-12%, it is still far too expensive to finance investments on the
Hungarian capital market.
Our emphasis here was on the financial restrictions to technological modernization in
domestic companies, partly since this was the only restriction indicated by the managers we
spoke to. However, our general impression was that technological modernization in par-
ticular, and company restructuring in general was not a high priority in domestic companies.
This contrasts with foreign privatized companies where both issues have top priority, as was
also indicated by our findings above.
FUTURE INVESTMENTS
From the 13 domestic companies in our sample, 9 have plans for future investments. The
replacement of obsolete equipment was the most important motive for these investments
as mentioned by managers at 4 companies. Other factors are capacity expansion (3 compa-
nies) and improvement of product quality (2 companies).
Three others have no intention to invest, although for 2 of them the state of equipment
requires upgrading with respectively 100% and 80% obsolete equipment. The company with
100% obsolete equipment explained that they have already made the necessary/planned
investments in the past, when they bought new and used machines from bankrupt SOEs.
However, this did not lead to a decrease in obsolete equipment. According to the manager
of the company that produces open and covered stairs for airplanes, it is not necessary to
use modern machines since it concerns single-piece production, involving much handwork
and general tools. The second company, using 80% obsolete equipment, is not planning
future investments since orders are decreasing. Future market developments are also rele-
vant in the case of the domestic company that is still unsure about future investments.
5.5.2 Differences: sectors and regions
Looking at the technological modernization in domestic companies by sector we found
some remarkable differences. In line with findings in foreign privatized companies, the me-
chanical engineering sector is the worst sector according to our classification: both at the
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time operations began and at present around 90% of production equipment is obsolete
(table 5.5). Electrical engineering fares slightly better. The present share of obsolete equip-
ment in both sectors is still higher than that of foreign privatized companies at the com-
mencement of their operations (compare table 5.3).
The starting level of the domestic companies in the food and beverages sector is re-
markably good. Not only compared to the other sectors, both also compared to the pro-
portion of obsolete equipment in foreign privatized companies at the time of establishment.
In fact, of the 3 domestic companies in this sector, only 1 started with a substantial share of
obsolete equipment. The other 2 started with only a very limited share of obsolete equip-
ment, for instance, PANNON GABONA in Györ, that produces flour and grain mainly for the
Hungarian market. According to the deputy general manager they owe their good starting
position to the fact that a lot of investments have been made already before the privatiza-
tion. The company had a very dynamic management that was able to secure a lot of money
from the state budget to invest in new equipment.
Table 5.5 Technological modernization in domestic privatized companies, by sector and by region
% Obsolete equipment
N Foundation Present Decrease
Current average
equipment age
Sector
Mechanical engineering 6 92.8 89.1 3.7 14.3
Electrical engineering 4 81.3 74.8 6.5 14.0
Food & beverages 3 35.0 32.3 2.7 15.8
Region
Center 9 87.4 82.1 5.3 14.7
Northwest 4 50.0 48.0 2.0 14.4
Nevertheless, one has to place these findings in perspective. First the number of companies
in the food and beverages sector is limited (3). Second the equipment is almost 16 years old,
making it older than the ones used in mechanical and electrical engineering.
These two food companies located in the northwest of Hungary are also responsible for
regional differences (table 5.5). The four domestic companies we interviewed in the north-
west accounted for three companies in the food and beverages sector, which operated a
surprisingly low percentage of obsolete equipment9. Looking at the average age of equip-
ment, one sees that they are practically the same.
5.6 Conclusion
In this concluding section the most important findings in this chapter are:
· Both foreign greenfield and privatized companies contribute to the technological mod-
ernization of the Hungarian manufacturing industry in their own specific ways. However,
in general, production equipment in greenfield investments was and still is superior to
that in privatized companies.
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· Foreign privatized companies have done a lot to replace obsolete production equipment
in their acquired plants. Most of them take a gradual but steady course in replacing
equipment. Some replace all the acquired equipment shortly after the investment with
new equipment, so-called brownfield investments. In only a few companies we found
only limited technological modernization. These companies are involved in labor-
intensive production aimed at outward processing to other subsidiaries in Western
Europe.
Some 90% of the privatized companies are planning to invest more in technological up-
grading in the years to come. When modernizing production equipment, foreign privat-
ized companies make use of their international network of subsidiaries extensively. As a
result technological modernization often involves already used equipment of accepted
international standard.
· Production equipment in greenfield investments set up as a result of an expansion of
production capacity is more modern that those in greenfields where the investment in
Hungary was the result of a transfer of production capacity from the expensive EU to
low-labor-cost Hungary. Here the investment coincides with a physical transfer of pro-
duction equipment from Western subsidiaries as well, whereas greenfieds that involve an
expansion of capacity more often use new, state-of-the-art equipment.
· Companies involved in labor-intensive production have invested less in technological
modernization because the effects on cost savings are limited due to low labor costs.
Thus, investment returns take a long time to materialize. In our survey this mainly goes
for companies in mechanical engineering, where handwork is an import element in pro-
duction.
· There are no regional differences in the extent of technological modernization at foreign
companies.
· Domestic privatized companies have seen their position worsen as opposed to foreign
companies, because of a higher share of obsolete production equipment than in foreign
privatized companies at the start of their operations, and their very limited investments
in technological modernization afterwards. Technological modernization at domestic
companies is seriously hampered by financial restrictions (that is high interest rates in
relation to profit expectations), and (too) high risks for financial institutions, because of
the largely outdated production equipment. Besides the impression given was the low
propensity of domestic companies to modernize their plants.
NOTES
1 In the case of foreign investments this refers to the date the foreign company actually started operations in
Hungary (time of entry). In the case of domestic companies this refers to the date the company was actually
privatized. The present situation refers to the time the interviews were conducted ( February - April 1997).
2 The other 20% is owned by an Italian company. The management is fully in the hands of UNILEVER.
3 In this study the development in turnover is not discussed in detail.
4 See also the example of MTD HUNGARIA below.
5 That is at the beginning of 1997. OPEL will stop assembling the Astra model in the course of 1999.
6 The company produces control valves and flow measurement equipment.
7 100% foreign ownership was not possible at that time.
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8 For an overview of the reactions to all statements see annex 3.
9 The food and beverages sector in Budapest is dominated by foreign investors which acquired practically all
the SOEs. Therefore it is not surprising that we were not able to find domestic companies in this sector
here.
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FDI and the demand for labor
6.1 Introduction
Labor market transformation is one of the central features in the transition from a
centrally-planned to a more market-based economy. Foreign companies are regarded as
active participants in this transition process. After all, they take a leading position in the
technological modernization, as shown in the preceding chapter. Moreover, they are
expected to introduce Western working methods and management techniques. All these
elements of modernization have their effect on the demand for labor, both in quantitative
and qualitative respects.
This chapter deals with the demand for labor in foreign companies in the context of the
transition process. Moreover, we look at the demand for labor in domestic companies so as
to place our findings about foreign companies in perspective. Answers to the following
research questions will yield insight in the issues under discussion.
4. What are the effects of the modernization within both foreign and domestic companies
on the quantitative demand for labor? (section 6.2)
5. What are the effects of the modernization within both foreign and domestic companies
on the qualitative demand of labor? (section 6.3)
6. In what way and through what channels are new employees recruited, and what are
selection criteria used? (section 6.4)
7. What are the effects of modernization and training on labor productivity? (section 6.5)
8. Are there differences for different regions, and what role did the regional supply of labor
play in the location decision? (section 6.6)
6.2 Quantitative effects on labor in foreign and domestic companies
After the 1989 change of system, Hungary was confronted with a steady growth in
unemployment. The increase was high in the more remote regions in the northeast, which
are characterized by heavy industry, and the southeast, which is mainly an agricultural
region. However, unemployment rates are relatively low in the northwestern part of the
country, including Budapest.
Where labor market opportunities in the state sector declined, new openings were
offered through FDI. Research by Kopint Datorg (Papp, 1995) shows that foreign firms (in
6
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all sectors) in 1993 accounted for almost one-third of all employment in Hungary: 5% in
greenfield plants, 26% in joint ventures and acquisitions by foreign companies. These
figures roughly correspond with the ones presented in table 3-3 which shows employment
shares in foreign companies of 23% and 37% for the whole economy and the
manufacturing sector respectively (1994 data).
In this section we will discuss the developments in employment at the company level
(section 6.2.1), as well as the employment effects for different departments within the
company (section 6.2.2).
6.2.1 Employment effects
In our research we studied the development of employment in both foreign and domestic
companies in our survey from 1990 onwards (table 6.1). Since not all the companies in our
survey were present in Hungary from the beginning of the transition process, the
employment figures are classified by the year of establishment. Our assumption was that in
the case of foreign companies, different modes of investment would have different effects
on employment. Greenfield investments were expected to have a positive effect on
employment, since firms start from scratch. Investments in the privatization of SOEs,
however, were expected to have a negative effect on employment, since they generally had
to deal with excess employment. This also counts for domestic privatized companies.
However, where domestic privatized companies are concerned, the decrease in employment
was expected to be less dramatic than in foreign privatized companies, because the former
have made far less progress in the modernization process, as seen in chapter 5.
Our survey shows that greenfield investments indeed have a strong positive effect on
employment. In total, the greenfield companies in our survey have created close to 9,000
jobs (table 6.1). Most of these jobs (more than 6,000) were not created at the time of
foundation, but afterwards. Some greenfield companies started with only a handful of
employees that were responsible for the setting up of the production facilities. However,
most greenfield companies showed a significant expansion of their production capacity
since their first entry. After an initial investment, many greenfield firms made additional
investments, leading to job creation.
This somewhat cautious, albeit aggressive investment strategy, in connection with
growing employment can be illustrated by the example of IBM which started making hard
disk drives in Székesfehérvár (Fejér) in November 1995. The newly built factory is owned
by VIDEOTON (a large state-owned enterprise, privatized and sold to Hungarian owners) at
the VIDEOTON INDUSTRIAL PARK. IBM invested $ 110 million in the production lines. As
this was the first investment in a production facility in CEE, the modest scale worked in
IBM’s favor. It enabled the company to leave with minor losses if production in Hungary
turned out to be less profitable than initially expected. In the same vein, another deal with
VIDEOTON was made concerning labor. The first 300 shop-floor workers were employed by
VIDEOTON. VIDEOTON was willing to take this responsibility, as long as they were
contracted to provide new employees in case of expansion. By November 1996, a second
production facility was finished. Employment at IBM rose from 800 (end 1995) to 1,800
(end 1996) and grew to 3,000 in April 1997. Of these, some 2,500 workers are on the payroll
of VIDEOTON and 500 people in management positions are directly employed by IBM
HUNGARY. Besides, another 100 expatriates work at the Székesfehérvár plant.
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Table 6.1 Employment developments in foreign and domestic companies in Hungarya
Foreign
greenfield 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth/
decreaseb
90c 123 173 206    273    396    494 724    601
91 482 841 1,068 1,280 1,436 1,670 1,188
92 719 1,137 1,462 2,059 3,180 2,461
93      90      85      85 78    -12
94    212    410 1,216 1,004
95    905 1,960 1,055
Total 123 655 1,766 2,568 3,435 5,389 8,828 6,297
Foreign
privatizedd 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth/
decrease
90 3,616 3,232 2,997 2,943 2,980 2,883 2,535 -1,081
91 1,999 2,612 2,597 2,544 2,604 2,276     277
92 4,813 3,275 2,934 2,879 2,652 -2,161
93 1,988 1,843 1,842 2,240     252
94 2,163 2,003 1,665    -498
Total 3,616 5,231 10,422 10,803 12,464 12,211 11,368 -3,211
Domestic
privatized 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Growth/
decrease
89 ..
e .. ..      41      41      48     44 3
90 1,028 1,062    957    727    674    780    715 -313
91    790    710    620    501    427    388 -402
93 1,072 1,029 1,035    882 -190
94 3,946 4,008 4,075 129
Total 1,028 1,852 1,667 2,460 6,191 6,298 6,094 -773
a The figures presented in this table exclude seasonal labor. This can be substantial, especially in the food and
beverages sector. For instance, ice cream producer ESKIMO in Veszprém employs more than 200 seasonal
workers and 180 regular employees.
b The difference between employment in the first year of operation (that is 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 or
1995) and 1996. The total in this column is the sum of this column.
c Year of establishment/privatization.
d GE TUNGSRAM is excluded from this table because of the great number of employees of this company.
When the American multinational GENERAL ELECTRIC bought TUNGSRAM, the company employed 17,000
people. Since 1992, after major restructuring, the company has a constant number of 10,000 employees.
e This concerns two companies for which no employment figures for 1989-1992 were available.
Foreign privatized companies show a different picture (table 6.1). They are often
confronted with huge overstaffing at the time of the establishment. In some cases, the
acquired property includes some supporting services1, like kindergartens and hotels,
characteristic of SOEs. After the acquisition, the foreign company usually sells or closes
these supporting facilities, resulting in a drop in the number employed (at least for the
privatized company). Overstaffing can reach very high levels, up to three or four times the
required labor. The AMSTEL brewery in Kómarom is a case in point. The brewery, which
was founded in 1984, was part of the state oil company MOL. It was set up as an
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employment project. When AMSTEL bought the company, there was only enough work for
two to three hours a day for each employee.
However, from the 29 foreign privatized companies in our sample, only 15 showed a
decrease in the number of employees between the time of entry and 1996. Contrary to our
general assumption, 14 privatized companies have witnessed an increase in the number of
employees following the initial investment. Nevertheless, overall, the foreign privatized
companies in our sample show an aggregate decrease in the number of employees of more
than 3,2002. The differences between the employment effects within foreign privatized
companies seem to result from the combined effects of (1) the expansion of physical
production capacity, and (2) differing circumstances related to overstaffing at the time the
operations started. The following explain what some of these circumstances are:
a) Some foreign privatized companies, that entered the country by way of a joint venture
with the state, could have started with a limited number of the best workers at the SOE.
Therefore they did not have to cope with excess employment.
b) Privatized companies might have been bound by contract with the state to (largely)
maintain employment for a set period of time. Making the assumption that a privatized
company has to cope with overstaffing, this might have forced them to expand capacity
or set up new activities.
c) As reported above, in a limited number of cases, the acquisition included supporting
services, that were typical of SOEs (like kindergartens, hotels etc.). The sale of parts of
the acquired property decreases employment.
d) Pre-privatization restructuring might be of major influence on the subsequent
development of employment. As already stated in chapter 1, mainly in the first years of
transition some restructuring took place before the company was put up for privatization
to a foreign owner, in order to get a better price for the company.
e) Apart from the points mentioned above, there are differences between companies as
such with respect to the extent of overstaffing in the SOEs that were targeted for
privatization.
These differing starting points may exert major influence on employment developments
after privatization. However, it is not possible to ascertain the combined effects of all the
abovementioned factors on the actual level of overstaffing at the time of foundation. But
we might conclude that companies that have shown an increase in employment have
expanded their physical production capacity or have started new production activities.
However, it should be noted that this must have been far more easy for companies that
started with less excess employment.
The above observations also make it difficult, if not impossible, to relate employment
developments to technological modernization. Moreover, the effects of technological
modernization are double-edged: Investments that are aimed at increasing efficiency,
generally lead to labor shedding, whereas investments in extra capacity creates new jobs.
For domestic privatized companies we found, similar as for foreign privatized
companies, a decreasing number of employees (table 6.1). In 5 companies, employment
increased moderately, and in 8 companies employment decreased. Overall, employment in
domestic companies in our survey decreased by 773. Most of the abovementioned
observations (points a-e) are valid for domestic privatized companies as well. For example,
also in domestic privatized companies some restructuring might have taken place before the
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company was sold to private owners. Consider MMG AUTOMATIKA, a Budapest-based
company producing industrial instruments, automatic elements, process control systems
etc., that was sold to employees and domestic financial institutions. As a result of pre-
privatization restructuring, employment decreased from 4,100 in 1990 to 2,442 in 1994, the
year when the company was privatized. Under private ownership employment at the
company increased moderately to 2,553 by the end of 1996.
To sum up, the figures in table 6.1 have to be read as a description of the actual
employment developments that have taken place in the survey companies between the time
of setting up operations and 1996. However, what can be concluded, is that greenfield
investments show a positive effect on employment. Large greenfield plants that have
created jobs for many people can be of major importance for the city or region where they
are located. The employment effects of foreign privatized companies are not negative per se
(notwithstanding the marginal notes presented in chapter two as well as above). Contrary to
our expectation, half the foreign privatized companies have shown an increase in
employment.
6.2.2 Employment effects for different company departments
Next to the overall employment figures presented above, we looked at the development in
employment in different departments over the last three years, that is 1993-1996 (table 6.2).3
Not surprisingly, in greenfield plants the general tendency is one of expansion in the
departments of production, management and administration, and support services
departments (sales, R&D, distribution and the like). As for support services departments,
more than 90% of the greenfields reported an employment increase, indicating that foreign
investors follow a cautious strategy in the setting up of these departments: Only when the
investment in Hungary proves to be a good decision, are sales, distribution or in some cases
even R&D activities transferred from the parent company to the Hungarian plant.
Table 6.2 Changes in the number of employees in different departments (1993-1996) (%)
Foreign greenfield Foreign privatized Domestic
privatized
Production
Decrease 14.3 51.7 38.5
Equal 14.3 6.9 15.4
Increase 71.4 41.4 46.2
Management/administration
Decrease - 51.7 76.9
Equal 28.6 13.8 7.7
Increase 71.4 34.5 15.4
Support services departments
Decrease 4.8 35.7 53.8
Equal 4.8 10.7 23.1
Increase 90.5 53.6 23.1
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Looking at foreign privatized companies the picture is more diverse. We already concluded
above that half of the foreign privatized companies in our survey show a growing number
of employees, while in the other half their number has decreased. These findings are also
reflected in an analysis per department. In more than half of the companies, the number of
production workers has decreased over the last three years. However, in more than 40% of
the companies their number has increased. The same goes for the number of employees in
management and administration departments. It seems that whereas some companies are
still in a process of restructuring and modernizing their acquired plants, others have left this
stage and are even in an expanding phase now. However, it is a different picture with
respect to employment development in support services departments. In the majority of
companies (54%) an increase in the number of employees was found. The setting up of new
departments for sales and distribution, that were non-existent under central planning, is
mainly responsible for this. This can be seen as an outcome of the positive experiences of
these companies, where more and more supporting tasks are decentralized from the parent
company to the Hungarian subsidiary. Hence, the setting up of these new departments
might be another explanatory factor for the total increase in employment in half the foreign
privatized companies as found above.
The setting up of sales and distribution departments and the like can be seen as another
contribution of foreign companies to the modernization process. Before 1989, companies
that produced for the local market did not have any marketing or sale strategy or a
distribution network, as for instance indicated by the general manager of margarine
producer UNILEVER. He pointed out that when they bought the company, they were not
selling margarine but only distributing it. Every day a 2-kilometer queue of small trucks and
vans (without cold storage facilities) lined up at the entrance of the plant to pick up the
products and to bring them to the 15,000 customers, mostly small grocery stores. Now the
situation has totally changed: 70% of the products is sold to the 10 biggest customers
(supermarket chains) and the company has its own sales department. For companies that
produced for export to CMEA countries, export was carried out by separate export trading
companies. These exports were mainly involved in barter trade. Therefore, one could say
there was no relation with either demand or supply, and therefore no sales, marketing or
distribution policy unlike the practice in Western companies.
Some domestic privatized companies show a moderate increase in the number of
employees between privatization and the present, as shown in the preceding section.
However, employment developments differ in different departments as compared to
foreign companies. The biggest differences are found in the management and
administration departments and support services departments. More domestic than foreign
companies show a decrease in management/administration over the last three years. Where
many foreign companies have passed the stage of reducing the number of people in
management and administration in their plants, domestic companies seem to be still in the
middle of this process. Besides, the majority of the domestic companies show a decrease in
employment in support services activities. The difference with foreign companies might be
that they have not yet set up departments for sales, expedition and the like. The pitfalls
inherent to generalizations aside, it is another indication of our earlier finding that they have
not adopted the capitalist style of doing business yet.
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6.3 The qualitative demand for labor
In 1989, Hungary set a new course towards a more market-based economy. Apart from the
modernization of industrial production, this process leads to a shift within manufacturing
industries and the emergence of a separate services sector4. In response, there is a shift in
the qualitative demand for labor, which in turn has implications for vocational training and
education in general. The qualitative transformation of the labor market is thus a lengthy
process, but the first signs of this process are already evident. This section elaborates on
various aspects of the transition of the labor market in a qualitative respect.
First, some general impressions of managers at foreign companies on the education level
of the Hungarian labor force are presented. We do this by looking at their responses to
some statements (section 6.3.1). Next, in section 6.3.2, we deal with the demand for
unskilled and skilled labor in relation to the transition process. Section 6.3.3 discusses the
problems that companies have in appointing people to certain positions. We look at the
extent of this problem, the kind of professions involved, the competition between foreign
and domestic companies, and companies’ assessment of the course of future developments.
Section 6.3.4 discusses the role of in-house education and on-the-job training.
6.3.1 Foreigners’ impressions of the education level of the Hungarian labor force
It has been mentioned several times that the Hungarian labor force is well educated, and
that the cost of labor is low. But we wondered if the foreign investors are of the same
opinion. We found that 92% of the foreign managers agree to the statement ‘The Hungarian
labor force is well educated’ (statement ii). Of these, 30% even fully agree.
Apart from this generally high education level, the shift from a centrally planned to a more
market-based economy requires skills which are different and new, and a change in
mentality and work ethics. Therefore, we asked the managers if they are of the opinion that
Hungarian employees are eager to learn. The vast majority (88%) agree to that statement
(statement iii). It is surprising that the managers at foreign companies were more positive
about this statement that those at domestic companies5.
Likewise we asked the managers for their response to the statement: ‘Hungarian employees are
fast learners and adapt to the new situation in their country very quickly.’ Here too, we found that the
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vast majority (83%) agree (statement iv). What is striking is the high percentage of managers
that fully agree (32%).
Considering the above, it might not come as a surprise that all but two of the managers are
not of the opinion that the general education level of Hungarian employees is a hindrance
to the modernization of production (statement v). The responses of the managers were
even more convincing, since 66% fully disagree.
So we can conclude that the education level of the Hungarian labor force, in combination
with a willingness and ability to learn are characteristics that are highly appreciated by
foreign managers. The following quotation seems to illustrate this point6: ‘Labor costs will
rise over time as Hungary’s economy modernizes, but that doesn’t trouble me. The quality
and productivity here is such that we can compete with plants anywhere in the world. (...)
With many countries we have to educate the workers to a certain level, but the Hungarians
are well educated, which is a credit to their education system.’
6.3.2 Foreign direct investment and the demand for skilled labor
In chapter 4 we looked at the motives for investment. An important motivation for
investing in Hungary is low production costs (notably low labor costs), especially for
mechanical or electrical engineering companies. However, a closer look reveals that these
low labor costs do not stand on their own: For most companies in the engineering sectors,
the ‘optimum of labor costs’ appeared to be the main motive for investment. They are
looking for a combination of low labor costs and a relatively high level of education,
especially in the technical professions. Therefore, it is probably no coincidence that the
engineering sectors are highly favored by foreign investment.
In this section our aim is to see whether this finding is borne out by the share of skilled
and unskilled labor in the companies. Companies were asked for the proportion of unskilled
and skilled workers in production, and the change in numbers over time. An overall share
of 38% unskilled workers at entry, indicates that it was not (primarily) the low labor costs
that foreign companies were interested in (table 6.3). In companies that invested in Hungary
mainly because of the low labor costs, the share of unskilled workers is the lowest (29%).
Especially in mechanical engineering the share of unskilled workers is low. This sector is
generally characterized by labor-intensive production in small batches or single piece
production, where handwork is important. Moreover, on average, companies showed a
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decrease in the share of unskilled workers. Therefore we conclude that, based on our
survey, the emergence of Hungary as a center for routinized, unskilled work, is not very
likely.
Table 6.3 Percentage of unskilled workers in foreign companies, by sector and motive of
investment
Mechanical
engineering
Electrical
engineering
Food & beverages Total
Entry Present Entry Present Entry Present Entry Present
Hungarian market 57 34 26 20 55 38 46 32
Production costs 11   8 45 45 50 70 29 29
Strategic reasons 21 27 85 70 41 21 36 31
Total 22 17 40 36 53 38 38 31
A further analysis of the differences in the share of unskilled employees by sector shows
more remarkable differences. However, the figures in table 6.3 have to be interpreted with
care, because of the small number of companies in each cell, and the large differences
between individual companies.
The smallest share of unskilled workers is found in mechanical engineering. A relatively
high share of skilled manual work is inherent in practically all the activities in this sector, as
we already found in the previous chapter on technological modernization. This
characteristic was found to be also responsible for the limited investments in more modern
machinery in privatized companies in this sector, since investment costs do not outweigh
benefits in terms of production costs.
Within the automobile industry large differences can be found, depending on the type of
activity that is set up in Hungary. SUZUKI, for instance, employs solely unskilled people for
the assembly of the Swift model. Two other two car manufacturers in our sample, OPEL and
AUDI, largely depend on skilled workers. At OPEL, that assembles cars for the local market,
but that is mainly involved in the production of engines, nearly all shop-floor workers are
skilled. AUDI manufactures engines exclusively, and employs only skilled workers.
In electrical engineering, the share of unskilled workers is much higher. Because of the
high savings in automation, companies are forced to automate production to a large extent,
in order to secure or improve their competitiveness. Therefore, this sector is characterized
by more unskilled jobs on average. Nevertheless the differences are high, because of the
different types of activities within this sector. For the assembly of electronic appliances or
computer parts (like PHILIPS CAR SYSTEMS, TEMIC TELEFUNKEN and IBM), unskilled labor is
needed to a large extent. On the other hand, companies which are involved in the
production of technological equipment for industrial application for instance, largely
depend on skilled work.
In the food and beverage sector we find the most unskilled work. However, this is not
caused by their search for low-cost unskilled labor, since we established in chapter 4 that
market considerations are dominant in investing in Hungary. Nevertheless, the share of
unskilled work has decreased to a large extent. This sector is increasingly dominated by
computer technology, which requires skilled labor. UNILEVER in Budapest for instance no
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longer hires any unskilled workers. The unskilled workers in this sector are mainly to be
found in packaging.
Table 6.4 Percentage of unskilled labor in foreign and domestic companies and changes in this
percentage between time of foundation and present
Foreign greenfield Foreign privatized Domestic privatized
Foundation 39 38 34
Present 35 29 25
Changea Change Change
Decrease 25 52 62
Increase 30 7 -
Equal 45 41 38
a Percentage of companies in which we found a decrease, increase, or an equal share of unskilled workers
between foundation and present.
A breakdown by different entry modes does not reveal large differences (table 6.4). Nor did
we find large differences between foreign and domestic companies, although we found that
the share of unskilled workers in greenfields is 10 percentage points higher than in domestic
companies. For all three types of companies we found that the share of unskilled workers is
decreasing. However, these aggregate figures mask the large differences that were found in
individual companies, as indicated under ‘change’ in table 6.4. For instance some greenfield
companies had a high share of unskilled workers in the first year after foundation. By
training employees and by encouraging them to educate themselves, the number of
unskilled workers decreased. An example is AUER, an Austrian chocolate manufacturer in
Budapest, where the share of unskilled workers in 7 years has decreased from 80% to 20%.
At other greenfield companies, the number of unskilled workers in the first year is very low,
since for the start-up of their activities mainly skilled people are needed. Once production
starts to grow, more unskilled people are hired. The GödöllÅ-based (near Budapest)
greenfield plant of UNITED TECHNOLOGIES for instance started with one employee with a
high level of education for every two low or unskilled workers. Six years after the
establishment of the company, the situation has changed to one skilled for every 23
unskilled. This practice, which can be found in more greenfield companies, explains the
relatively high number of greenfield companies that reported an increase in the share of
unskilled employees.
Nevertheless, the number of companies which reported an equal or diminishing share of
unskilled workers is dominant. This counts even more for foreign privatized companies,
where the number of unskilled workers has decreased in more than half the companies
under survey. The decrease in the number of unskilled workers is due to several reasons.
The most important reasons are training and in-house education (see section 6.3.4), and the
dismissal of mainly unskilled employees because of excess employment (in privatized
companies). One other factor might be that the activities of foreign companies change over
time. INDA HUNGARIA, for instance, started manufacturing simple products. But in the
course of time, they started producing more and more complicated products, which
required more skilled workers. Now they have reached the limits of what is possible in
Hungary at this point in time. They want to produce in smaller batches, but they have
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reached the point were workers’ lack of experience and inability to work on their own
constitute stumbling blocks.
6.3.3 Vacancies which are difficult to fill
Technological and organizational modernization lead to a different demand for labor in a
qualitative respect. One might expect that the modernization process in foreign companies
takes place at a faster pace than what the labor market (including the educational system)
can cope with. Therefore, one of the indicators for a shift in the demand for labor (and the
ongoing modernization process) is in vacancies for which companies have problems filling.
In this respect we studied three related issues. First, we asked the companies whether they
had vacancies for which they had difficulty filling and the kind of jobs this concerned.
Second, we made an inventory of how companies cope with this problem. Finally, we asked
the companies for their assessment of developments in the future.
FOREIGN COMPANIES
The contribution of foreign companies to the technological modernization is obvious.
Therefore, one can expect them to have problems in filling jobs with certain requirements.
Indeed, more than three-quarters of the foreign companies in our survey indicated that they
had some problems in filling vacancies. However, only 35% of the managers indicated that
‘It is very hard to recruit well-educated employees in Hungary’ (statement vi). This low score might
have to do with the ambiguity in the statement that refers to both the difficulty of recruiting
people and the education of workers. We saw above that managers are very positive about
the latter.
In describing vacancies that are hard to fill, we distinguish between vacancies involving
skilled manual work and management positions. Contrary to what we expected, foreign
companies did not have that many problems with vacancies involving skilled manual work.
Indeed, as a result of investments in new equipment, the requirements for workers’
qualifications have changed, in some cases even dramatically, but the high base level of
education made it easy to train the current or newly hired employees in the skills required
(see also statements ii and v above).
Therefore, among the skilled manual workforce, there are long-standing vacancies for a
limited number of jobs. In the food and beverage sector, there was no shortage of manual
workers. Some companies in the mechanical engineering sector reported that they had
problems in finding good welders. Welding has not been a very popular profession in
Hungary after the change of system. Besides, the good welders tend to leave for much
better-paid jobs in Germany. As a result, wages for welders in Hungary are relatively high.
Perhaps a bigger problem is the shortage of NC (numerical control) and CNC (computer
numerical control) operators in the engineering sectors. Many companies said they had
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major problems in finding employees with these qualifications. The main cause seems to be
the educational system in Hungary. CNC machines are rather expensive. Vocational schools
do not have the financial means to buy these machines because of the ongoing austerity
measures imposed by the government on education. In some areas, like Székesfehérvár, the
rising demand among foreign companies for NC/CNC operators is another factor in the
shortage of these skills.
Better pay or overtime appeared to be short-term solutions to this problem. But some
companies are working on more structural solutions. In Székesfehérvár, for instance, where
CNC operators are scarce, some companies, including FISHER-ROSEMOUNT and VIDEOTON,
have agreed not to compete with each other in hiring CNC operators. Instead, they
cooperate. These firms give financial support to the vocational schools. After their regular
education, the graduates get a three-month training as a CNC operator. FISHER-
ROSEMOUNT, which is expanding its activities in the region at a rapid pace, draws more than
half of its new employees from these training programs.
During the interviews, it appeared that there was a shortage of personnel in management
positions. This counts for both greenfield and privatized companies, and for all three
sectors in our study. The shortages mentioned by numerous companies were in: human
resource management (HRM), logistics, (middle-level) production management, sales and
marketing, finance, project management, and quality assurance. All shortages in the white-
collar positions can be traced to the absence of such professions during the era of central
planning, the slow adjustment of the educational system, and the fact that people still have
difficulty taking responsibility in their work. An additional factor causing problems in filling
the abovementioned vacancies lies in the requirement of English or German for most jobs
in management positions (see section 6.4.3).
These shortages in management positions differ across the regions selected for study. In
this respect, the difference between Budapest and the northwest is striking. There even
appears to be a strong contrast between Budapest and the larger towns in northwest
Hungary like Györ (Györ-Moson-Sopron), Székesfehérvár (Fejér) or Szombathely (Vas).
But especially in the smaller, more remote towns and villages, companies had difficulty
finding qualified staff. The problem becomes more serious for these companies, since it
involves finding applicants who are willing to move from Budapest to the countryside. For
instance, PHILIPS CAR AUDIO in Sárbogárd, a small town some 30 kilometers south of
Székesfehérvár has run into major problems in employing HRM and logistics managers.
The same goes for OPEL in Szentgotthárd (Vas), which has problems hiring managers in
financial positions. On top of the general problem of scarcity on the labor market for
people with the required skills, these companies have to cope with the fact that many are
not willing to leave Budapest, where the largest pool of professionals for higher
management functions are to be found. The problem is aggravated by the fact that there are
enough jobs in Budapest itself. Therefore, they are not willing to move or to commute to
the countryside, despite the fact that both are well-known multinationals, which Hungarians
are normally eager to work for.
In contrast there was no shortage of personnel for certain types of jobs. In this respect,
IT (information technology) specialists were mentioned several times7. Recruiting engineers
for technical positions is not much of a problem either. In general we may conclude that
people with good technical skills are abundant in Hungary. The comparative advantage this
offers for Hungary is an important factor in the attractiveness of the engineering sector for
FDI. This is also the reason why managers indicated that the introduction of new
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technology in their companies was not much of a problem in general and that it did not
lead to vacancies which are hard to fill. Because people have a solid basic education, it is
fairly easy to get them acquainted with new technologies.
As problems need to be solved, it is interesting to look at how foreign companies cope
with these hard-to-fill vacancies. More than half of the companies indicated that training or
in-house education is a way of coping with this problem. For a more detailed description of
training we refer to the next section that deals with this subject exclusively. Better pay is the
second most important option, mentioned by every fifth company. This option, however, is
only valid when it is a matter of scarcity in a particular profession on the labor market and
not total absence. Nevertheless, this option was regarded an unsuitable solution by some
companies. For smaller companies it is much too expensive. Although most foreign firms
pay higher salaries than domestic companies, the excessive salaries we are talking about here
are too high for them. Moreover, since most smaller companies are not as attractive an
employer as the big multinationals, higher remuneration is not a solution. But even
multinational companies are not eager to pay high salaries unconditionally. For instance, at
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES AUTOMOTIVE, the starting salaries for people in key positions are
not extremely high. But if someone has proved to be the right person in the right place, the
reward is double the salary in half a year, an incentive to stay with the company.
Another option, mentioned by every fifth company as well, is to improve or change the
recruitment methods used. In particular, this means obtaining the services of a recruitment
agency or a headhunter. Only a limited number of companies reported that they have
strengthened their ties with vocational schools and universities. One strategy in this respect
is to get scholars acquainted with the company even before they graduate. Employing
expatriates is not a frequently mentioned option either. It is only seen as a final solution,
since the costs are high and it can not be more than a temporary solution to the problem.
Other solutions mentioned, by only one or two companies, include for instance overtime
and hiring temporary personnel.
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
Almost all the domestic companies in our survey indicated that they have vacancies which
are difficult to fill. Therefore, domestic companies appeared to have even more problems
than foreign companies. As opposed to foreign companies, most jobs that are difficult to
fill are among the skilled manual workers. The vacancies reported are partly similar to the
ones we found for foreign companies. Welders and CNC operators, are mentioned several
times.
Contrary to foreign companies, domestic companies did not have problems in finding
employees for HRM, logistics, sales, marketing, and quality assurance. This is another
indication which concurs with our earlier findings that domestic companies are not very
much involved in modernizing their plants. After all, these professions are all relatively new
in Hungary, and the need for these professions might therefore be seen as an indicator of
the modernization of the corporate organization and the way of doing business.
Nevertheless, a few companies reported problems in finding (middle-level) production
managers and people for financial functions.
In coping with hard-to-fill vacancies, domestic companies opt for more or less similar
solutions as we found above when we dealt with foreign companies. In-house education or
on-the-job training is the most common solution. One-third of the companies mentioned
this. Better pay, contacts with schools and other search mechanisms are important as well.
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With respect to the other search mechanisms, however, we have to add that in contrast to
FDI, this does not refer to roping in recruitment agencies and headhunters. In conclusion
we can state that in the search for good employees, competition with foreign companies
seems to be an important factor. We will deal with this competition in more detail in
section 6.4.1.
FUTURE PROJECTIONS
The managers at the foreign companies in our survey appeared to be very pessimistic about
an improvement in the situation surrounding vacancies which are hard to fill. Managers at
foreign greenfield companies are more pessimistic than managers at foreign privatized
companies (figure 6.1). No conclusive explanation was found for this difference. It might
have to do with the kind of activities companies are involved in – whereby the expertise
present in Hungary is more suited to the need of privatized companies – or with the better
access to and knowledge about the Hungarian labor market which privatized companies
have.
Domestic companies are the least pessimistic. In fact, 58% of the companies that
indicated problems with filling certain vacancies, expect the situation to improve in the near
future. This is remarkable, since, apart from the same problems as in foreign companies,
they have to compete with these foreign companies for good, skilled employees. The
competition is very uneven since foreign companies are able to pay higher salaries and have
a better image as employer. A possible reason for their optimism, at least for the 58% of the
companies that expect vacancy problems to diminish, might be the fact that they have not
really started to modernize their plants’ production and their way of doing business.
Therefore, their current demand for labor is hardly different from pre-1989 days.
Figure 6.1 Managers’ opinions on an improvement in the hard-to-fill vacancies in the near futurea
a Foreign greenfield N=15; foreign privatized N=23; domestic privatized N=12.
One of the points brought up in support of a positive future outlook (both foreign and
domestic companies) lies in the observation that changes in the education system are
beginning to pay off because of the growing number of young people with a good
education. The same goes for in-house training, not only in their own company, but also in
other (foreign) companies. Besides, more and more people are learning English and
German in school, which is an important issue for many foreign investors. This not only
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concerns people in key positions, but also shop-floor workers in some companies since
manuals are often not in Hungarian.
Points brought up which indicated a pessimistic outlook are more diverse. Several
managers pointed at the lack of language skills and the lack of experience. They expect that
these will improve only very slowly. Others referred to the geographical aspect. But taking
into account that this refers to both companies located in Budapest and in the northwest,
this might not be valid argument. Or perhaps it is, but for different reasons. Some
companies located in Budapest or its surroundings reported that the vast and increasing
number of foreign companies in the capital city, puts a lot of pressure on the labor market.
This would especially have an effect on the smaller firms. Besides, since most foreign
companies are looking for similar workers’ qualifications, companies’ problems with certain
vacancies would not decrease in the short term. On the other hand, some companies in the
northwest are pessimistic about the future since they do not expect people with
management capabilities who are mainly found in Budapest to move to the countryside. For
some companies close to the Austrian border, an additional problem lies in the difference in
the salary level with Austria.
6.3.4 In-house education and training
In-house training of employees has been already mentioned several times in this study.
Obviously, there is a close relation with technological modernization and corporate
organizational changes. New technologies require new, or at least different, skills. Besides, as
a result of organizational modernization, companies require skills that were absent during
the old times (like logistics, sales) or largely underdeveloped (like the ability to work in
flexible teams). Moreover, along with the economic and political changes, a change in work
ethics and mentality is required. In bringing the ‘new demand’ and the ‘current supply’
together, in-house education and training might be a valid instrument. A first indication of
these frictions on the labor market is provided by the managers’ responses to the necessity
to educate workers themselves (statement vii). Three-quarters of the managers agree8.
Moreover, respondents were asked whether and how they train their employees. They were
also asked for their reasons for doing this. From the 50 foreign companies in our sample, 46
train their employees. From the interviews we got the impression that the big multinational
companies put most effort into training their employees and spend the largest amount of
money on this. As such this is a positive finding, as it might be an exponent of the
modernization process going on. Moreover, it might be an indication of the foreign
companies’ need for skilled labor, and not for unskilled labor and may therefore strengthen
our earlier conclusion that foreign companies will not leave Hungary for other, cheaper
countries as labor costs rise. This is especially relevant when considering the sunk character
of the costs of training. When a company closes a plant, or moves a certain production
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facility to another low-cost country for instance Romania, there is no way these sunk costs
can be retrieved. Especially with respect to FDI in Hungary, as one of the more expensive
countries in CEE in terms of labor costs, this is a relevant issue.
When asking for the motives for training employees, a broad range of motives were
forwarded which could be classified in three categories.
1. Training employees to operate (new) machines, or for the production of new or firm-specific products.
This kind of training refers to two sets of training. First, training for (new) employees to
work with the new, more modern, machines. Second, training to get employees
acquainted with firm-specific knowledge and products. Both have one thing in common.
There is a direct relation to the investment in Hungary and technological modernization
in the first years of a company’s presence in Hungary. Foreign companies have done
much to modernize production equipment, both when investing in privatization and
greenfield operations, as shown in chapter 5. As a result, at most companies, additional
training was necessary to get employees acquainted with handling the new equipment.
However, the high education level of the employees made it easy to train them.
Therefore, training was only given for special skills that were needed to operate the new
machines. Most training was done by the company itself.
2. Training that is necessary to increase the competitiveness of the firm. Training implemented to
increase the competitiveness of the firm consists of several sorts of training. For
instance, training to keep up with new (technological) developments9, to prepare
employees for the ISO quality standards, to increase quality and efficiency, to motivate
people and increase employees’ commitment to the company or to improve their
flexibility. Such training is interrelated and shares the same aim: to increase the
competitiveness of the firm. In this regard, the companies do not differ from their
Western counterparts, but it is in fact a major change compared to the situation before
1989.
We found that almost all of the companies are engaged in this kind of training. Only a
few companies do not train their employees in this way. Those that do not are mainly
privatized companies that have moved labor-intensive production lines to Hungary,
producing for and supplying only to the parent company. These investments tend to
result from former contacts in the pre-1989 period. In these companies, no investments
of importance have been made after the (partial) acquisition.
3. Training employees in professions which experience scarcity on the labor market. As we found in the
previous section, foreign companies in Hungary have to cope with labor shortages with
regard to certain qualifications. One way of dealing with this problem is to take the task
of training employees in these skills upon themselves. Half the companies with hard-to-
fill vacancies are engaged in this kind of training. They can either train members of the
staff, or hire someone new who will then be trained. The latter solution is found mainly
among the larger foreign companies. The practice can be seen as a positive contribution
of foreign companies to the ongoing economic restructuring process. Their contribution
is greatest when it concerns training for people in key positions, like general company
management, human resource management, logistics, quality control, sales, and
marketing.
This type of training also refers to training which is necessary because the company is
the only one of its kind in Hungary. Such is the case with some greenfield investments
which set up types of activities that were up till then not present in Hungary. One can
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for instance think of the investments in the automotive industry10 or the computer
industry. This also refers to foreign companies that acquired an SOE with a national
monopoly. This way, the state monopoly is transferred into a privately-owned
monopoly. Foreign investors have been keen on buying these state monopolies. Since
there are no other companies involved in the same kind of activities, employees have to
be trained by the company in question.
There is one major disadvantage of training employees in skills which are
characterized by a shortage on the labor market, however. Once they are fully trained,
there is a good chance they will leave for another company. Headhunters in Hungary
know exactly where to find the right people. Some of them get a new job offer almost
every week, according to one of the interviewees. Some Hungarian employees are very
immobile geographically (see below in section 6.6). Others turn out to be real job
hoppers. This is especially true for people with skills that are in acute shortage. Those
with the required skills get opportunities in Hungary, that others in the West can only
dream of. In search of the best salary and the best conditions, they change jobs almost
overnight. In this way, the company loses a great deal of knowledge. It becomes more
difficult to keep investing in someone. The problem is that companies do not really have
a choice. The alternatives – not being able to fill a slot or employing expatriates – are
either not acceptable or too expensive.
METHODS OF TRAINING
A large number of the foreign companies do put a great deal of effort in training their
employees. This can be either in-house or external courses, or training on the job, either in
Hungary or in some cases abroad.
On-the-job training is mainly addressed to the types of training mentioned under
categories (1) and (3) with respect to manual workers. Mostly this involves a practical
training stint at the Hungarian plant. Sometimes on-the-job training is abroad at the foreign
parent company. Especially in the early years of investment, training abroad was common.
Sometimes training was conducted for foremen or shift leaders, who later passed on their
knowledge to the rest of the workers. Sometimes, all the workers are sent abroad for
training.
In-house and external courses are an important way of training employees as well. As
opposed to on-the-job training, that is directly linked to working skills, courses cover a wide
range of areas that are not always directly related to skills needed to carry out a profession.
Examples are language courses, that are sometimes compulsory and sometimes voluntary,
courses necessary for the ISO quality standard, and in relation to this, courses in hygiene,
security, environment and health etc.
Several companies reported that they give team training, so as to improve teamwork and
therefore productivity and profitability. These courses are aimed at improving the flexibility
of the workers (for instance by training them to become multi-skilled) and to improve
cooperation. Hungarian (or more general CEE) employees have difficulty in cooperating at
work, something which emerged from foreign managers’ responses to a statement
(statement viii). A small majority of the managers (62%) agreed with this statement11.
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External courses are also used by some companies to educate potential employees before
they start working at the company. In the preceding section we mentioned the example of
FISHER-ROSEMOUNT, that offers scholars an additional three-month post-graduate course,
before they begin working at the company. The same goes for GE TUNGSRAM that organizes
2-year post-graduate courses at the technical university. Graduates are selected by
TUNGSRAM, as are the courses. After 2 years, graduates are offered a job at TUNGSRAM,
though they are not obliged to take it. The reason they offer these post-graduate courses
lies in the fact that they are the only lamp manufacturer in Hungary and because there are
hardly any electrical engineering courses that are relevant for the company in the regular
courses offered by the universities.
In chapter 2, we referred to Swaan (1995) who pointed out that a lot of education in
foreign companies is geared to matters that employees are already acquainted with. This is
because companies perceive workers’ low level of skills as a lack of codified knowledge,
whereas their biggest weakness is a lack of tacit knowledge. What we did find in our survey,
however, was a very high opinion of the education level of Hungarian personnel. This is
also supported by the outcomes on some statements we already presented above. Generally
foreign managers think that the labor force is well educated, that employees are eager to
learn, and that they adapt quickly to the new situation (statements ii, iii, iv). This suggests
that foreign companies have correctly assessed the skill level of their employees and had not
been training them for nothing. However, it cannot be excluded that some training may
have been redundant. Understandably, the foreigners may not have had any point of
reference or insight into the real skills of their employees, especially in the early years of
transition.
Our survey showed evidence for our suggestion in chapter 2, that foreign investments in
Hungary play a major role in transmitting tacit knowledge. Foreign companies generally
spend a great deal of time and effort in changing their employees’ way of thinking and their
working methods. It should be noted that some managers have found more effective ways
to do this than others.
6.4 Recruitment and selection
Recruitment and selection of new employees forms an interesting object of study in
transition economies. For one, employees’ value in terms of output and value added has
become more important with the transition from a socialist to a market economy.
Therefore it has become of utmost importance to hire the best employees. Besides,
recruitment and selection are of special interest as a research topic in transition economies,
since it is a rather new phenomenon.
In this section we will discuss three related items. Section 6.4.1 discusses the labor
market status of the new recruits. Section 6.4.2 deals with the way in which companies
recruit new employees. Finally 6.4.3 examines the selection criteria used in hiring new
personnel.
6.4.1 Labor market status
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In our survey we asked companies about the labor market status of the new employees they
hired in 1996. It is interesting to see what the preferences of the foreign (and domestic)
companies are, and thereby, which segment of the labor market they tap the most. We
selected 5 categories beforehand (table 6.5). Within the working population we made a
distinction between people working at local companies and people working at foreign
companies. Besides these two categories, we selected recent graduates, formerly
unemployed and re-entrants on the labor market. The last category includes people who
finished their military service or housewives who start to work again.
In 1996, the foreign companies in our sample hired close to 4,900 people (table 6.5:
3,916 + 968). Not surprising, the lion’s share is to be found among the greenfield
companies. However, not all companies could give a detailed breakdown of the labor
market status of newly hired employees. The second total in table 6.7 refers to the
companies that could give this information. The large difference between the two figures
for the greenfield companies is due to the lack of knowledge of some major employers
about the activities of their new employees prior to their appointment12.
Foreign companies prefer to hire school-leavers and people that worked at domestic
companies. However, there is a difference between greenfield and privatized companies.
Greenfield companies generally prefer to employ people who used to work at domestic
Hungarian companies (71%), as is, although to a lesser extent, also the case with foreign
privatized companies (41%). The latter tend to employ school-leavers to a large extent as
well (41%). The outcome of the interviews did not provide an explanation for this
difference. A possible explanation lies in the fact that privatized companies do have in-
house experience, as opposed to greenfield investments. Therefore, they can afford to hire
school-leavers, who have no experience under the socialist system and are cheaper to
employ. Greenfield companies, on the other hand, do not have this in-house experience.
For those companies, it is more important to gain this experience, by employing people
who have been working at domestic companies for a number of years.
Table 6.5 The labor market status of the employees who were hired in 1996
Foreign greenfield Foreign privatized Domestic privatized
Number %a Number %a Number %a
School-leavers 70 11.9 644 41.4 51 18.3
Other local companies 1,076 70.5 232 40.9 307 57.5
Other foreign companies 42   4.3   24   6.7 6 1.5
Formerly unemployed 77 12.9   40 10.6 56 21.0
Re-entrants labor market 4   0.4     3   0.3 50 1.7
Totalb
Totalc
1,269
3,916
100.0 943
968
100.0 470
490
100.0
Number of companies 19 29 13
Average per company 206 33 38
a Unweighted average of the percentage in each company for each of the categories. Therefore, the
percentages do not refer to the numbers in the columns on the left of the percentage columns.
b Total number of newly hired employees in 1996 at companies that could give a detailed breakdown of the
labor market status. Foreign greenfield: N=16; foreign privatized: N=28; domestic privatized: N=12.
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c Total number of newly hired employees in 1996 at companies that could indicate how many new people
they hired last year.
It is striking that, despite the relatively high unemployment figure in Hungary, foreign
companies in our survey recruited only a limited number of previously unemployed people.
Two factors are relevant in this respect. First, unemployment levels in most selected regions
for our survey are relatively low. This is especially true for Budapest, Székesfehérvár and the
towns near the Austrian border, like Sopron, Györ and Szombathely. Second, foreign
companies are not very eager to employ previously unemployed people. One could argue
that they are seen as the ‘losers of the transition’. So, foreign companies do not contribute
to a reduction in unemployment figures directly. However, this can, though to a lesser extent,
also be argued for domestic companies, that tend to employ only slightly more unemployed
persons than foreign companies.
Notwithstanding, these findings show once more the impact of foreign companies on
the Hungarian labor market. By offering a higher salary and better fringe benefits, they are
able to get the best employees. Besides, they have the advantage of a better image as
employers, where there are more opportunities for career advancement. One could speak of
a brain drain from the state and domestic private sector to foreign companies. In line with
this we asked the managers at domestic companies whether there is, in their view, a strong
competition with foreign companies for the best employees. From the 13 companies, 10
indicated this to be the case. Some of them indicated that because of the big difference in
salary, there is actually no competition. If a foreign company wants to hire someone, they
can. In areas where relatively few foreign companies are located, the competition is not that
high, which is an indication of the rigidity of the labor market in Hungary, a topic to be
discussed in more detail in section 6.6. Competition might also explain why domestic
companies tend to employ more formerly unemployed workers than foreign companies.
6.4.2 Recruitment
In the search for new employees, advertising in a newspaper is most commonly used by
both foreign and domestic companies (table 6.6). One could conclude that it is also a very
effective way to recruit new staff, a situation which does not differ much from Western
countries. However, the growing pressure on the labor market in certain regions forces
companies to look for more effective ways to find the people they need. At ERICSSON
(Budapest) for example, an advertisement in the newspaper has always been the most
effective way to find suitable employees. But as this became less effective recently, hiring
the services of a recruitment agency became necessary. This might be seen as an indication
of the tough competition between (foreign) firms for the best employees in the capital city.
Actually, a lot of companies use recruitment agencies or headhunters, although these are
not one of the two most important means in most cases, since their services are needed
only/mainly for the recruitment of middle and high-level management or people with
specific skills. Roping in a recruitment agency is much less important in domestic
companies. Apart from the fact that this is a rather new and unknown phenomenon in
Hungary, it is also rather expensive. Besides, because of limited modernization and related
lower demand for ‘new’ – and as we have seen also scarce – management positions, there
might be less need for the services of recruitment agencies.
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Maintaining contacts with (vocational) schools in order to recruit new employees is of
some importance as well. This can be found mainly within some subsidiaries of larger
foreign multinationals. We already mentioned the examples of FISHER-ROSEMOUNT and GE
TUNGSRAM. The same goes for instance for the Györ-based AUDI subsidiary, that has good
contacts with local vocational schools. They offer AUDI engines to a vocational school for
practical training. This way, graduates gain some basic knowledge of AUDI engines and
familiarity may foster some affinity with the company.
Table 6.6 Means of recruitment of new employees
Foreign companies (abs.) Domestic privatized (abs.)
Most
important
Second most
important
Most
important
Second most
important
Recruitment agency 2 7 1 1
Labor office 4 3 1 4
Advertisement 26 18 6 2
(vocational training) Schools 6 11 1 2
In a roundabout way 8 4 4 1
Government job creation schemes - - - -
Other 3 - - -
Total 49 43 13 10
Recruitment in a roundabout way is important especially in some smaller plants of foreign
investors in remote areas. Moreover, it is the second most important recruitment strategy in
domestic companies.
The labor office is not an important recruitment source for foreign companies, which is
also reflected in the limited share of formerly unemployed among the new recruits as found
above (see table 6.5). Job transition patterns are causing a growing pool of long-term
unemployed as is also indicated by Dorenbos (1999). Allison and Ringold (1996) state that
individuals are more likely to be hired from the public sector into the private sector, or
between firms, than from the pool of unemployed, or right out of school13. The increase in
duration of unemployment represents the most serious labor market development in the
transition, not only in Hungary, but in all transition economies (Allison & Ringold, 1996)14.
6.4.3 Selection criteria
In the second chapter, it was reported that case study evidence suggested that foreign firms
select personnel less for their education and experience, than for their mentality and
attitude. Our own empirical findings are not entirely in line with this. We found that,
overall, education, experience, and attitude/mentality are of equal importance in selecting
shop-floor employees (table 6.7). This indicates that attitude/mentality is in fact an
important selection criterion at foreign companies, but not for all kinds of jobs and all
companies.
First, attitude/mentality is the prime selection criterion for (foreign) firms that consider
team spirit and the ability of teamwork key values for their organizations. As table 6.7
shows, domestic companies do not share this view, as attitude/mentality did not surface as
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the most important selection criterion in any company. The focus on these skills might be
strengthened by the perception that the ability to work in a team is more or less a problem
for Hungarian employees (see statement viii), although it is very dangerous to generalize.
Second, mentality was the main selection criterion for unskilled jobs. In companies that
employ mainly skilled workers, mentality appeared the main selection criterion only in a
limited number of cases. For skilled manual workers, experience and education are generally
the most important selection criteria. Sometimes experienced people are wanted, but since
it is hard to find qualified people anyway, those who are qualified and experienced are even
much harder to find. For companies that are the only ones engaged in a specific activity in
Hungary, it is not possible by definition to recruit experienced people. This holds for some
greenfield plants and for privatized companies that originated from state monopolies for
instance GE TUNGSRAM.
Table 6.7 Selection criteria for hiring new employees on the shop-floor
Foreign companies Domestic companies
Most
important
Second most
important
Third most
important
Most
important
Second most
important
Third most
important
Education 17 14 7 6 6 -
Experience 15 12 8 7 3 1
Attitude 16 15 11 - 3 3
Other 2 4 - - - 1
Total 50 45 26 13 12 5
Moreover, our survey showed that the ability to speak English or German is still an
important factor for most administrative or (middle) management positions. People
working at that level have to be able to communicate with the foreign management or the
parent company. But there are also foreign managers who regret selection by language skills.
One such example is Robin Muir from the Györ-based . He now realizes that
it is illogical to select people on their language skills and then train them in the skills needed
for the job. The opposite is in fact more logical. Anyway, because of the size of the country
and the need to integrate in the world economy, foreign language skills will continue to be
important in Hungary.
6.5 Labor productivity
As already noted in the first two chapters of this study, the countries of CEE, including
Hungary, were characterized by their low levels of productivity. After the 1989 change of
system, productivity levels were expected to rise significantly. There was an absolute need
for foreign and domestic privatized companies to increase labor productivity, in order to
survive in the new economic environment. Thus, there is a strong relation between
productivity and the modernization process, as we will see below.
The role of foreign companies might be an important one. Not only in a direct way, but
also indirectly, through the demonstration effect on domestic suppliers and subcontractors
and by forcing indigenous competitors to increase labor productivity. But obviously as for
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productivity increase inside their own plants (direct), we have to make a distinction between
privatized and greenfield companies. As we have come across several times already in this
study, the difference lies in the fact that where privatized companies have to cope with the
problems of the legacy of the socialist system directly, greenfield companies do not.
Therefore, we expected to find higher productivity increases in foreign privatized
companies than in greenfield plants. Due to the limited progress in the modernization
process, as chapters 5 and 6 show, we expected productivity increase to be lower in
domestic privatized companies, at least compared to foreign privatized companies.
We asked the managers in our survey to indicate the changes in productivity levels
between time of foundation and present in general rather than in absolute terms (table 6.8).
This gave us the opportunity to compare our findings for separate companies, and between
the three different types of companies in this study, especially since all companies started
operating in different years.
Table 6.8 Change in labor productivity between foundation and present (%)
Foreign greenfield
(N=20)
Foreign privatized
(N=29)
Domestic privatized
(N=13)
Increased significantly 60.0 69.0 38.5
Increased moderately 40.0 24.1 46.2
Equal - 6.9 7.7
Decreased moderately - - 7.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
We found a major productivity increase in both privatized and greenfield companies (table
6.8). In close to 70% of the privatized companies productivity increased significantly
between the time of entry and present, compared to 60% of the greenfield companies. A
moderate increase was found in a quarter of the privatized companies and 40% of the
greenfields. Another two privatized companies (7%) indicated that productivity has not
changed. Productivity increase in domestic privatized companies is lower than in foreign
companies (both privatized and greenfield). Nevertheless, in close to 40% of the domestic
companies productivity increased significantly.
For both privatized and greenfield companies, different factors influence productivity
increase. Productivity increase in greenfield companies is closely related to start-up
problems. There tends to be a number of start-up problems in Hungary15 (and CEE)
because of the rapidly changing economic environment, the cautious investment strategy of
foreign companies16, and the fact that greenfields too have to cope with problems related
with the old socialist system, though more indirectly (for instance the mentality of
employees). As time goes by, and workers get more acquainted with machines, gain more
experience and education, productivity will increase (also referred to as economies of
learning). A good example of start-up problems in greenfield plants is exemplified by the
IBM-plant in Székesfehérvár. The company expects to have improved output from 4.1
million hard disk drives at the end of 1997 to 11 million in 1999 without increasing the
number of employees and with similar equipment.
For privatized companies, the low productivity level at time of entry, due to the socialist
legacy, made it not only possible but also necessary to increase productivity dramatically.
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After all, they had to contend with old practices, excess employment, obsolete equipment
and the like.
The broad range of reasons the managers offered to explain labor productivity growth in
their companies can be classified into four groups. Although they mainly refer to privatized
companies, they are to some extent also applicable to greenfield companies.
1. Better production equipment. The use of better equipment was mentioned by the managers as
one of the important factors behind productivity increase. This appeared all the more
valid in the case of privatized companies, which concurs the results mentioned in
chapter 5: Investments by way of a joint venture or acquisition of a state company
started on average with a large share of obsolete equipment. Investments in new
technology can lead to high improvements in productivity. This phenomenon also
applies to greenfield projects, although to a lesser extent.
We have already mentioned that investments in automation are not always profitable
in Hungary, since the accompanying costs do not match the benefits, as labor costs are
still low. But of course, in companies where production is automated, this does have a
positive effect on labor productivity.
2. Training of employees. The training of employees, which is a normal practice in most
companies (see section 6.3.4), has a positive effect on productivity. Not only directly
(better skills), but also indirectly, since training has a positive effect on workers’
motivation and involvement with their work. The requirements expected of employees
have changed and they have to adjust to these requirements. Training is an important
element in accomplishing this change. The change towards more Western work ethics,
the idea of making profit, and the change in attitude are influencing productivity in a
positive way. Moreover, this results in a more problem-solving instead of problem-
avoiding attitude. Furthermore, due to training, employees are able to make small repairs
to machines, enabling a more constant flow in production when machines break down.
Especially in the plants of larger multinationals, team spirit and team building are
important elements in training which have an overall positive effect on productivity.
Workers are expected to contribute their ideas about ways and means to increase
productivity and to propose for more efficient working methods. Finally, mainly in some
greenfield companies, experience partly induced by on-the-job training leads to
productivity increase as well.
3. Staff reduction. Staff reduction as a means to deal with excess employment has a positive
influence on labor productivity. This goes for both blue and white-collar workers. In
most manufacturing SOEs, the high number of white-collar workers imposed a retarding
effect on productivity levels. Therefore, by decreasing their number and by the
replacement of incompetent staff members (which is a general practice in the bigger
multinationals) they have improved productivity. For example, in a big multinational in
the food industry that invested in privatization, in five years, the number of employees
was reduced to one-third of its former level and the output was doubled, resulting in a
productivity increase of 500%. Staff reduction was only in the management and
administration and in other support services departments, which is currently at only 20%
of its former level. For instance the staff in the financial department was reduced from
100 to 12. The number of shop-floor workers actually increased by 20%. At the moment
the company is one of the better plants of the multinational worldwide.
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In addition, the effects of layoffs boost productivity, for the best workers stayed with
the company and the less qualified were fired. In several cases, staff reduction for shop-
floor workers is linked to the implementation of new technology. Furthermore, layoffs
have a positive effect on other workers’ motivation, especially in companies that are
located in areas that have a relatively high unemployment rate.
4. Organizational changes. Changes in the organization can lead to increased labor
productivity, especially for privatized companies where labor and production tended to
be organized very inefficiently. However, the managers were not very specific about the
actual reorganizations implemented. Where labor is concerned, job combination is
perhaps the most simple but most effective change leading to productivity increase. In
the strive for full employment in pre-1989 Hungary, every worker was given a single task.
This has had a positive effect on employment, but a negative effect on labor
productivity. The introduction of new work practices, like job rotation, is another change
in the organization of labor that can increase productivity. Changes in the organization
of production may involve changing the line-up of the machines. We visited several
companies where machines used to be placed in a long queue, resulting in a production
line of 1 kilometer or more, hardly an effective organization of production. By placing
machines in a circle or an oval, workers were able to work more efficiently.
Besides the reorganization of labor and production, a wide range of other
organizational changes were mentioned, for instance production targets. This can be
illustrated by the example of GANZ-HUNSLET. The company, currently 43% owned by a
Cypriot company, was part of one of the largest SOEs in pre-89 Hungary. The company
produces underground trains, electric trains and diesel engines for the Hungarian market
and exports 55% of its production to other CEE countries, Western Europe, Tunisia
and Malaysia. Under socialist rule, the company used a piece work system. The planning
department calculated for instance that it would take 200 hours to produce a certain
product. In reality it took maybe only 100 hours. However, nobody reported this to the
department. In this way employees could have a lot of spare time during working hours
(that they could use for second economy activities). Nowadays, the hours needed to
produce a certain product are reduced to half its former level, due to the introduction of
better work supervision.
Other reorganizations mentioned are for instance better cost management, a leaner
organization structure (GYÖRI KEKSZ, for example, reduced the number of levels in the
organization considerably, by removing 4 management levels), removal of bottlenecks in
capacity, the reduction of the number of departments, production in larger batches,
producing a wider range of products, and stopping the production of unprofitable items.
A better organization of work between the parent company and the Hungarian plant
can lead to a higher labor productivity. This is especially valid for foreign investments in
Hungary that are set up to produce components for the parent company. Productivity in
the Hungarian plant can be increased by fine tuning these activities to match the
capabilities of the Hungarian plant, something that is not always the case.
Table 6.9 Projected productivity increase in the next two years (%)
Foreign greenfield
(N=18)
Foreign privatized
(N=26)
Domestic privatized
(N=13)
No increase 11.1 7.7 15.4
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Up to 30% 72.2 80.8 61.6
30-60% 11.2 11.5 23.1
More than 60% 5.6 - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Despite the impressive increase in labor productivity thus far, it is still not up to Western
standards in most companies. This is illustrated by the companies’ expectations for their
productivity increase in the two years following the interviews (table 6.9). An increase of 10-
30% seems to be the norm. Foreign privatized companies had the highest expectations
where productivity was concerned. The expectations of domestic companies are positive
too, though a little less than the foreign privatized companies. Taking into account that they
have made fewer improvements in productivity prior to the interviews (table 6.8), their
marginal results in technological modernization (chapter 5), and their limited adaptation to
the Western way of doing business (section 6.3.3), it seems unlikely that the gap between
domestic and foreign companies in Hungary will decrease in the near future.
6.6 Regional impact of FDI on the labor market
The preceding sections of this chapter dealt with the effects on the labor market in a
thematic way. In this section we deal with the effects of FDI on the labor market from a
geographical perspective. Our attention is on three areas in the research area that attracted
many foreign companies: Budapest, Székesfehérvár, and the northern border regions with
Austria. First an examination of the role of the regional supply of labor in the location
decision of foreign companies.
6.6.1 The role of labor in the location decision
The regional supply of labor might be an important factor in the location decision of
foreign companies. For companies that need specific skills, a location that offers a pool of
proper qualified workers is of vital importance. Going by our classification of sectors and
regions, this means that companies generally prefer a location in or near Budapest, or one
of the bigger cities with an industrial tradition like Györ or Székesfehérvár.
Companies that need a lot of unskilled labor prefer a location where the quantitative
supply of labor is sufficient. A location in a more remote area where unemployment is
relatively high and wages tend to be lower (because of less competition between firms for
labor) then seems be the best option17.
Besides the regional supply of labor there are a great many other factors that can
influence the location decision of foreign companies. This can for instance be proximity to
clients, suppliers or subcontractors, the physical infrastructure or the presence of raw
materials. Moreover, in the specific case of Hungary one can for instance think of the
proximity to the EU or the telecommunication infrastructure.
In our research we asked the managers how important the regional supply of labor was
in their location decision. They had to select one of five options, ranging from determining
importance to negligible importance (table 6.10). In analyzing the results we made a
distinction between greenfield and privatized companies. After all, in the case of the former,
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labor supply could be an important factor in the location decision, since they were free in
locating their premises on the optimal location; in the case of the latter, labor can indeed be
an important factor, but the location of the acquired company is the determining factor18.
We conclude that the supply of labor is an important factor in the location decision of
foreign companies. In 19% of the greenfield investments, the regional supply of labor was
of determining importance in the location decision. For another 48% of companies, it was
very important. The supply of labor can be important both in terms of the qualifications
(skills) of the labor force in a certain town or region, and the availability of a sufficient
number of workers. The latter is becoming more and more important in Hungary, as the
concentration of FDI is imposing more and more pressure on the labor market in certain
areas, as we will see below. SUZUKI, for instance, which needs no specific skills for the
assembly of the Swift model, chose Esztergom for its relatively high unemployment rate. In
1993, Esztergom had an unemployment rate of 20% against a national average of 14%. All
employees get a basic education at the company. The company prefers to employ males
between 19 and 40 years old who are willing to work hard, preferably after they have
finished military service. Apart from Esztergom, there were offers from Székesfehérvár,
Budapest and Pécs. But the local government of Esztergom offered the best conditions,
including land. The site which was formerly a Soviet army base where 1,000 soldiers were
stationed was targeted by the local government for an industrial park. The company which
gives work to 1,400 people is the major employer in the region.
Table 6.10 The importance of the supply of labor in the location decision of foreign companies in
Hungary
N
Determining
importance
Very
important
Average
importance
Minor
importance
Negligible
importance
Greenfield 21 19.0 47.6 9.5 23.8 -
Privatized 29 17.2 20.7 20.7 31.0 10.3
Center 27 14.8 22.2 22.2 33.3 7.4
Greenfield 11 18.2 36.4 18.2 27.3 -
Privatized 16 12.5 12.5 25.0 37.5 12.5
Northwest 23 21.7 43.5 8.7 21.7 4.3
Greenfield 10 20.0 60.0 - 20.0 -
Privatized 13 23.1 30.8 15.4 23.1 7.7
In the specific case of Hungary, employees’ language skills are sometimes an important
factor in the location decision. This is one of the explanations for the fact that the border
regions with Austria, where German is the second or sometimes first language for many
people, attract relatively many foreign companies, especially small and medium-sized
Austrian companies. Language ability was also the determining factor in the location of the
German company INDA HUNGARIA in Taksony, a small town only a few kilometers south of
Budapest, where the majority of the inhabitants speak German as their first language.
Also for privatized companies, for which the location of the acquired company was
given, we found that they highly appreciated the skills and experience of the companies’
employees. In several cases (17%) this was even a determining factor in acquiring this
specific company. For another 21% labor supply was considered very important. These
findings are an indication of foreign investors’ appreciation of the skills of the employees.
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Moreover, the regional supply of labor might be important in case of expansion or when
existing employees need to be replaced (because of retirement, dismissal or a new job
elsewhere). In some cases the acquired company is the only or one of the few in this
specific branch in Hungary, and the expertise in a specific field of work is restricted to this
specific region.
If the labor supply was not of determining importance in the location decision, we asked
the managers to name the most important. In the case of acquisitions and joint venture
acquisitions it is obvious that the location of the company which they acquired was of
determining importance. Some managers of Austrian investors that invested in the
privatization mentioned that they deliberately searched for an investment near the Austrian
border. For instance BRAU UNION bought a major share in SOPRONI SÖRGYÁR, a Hungarian
brewery in Sopron, a town 8 kilometers from the Austrian border. Besides the 25 years of
contacts between the two companies, the location close to Austria was important in
investing in this particular brewery.
However, for greenfield companies there are other factors (apart from the supply of
labor) that have played an important role in the location decision because they were free to
choose the optimal location. For some greenfields, established before or shortly after the
1989 change of system, the physical and telecommunication infrastructure in Budapest –
which surpasses the rest of the country – was of determining importance in locating their
production facilities in or near the capital city. Moreover, in the early days of transition,
when the legal and political structure of the country was changing rapidly and was rather
unstable, foreign companies preferred to locate in the proximity of decision making centers
and other relevant organizations, all located in Budapest. However, the need to locate in or
near the primate city is considerably less urgent these days. In recent years, the exceptional
position of Budapest has changed somewhat in favor of other parts of the country, as the
path of transition has become much more defined, and the legal framework much more
stable.
So next to the presence of a highly skilled workforce, these special positive assets of
Budapest might be one reason for our findings in table 6.10, that the supply of labor is
judged more important in regions outside Budapest. The share of greenfield companies that
characterized the supply of labor as determining or very important is 80% for companies
located in the northwest of Hungary compared to 55% for Budapest-based companies.
Other (negative) factors of influence might be the relatively high wages in Budapest (which
is especially valid for companies that are mainly looking for unskilled labor), and the fierce
competition among foreign companies for the best employees.
6.6.2 The regional demand for labor
Partly because of the geographical concentration of foreign investment, there are large
differences in the regional demand for labor. This is exacerbated by the immobility of the
Hungarian labor force. Several reasons explain this immobility:
1. (public) Transportation problems, especially to and from the smaller towns, cause long
commuting times;
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2. Private transport is scarce and expensive. Car ownership is not widespread outside the
big cities. Driving a car is becoming more and more expensive, with gasoline prices
almost as high as in Germany;
3. There is a housing shortage. Even before 1989, Hungary was characterized by a high rate
of private homeownership. After 1989 most state-owned flats and houses have been
privatized under very favorable conditions (Douglas, 1997). The result is that the market
for rental dwellings is one of the smallest among developed countries in Europe;
4. Traditions play a major role. Hungary is a very family-oriented society. For that reason,
people are not willing to move.
Therefore it seems appropriate to take a closer look at the relation between FDI and labor
within different regions in our survey. Three regions, that are endowed with a relatively high
share of foreign companies, will be discussed here in more detail: Budapest and its
agglomeration, Székesfehérvár, and the border area with Austria. Concerning the border
area, our emphasis is on the western parts of the counties of Györ-Moson-Sopron and Vas.
Furthermore, we look at Veszprém and Komárom-Esztergom, where the labor markets are
not very tight, partly because these counties do not host a great many foreign investors. The
discussion includes a partial summary of the above.
BUDAPEST
Budapest has by far attracted most foreign investments in Hungary. One of the reasons for
the attractiveness of Budapest as a location for foreign investments lies in the fact that
Budapest hosts the best qualified labor. Especially for people in key positions, who as
shown cause the most serious problems for foreign companies, Budapest is the best
location in Hungary.
The presence of a great many foreign companies in Budapest is one of the reasons for
the fierce competition for the best employees. This is also one of the factors responsible
for high wages in the capital city. We got the impression from the interviews that the
establishments of smaller foreign companies (that have less financial strength) face more
problems in finding suitable employees.
Despite this tight labor market, Budapest still offers most qualified staff for key
positions. However, one can imagine that Budapest is becoming less attractive for
production facilities. Especially for activities that require mainly unskilled labor which is
much cheaper outside the capital city.
SZÉKESFEHÉRVÁR
One of the most successful regions in Hungary in attracting foreign direct investment, apart
from Budapest, is Fejér county, and especially its capital Székesfehérvár. According to a
Financial Times survey, Székesfehérvár and its surroundings is one of the 10 most rapidly
developing areas in the world. A major reason is that, unlike other parts of the country in
which investment in privatization is dominant, Székesfehérvár has managed to attract a lot
of greenfield investments. Large multinationals like FORD, IBM, EMERSON-ELECTRIC,
PHILIPS, and STOLLWERCK have chosen Székesfehérvár for their greenfield projects. Several
factors contribute to the success of this city and its surroundings as a location for the
investments of foreign companies:
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1. The presence of an industrial tradition in the region as it was the base of two of the
largest state companies in Hungary: VIDEOTON (electronics) and IKARUS (bus
manufacturer);
2. A well-educated workforce, many of whom became available after restructuring at big
state companies like VIDEOTON and IKARUS;
3. All kinds of business services and factory premises provided by former state company
VIDEOTON;
4. An ‘investment friendly’ local authority, which assists foreign companies in legal matters,
and an army major who is very active in attracting FDI to the city;
5. The geographical location, only 50 kilometers from Budapest and close to the EU.
Perhaps the most important factor is the role that former state company VIDEOTON plays
in the region, something which becomes apparent from the first three points mentioned
above. After privatization in 1991 and the foundation of VIDEOTON HOLDING in 1992, the
company started, apart from their own production, to provide services to other companies,
mainly foreign investors. The VIDEOTON INDUSTRIAL PARK, which operates as a separate
economic entity under the holding, provides a wide range of services for foreign companies
located on the premises of VIDEOTON, which makes greenfield investment very attractive.
Companies can lease buildings from VIDEOTON, whether existing or newly built. A wide
range of other services is provided by the former state company. For example, the vast
majority of IBM’s employees are on the payroll of VIDEOTON. Other services are for
instance customs services, accountancy and tariff administrations services, training of
employees, etc. The services provided by VIDEOTON lower the threshold of a foreign
greenfield investment considerably. Or, as the general manager of FISHER-ROSEMOUNT put
it: ‘It is easy to grow with VIDEOTON in the background and using the facilities of
VIDEOTON.’
The well-educated labor force is an important factor in the region’s attractiveness as well.
However, the establishment of a growing number of large foreign greenfield plants puts a
heavy stress on the labor market. The low unemployment rate in Székesfehérvár and the
immobile labor force necessitates that companies become inventive in recruiting new
employees. IBM, for instance, has its own transportation network which operates within a
radius of 50 kilometers. This is the only way to get enough employees.
Székesfehérvár has not been a boom town from the start of the transition process. This
is illustrated by the example of STOLLWERCK, a German candy and biscuit manufacturer,
that opened a greenfield plant for the production of biscuits in 1992. They needed a 450-
meter long production line. In Germany it was not possible to find an area that big, so they
looked for a proper location in Hungary. In Budapest, where the headquarters is located, it
was not possible to find a big enough area either. They looked and tested more than 400
possible locations in Hungary. Székesfehérvár appeared to be the best location by far, at
that time. They were not only able to find a suitable production site in Székesfehérvár, the
city could also provide enough skilled female production workers. After the establishment
of some large foreign greenfield plants in Székesfehérvár, the labor market situation has
changed dramatically. Moreover, these foreign plants that are mainly involved in electrical
engineering, where profit margins are higher than in the food and beverages production,
have a higher status as employer and are able to pay better salaries.
Although part-time work hardly exists in Hungary19, our survey showed that at least one
company in Székesfehérvár uses part-time work as an instrument for committing employees
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to the company. The company, that aims at employing women with children, offers these
part-time jobs as a kind of fringe benefit of employment. By offering part-time jobs, the
company hopes to prevent job-hopping among its employees.
BORDER REGIONS
The border regions with Austria have attracted a lot of foreign investments. Both in
absolute numbers, but especially in relation to the number of inhabitants and the number of
domestic companies. These foreign investments are not only found in the larger towns and
industrial centers, but also in some small villages that lie within a stone's throw from the
border.
Especially in these small villages, the establishment of foreign companies can impose a
high pressure on the labor market. For instance Jánossomorja, a small village with 5,000
inhabitants, is only a few kilometers from the Austrian border, just 15 kilometers south of
Mosonmagyaróvar. The village cannot provide enough employees for the two food facilities
in our survey located there. The two companies together employ 325 people. The situation
is so pressing that one of the two companies is contemplating a move to Mosonmagyaróvar
(with nearly 30,000 inhabitants). The fact that they would consider moving a factory only 15
kilometers further in order to be accessible to the workforce, emphasizes both the
immobility and unavailability of labor in this region. One other argument that plays a role in
the relocation concerns their employees’ travel expenses which the company has to pay. In
the meantime, the two foreign companies in our survey cooperate. They set up their own
transportation network to ferry their employees from surrounding villages to and from
work.
The lack of labor in this part of Hungary is also caused by the fact that many people
work (illegally) in Austria for a large salary that reportedly may be up to four times the
amount they would make in Hungary.
Also in larger cities in the region, the establishment of foreign greenfield investments
puts a heavy burden on the labor market. Györ is the largest city and the most important
industrial center in the northwest of Hungary. The city’s attractiveness for FDI is due to a
number of favorable characteristics. First, the city has a long-standing industrial tradition.
The headquarters and a number of production plants of the large state conglomerate RÁBA
were located in Györ 20. Another favorable condition is the location of the city near the
Austrian border (and the EU market), and on the highway from Vienna to Budapest.
In Györ, some large foreign investments are to be found. Not only companies that
invested in the privatization, but also, to an increasing degree, greenfield plants. Where in
autumn 1995 there were only two companies at the industrial park in Györ (Ipari Park),
currently, a great number of companies are situated there. AUDI HUNGARIA MOTOR, which
produces Audi engines, is one of the major foreign investors in the city, employing more
than 1,000 people21. Moreover, the company has plans to invest in another plant for the
assembly of cars. This would not only create more jobs at AUDI, but also much indirect
employment, since foreign subcontractors of the company would consider investing in
Hungary as well. Besides, purchase from indigenous Hungarian suppliers or Hungarian-
based foreign suppliers would create additional jobs as well. This ‘knock-on effect’ can be
substantial22. AUDI in Györ has calculated that by employing 2,800 Hungarian workers
directly, it also creates between 3,000 and 4,000 jobs in the rest of the economy (The
Economist, November 22 1997; Business Eastern Europe Survey). On the other hand,
however, there is an increasing pressure on the regional labor market. AUDI’s manager in
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Györ, Karl Hübscher, worries that it would take only one more big foreign investor in
western Hungary to tighten the labor market intolerably. Unemployment in Györ, which
was 20% when AUDI arrived, is now below 5% (The Economist, 22-11-1997).
In the other parts of Hungary in our survey (that is Veszprém, Komárom-Esztergom, the
eastern parts of Györ-Moson-Sopron and Vas, parts of Fejér, and southeast Pest), the labor
market is generally not as tight as in the above-described regions. The fact that they host
relatively fewer foreign companies is an important factor in this. Nevertheless, there might
be some problems with finding people with specific skills, especially people for key
positions.
But in these areas, the opposite is also true. We found some companies at which
employees are over-educated. This refers to activities for which low-skilled workers are
needed, but which are done by people with middle-level education. An example is MTD
HUNGARIA in Nemesvámos (Veszprém). One of the activities that the company is involved
in is in the assembly of small agricultural machines. The work is done by workers with a
middle-level technical education, although no specific skills are required to do the job. In
comparison, at the parent company in Germany the assembly is done by unskilled workers
only. This suggests that on a local level there is still an abundance of skilled workers.
6.7 Conclusion
In this concluding section the most important findings in this chapter are:
· The effects of foreign companies on labor in a quantitative respect are favorable for
greenfield companies. The setting up of new production facilities, and the aggressive
expansion afterwards have created many new jobs. The employment effects at privatized
companies were mainly negative during their first years in Hungary. These negative
effects are not so much the result of the introduction of new technologies, but also the
organizational adaptations that were necessary because of the legacy of the socialist
system (overmanning on the shop-floor and the management, and the hiving off or
closure of departments or collective facilities). However, we found that after the
organizational modernization, many of the companies have grown again in terms of
personnel, due to the setting up of new departments and an expansion of capacity. As a
result, we found an increase in employment compared to the start of their operations in
half the privatized companies in our survey.
· The managers of the foreign companies are very positive about the Hungarian labor
force with respect to their education level, their eagerness to learn and their adaptability
to the new situation. As a result, foreign companies do not find it difficult to get workers
acquainted to the new, more modern equipment. Nor do they have problems in filling
slots for shop-floor workers, except for NC and CNC operators and welders. In fact, for
cost-based investments, the skills of Hungarian employees in combination with the labor
costs are important elements in the decision to invest in Hungary.
· Foreign companies face great difficulty in filling vacancies for key management positions
in for instance human resource management, logistics, sales, marketing and finance. This
is the combined result of the absence of these skills during the centrally planned era, the
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slow adaptation of the educational system, and the difficulty workers have in taking
responsibility. These problems are greater outside Budapest than in the capital city itself.
The managers were very pessimistic about an improvement in the situation in the short
term.
· Due to the limited technological and organizational modernization, domestic companies
do not have problems in filling key positions. Their problems pertain more to keeping
their skilled workers, because the foreign companies prefer to recruit these experienced
workers from domestic companies. Therefore, foreign companies cream off the labor
market, rather than contribute to a decrease in unemployment.
· In practically all foreign companies, training of employees is very important. Partly these
training facilities are set up to address the scarcities on the labor market. However,
mainly in the larger industrial centers, this leads to a growing functional labor mobility.
Besides, training-on-the-job is an important element in getting workers acquainted to
new equipment. Finally, training is geared to increase the competitiveness of the firm.
But by doing this, foreign companies contribute to the transformation process as well,
by increasing workers’ motivation, company commitment and improving their flexibility.
As a result of training, in general the share of unskilled work has decreased.
· Labor productivity increased in practically all the companies in our survey (both foreign
and domestic). This is the combined result of technological modernization, training of
employees, staff reduction and a number of organizational changes. Despite the limited
technological and organizational modernization in domestic companies, they have been
able to increase productivity as well. This is probably the result of the terribly low labor
productivity before they were privatized, indicating that simple adjustments (for instance
staff reduction) might lead to an increase in labor productivity.
· Labor is an important factor in the location of foreign companies. This is more
important for companies that set up facilities outside Budapest, due to the additional
locational advantages we find in the capital city (infrastructure, centers of decision
making), despite the fact that the capital hosts the best qualified labor market. As these
additional advantages become less important, we expect a more dispersed pattern of
location in the future. As a result of the further tightening of the labor market in the
northwest (partly caused by the concentrated settlement of FDI), foreign companies
increasingly have to search for suitable locations for their greenfield facilities in the
eastern part of Hungary, where the education level and working skills are lower, but
where labor is abundant.
NOTES
1 In most, but not all cases the large state conglomerates are transformed into separate entities before being
privatized. Only in a limited number of cases is an entire SOE sold, including all its facilities.
2 Excluding GE TUNGSAM, where 7,000 jobs were lost.
3 Although we treat this topic as a quantitative effect here, it might include qualitative elements as well.
4 Service activities under the socialist system were usually integrated in the large state industrial
conglomerates, and were therefore classified under the industrial sector. Here, we do not refer to the
emergence of service activities due to the disintegration of these industrial conglomerates, but to the
emergence of new service activities and newly established companies in the services sector.
5 69% agree, of which only 8% fully agree. See also annex 3.
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6 W.C. Ford, Jr. about the FORD investment in Székesfehérvár, quoted in The Budapest Sun, June 20, 1996.
7 Note that this refers to the situation at the beginning of 1997.
8 It is striking that 90% of the managers of greenfields agree, compared to 64% of those at privatized
companies.
9 As opposed to the kind of training under the first point, which deals with training in direct relation to the
technological modernization, mostly in the first years of their presence in Hungary, this refers to training
for new technologies to keep up with international standards and to increase or secure their (international)
competitiveness.
10 There were and still are, however, some manufacturers producing trucks (RÁBA) or buses (IKARUS).
However, the production of passenger cars or engines for passenger cars was absent before 1989.
11 In contrast, a majority of the managers of domestic companies (62%) disagree.
12 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES (+641), MAGYAR SUZUKI which hired 450 new employees last year since they
introduced shift work and IBM (+1,500) where the selection and recruitment are contracted out to
VIDEOTON.
13 This is not totally in line with the findings in this study, as greenfields appeared to employ school-leavers to
a large extent (table 6.5).
14 Moreover, long-term unemployment is a chronic problem in OECD countries as well.
15 As compared to investments in Western countries.
16 As we found in chapter 5, the cautious investment strategy of greenfield investments is for instance shown
by use of already-used equipment from Western subsidiaries at the start of operations. Only later they
might be replaced or supplemented with new (state-of-the-art) equipment that ensure higher productivity
levels.
17 Hungary has legislated a minimum wage level. In 1996 5.0% of workers earned the minimum wage or less
(OECD, 1997).
18 However, for some ‘semi’-greenfields (see chapter 2), that are located in the building of the domestic
partner, the location was more or less a given. Nevertheless, although they are located on the same premises
as the domestic partner, these companies were free to choose their location.
19 Only 0.8% of employed men and 2.0% of employed women work part-time. In comparison, OECD
averages are 7.7% and 31.2% respectively (OECD, 1997).
20 RÁBA produces among a great many other things front and rear undercarriages, undercarriages for trailers,
diesel engines, trucks, trailer-tractors, and power machines.
21 The number of employees refers to the situation at the end of 1996. Currently, AUDI employs 3,000 people
in Györ (OECD, 1999).
22 This is shown for instance by the acquisition of SKODA by the VOLKSWAGEN GROUP in the Czech Republic.
VOLKSWAGEN created a large number of indirect jobs at other foreign companies that followed
VOLKSWAGEN in their investment in the Czech Republic.
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Linkages and the diffusion of technology
and know-how
7.1 Introduction
After having discussed the direct modernization effects of foreign companies in chapter 5,
the indirect effects of FDI on the modernization of production are dealt with in this chap-
ter. These indirect effects are through the backward linkages with domestic companies. In
other words, we study foreign companies’ purchase from domestic suppliers and subcon-
tractors. We will look whether and to what extent foreign companies have linkages with
domestic companies, and at the consequences of these linkages for the diffusion of tech-
nology and know-how from foreign to domestic companies. The main focus is on active
diffusion, that is the diffusion of technology and know-how by providing some kind of
assistance to domestic companies, that goes beyond the normal exchange of information
that one finds in supplier and subcontracting relations. Hence, we try to find answers to the
following research questions in this chapter:
9. Do foreign companies in Hungary maintain linkages with domestic companies via sup-
plier or subcontracting relations, and if so, what is their purchase from domestic Hun-
garian companies (section 7.2)?
10. For what reasons do foreign companies in Hungary maintain linkages with domestic
Hungarian companies, and what are the future prospects (section 7.3)?
11. What are the effects of these linkages on the diffusion of modern technologies and or-
ganizational and technical know-how to domestic companies (section 7.4)?
7.2 Supply and subcontracting relations between foreign and domestic
companies
In this section we deal with the linkages between foreign and domestic companies in Hun-
gary by looking at these linkages from the viewpoint of both foreign and domestic compa-
nies.
At foreign companies we study these linkages in two different ways. First, in section
7.2.1, we look at the backward linkages of foreign companies with domestic companies in
terms of the purchase of different types of commodities. We measured whether foreign
companies purchase each of the different selected types of commodities from domestic
companies. Furthermore, we studied these linkages in a global perspective. After all, foreign
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investors, and especially multinational corporations are tied in large networks of external
and internal international relationships. By considering the total purchasing behavior of
foreign companies we are able to put the purchase from domestic Hungarian companies in
a broader perspective. Moreover, as for purchases in Hungary, we distinguished between
the purchase from Hungarian domestic companies and other foreign companies located in
Hungary. This distinction is important in light of the diffusion of technology and know-
how to domestic companies.
Second, in section 7.2.2, we look at the value of the purchased products and services of
foreign companies (all commodities together). Using a similar distinction as for the origin of
the commodities, we distinguish between the purchase from domestic Hungarian compa-
nies, other foreign companies located in Hungary, and abroad.
In section 7.2.3, we look at the supplier and subcontracting linkages between foreign and
domestic companies from the viewpoint of domestic companies. This means that we study
the forward linkages of domestic companies with foreign companies. We distinguished be-
tween linkages with foreign companies located in Hungary and located abroad. This enables
us to determine the real surplus value of contacts with foreign companies that are located in
Hungary in terms of transfer of technology and know-how.
7.2.1 Purchasing behavior of foreign investors for different types of commodities
Our focus in this section is on the purchasing behavior of foreign companies in Hungary
with regard to different commodities: raw materials, simple semi-manufactured articles,
complicated semi-manufactured articles, and supporting services. The managers at the
companies in our survey were asked to indicate whether or not they purchase any of these
commodities from Hungarian domestic companies, other foreign companies located in
Hungary, or abroad. Their responses are presented in figure 7.1.
In our analysis we made a distinction between the purchasing behavior of privatized and
greenfield companies. We expected that for privatized companies, local sourcing (that is the
aggregate purchase at both domestic Hungarian companies and at other foreign companies
located in Hungary) would be higher than for greenfield companies, since they could use
already existing contacts of the companies they acquired. Besides, they are expected to have
better knowledge of the local economy, hence a higher number of domestic suppliers. In
contrast, greenfield investments have to establish a local supplier network from scratch,
something that takes time, as already pointed out in chapter 2. Moreover, they are more
often involved in assembly activities, in which the global supplier and subcontracting net-
works stay intact, but only the final assembly is moved to low-production-cost Hungary.
Three conclusions can be drawn from figure 7.1. First, most firms in our survey have a
very diverse supplier network in the way that they purchase from each of the three types of
companies we distinguished above. Second, the most purchase from domestic Hungarian
companies is for supporting services, followed by simple semi-manufactured articles and
raw materials. Only a limited number of companies purchase complicated semi-
manufactured articles from domestic companies. Third, greenfield companies do not pur-
chase less from domestic companies than privatized companies.
As for the first conclusion, we found that almost all the companies in our survey pur-
chase from Hungarian domestic companies, foreign companies in Hungary, and abroad.
This goes for both privatized and greenfield companies. Supplies from abroad are impor-
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tant. Multinationals already had an international supplier network before they invested in
Hungary. The new subsidiaries in Hungary often still make use of their international sup-
plier networks to some or even a large extent. Other companies are engaged solely in out-
ward processing to, or subcontracting for, the parent company. These firms are generally
fully supplied by (or via) the parent company. Next to these international supplies, all the
companies in our survey make use of suppliers located in Hungary. This includes both do-
mestic Hungarian companies and other foreign companies in Hungary. As for the former,
we can say that for privatized companies these linkages might be a continuation of former
linkages of the then SOEs1. But our research shows that a large share of these linkages with
domestic Hungarian suppliers are established after the foreign owner came in.
Figure 7.1 Purchase of foreign greenfield and privatized companies by commoditya
a The figures show at which type of company a particular commodity is bought. Three types of companies
are identified: domestic Hungarian companies (Domestic), other companies in Hungary with foreign capital
participation (Foreign Hungary), and companies abroad (Abroad). Companies that do not purchase a par-
ticular commodity on an arm’s-length market – either because the production does not require this type of
commodity (NA), or because they produce it in-house – are classified separately. For instance, 57.1% of the
greenfield companies purchases raw materials from one or more domestic companies. For all 4 tables:
greenfield: N=21; privatized: N=29.
Linkages with other foreign companies in Hungary are important as well. Notably, as many
foreign companies have invested in Hungary, there is a higher chance of being involved
with linkages with other foreign companies. Partly these foreign suppliers located in Hun-
gary are companies that were sold to a foreign investor after the supply linkage with the
then domestic company was established. This is hardly surprising, since the ‘best’ domestic
companies have a better chance both of becoming a supplier to a foreign company, as well
as being sold to a foreign company. Of minor importance, but yet worth mentioning, are
linkages with other foreign companies in Hungary that followed a large multinational when
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it invested in Hungary. In this way they were able to secure their delivery. Moreover, this
offers an ideal opportunity to explore the possibilities for expanding their production ca-
pacity in Hungary for exports.
When taking a closer look at the breakdown of purchase of different types of commodi-
ties there are a few findings that require some clarification. As a general rule of thumb, one
would expect that the more complicated products get – and therefore the more important
quality becomes – the more likely they would be purchased abroad. When considering the
linkages with domestic companies, it turns out that purchase from domestic Hungarian
companies is the highest for supporting services (76% in greenfield companies; 90% in pri-
vatized companies), followed by simple semi-manufactured articles (71% greenfield; 69%
privatized) and, to a lesser extent, raw materials (57% greenfield; 76% privatized). In con-
trast, only about one-quarter of the foreign companies (29% greenfield; 24% privatized)
purchase complicated semi-manufactured articles from domestic companies. Therefore one
could argue that this assumption holds true only to a limited extent: supporting activities
can be ‘complicated’ as well and raw materials are only ranked fourth. But for a proper in-
terpretation of these figures, we have to compare them with the figures for the linkages
with other foreign companies in Hungary and with companies abroad.
Supporting services, like catering, distribution, maintenance et cetera, are mostly bought
in Hungary, from domestic Hungarian companies (figure 7.1a). Only 29% of the greenfield
companies and 45% of the privatized companies obtain these services from other foreign
companies in Hungary, and even fewer companies obtain these abroad. The relatively high
share of purchase of supporting services from domestic companies seems logical at first
sight, but there might be several reasons why foreign investors obtain these supporting ac-
tivities abroad or from other foreign companies in Hungary. For a company that produces
for export markets, for instance, is seems more obvious to use logistical services from
abroad. Maintenance is another case in point. Since production equipment is largely of West
European origin, maintenance and repair is commonly provided for by the Western manu-
facturer, either from abroad, or by a Hungarian subsidiary. But this is not always the case.
For instance FISHER ROSEMOUNT bought some CNC layers in Hungary, and the mainte-
nance is done by a Hungarian company. According to the plant manager this is both
cheaper and better than hiring a foreign company.
For the purchase of simple semi-manufactured articles (SMAs) and complicated SMAs,
the above relation holds true to at least some extent (figure 7.1b+d). As for the former,
there is a slight preference for local purchase, as for the latter there is a preference for pur-
chase abroad. The limited local purchase of complicated SMAs might indeed have to do
with the quality of the products from domestic Hungarian companies. But there are also
other factors that play a role. First, there is a relatively large share of companies that do not
buy complicated SMAs on an arm’s-length market at all. This might be because the produc-
tion does not require complicated SMAs, or because the company produces them in-house
(this goes for 33% of the greenfield companies and 28% of the privatized companies). This
also explains why purchase from other foreign companies in Hungary and abroad is rather
limited as well. The most important reason, however, for buying them abroad is the un-
availability of a large share of products on the Hungarian supplier market. This also goes for
raw materials. Hungary is not richly endowed with natural recourses. So, here too, we found
more companies with foreign suppliers rather than domestic suppliers (figure 7.1c).
With regard to entry mode, figure 7.1 does not provide evidence for our assumption that
privatized companies have more linkages with domestic companies than greenfield compa-
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nies. There are even more greenfield companies that buy simple and complicated SMAs
from domestic Hungarian companies than privatized companies. In contrast where sup-
porting services and raw materials are concerned, we found that more privatized companies
purchase locally. Perhaps the following section, where we look at the value of the purchase
of foreign companies, might provide more evidence for this assumption.
7.2.2 Local sourcing
Where we looked at whether or not a company purchases products from Hungarian do-
mestic companies, other foreign companies in Hungary, and companies abroad in the pre-
ceding section, this section deals with the purchasing behavior of foreign companies in
terms of the value of the products. Although this provides a less detailed picture, it gives
more insight on the impact of foreign companies on the local economy in general and on
domestic companies in particular. We compare the purchasing behavior of both privatized
and greenfield companies, and companies in different sectors.
Looking at the share of purchase of foreign companies from any of the different types of
companies, we found a more positive picture as for local sourcing than we would have ini-
tially expected (table 7.1). Considering all the companies in our sample, slightly more than
half of total purchase comes from Hungary: 28.5% from domestic Hungarian companies
and 22.6% from other foreign companies in Hungary. We found differences for different
modes of entry and companies in different sectors.
Table 7.1 Purchase of foreign companies, by mode of investment and by sector (%)
Na Domestic
Hungarian
companies
Other foreign
companies in
Hungary
Foreign
companies
abroad
Total
Foreign sample total 37 28.5 22.6 49.0 100.0
Mode of investment
Privatized companies 20 31.7 29.9 38.4 100.0
Greenfield companies 17 24.7 13.8 61.5 100.0
Sectors
Mechanical engineering 13 33.0 18.2 48.8 100.0
Electrical engineering 11 13.9 11.1 75.0 100.0
Food & beverages 13 36.2 36.6 27.2 100.0
a The relatively high number of missing values in partly due to a number of companies that could not differ-
entiate between purchase at domestic and foreign companies in Hungary. In itself this might be a positive
finding, since it indicates that these companies do not see a large difference between these two types of
companies in terms of quality, price etc.
Local sourcing at privatized companies is considerably higher than at greenfield companies,
61% and 39% respectively. So in terms of the multiplier effect on the Hungarian economy,
privatized companies appear to be most important. However, the difference in local
sourcing is more a result of the difference in the purchase from other foreign companies in
Hungary than from domestic Hungarian companies. Considering the latter, we still find a
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difference between privatized and greenfield companies, but this is only 7 percentage
points.
When looking at the purchase of foreign companies in different sectors, we find some
striking differences (table 7.1). Mechanical engineering companies take an intermediate po-
sition and resemble the general picture the most. Just over half the total purchase comes
from suppliers located in Hungary. However, they seem to rely more on supplies from do-
mestic Hungarian companies.
Foreign electrical engineering companies obtain the smallest share of their total purchase
in Hungary. Three-quarters of the supplies come from abroad. This is due to the large share
of greenfield companies in this sector2. These companies are more often involved in large-
scale assembly activities which rely on worldwide supplies. Apart from the company’s pol-
icy, another factor might be the absence of certain commodities in the Hungarian industry3.
Local sourcing is greatest for companies active in the food and beverages sector. Almost
three-quarters of the total purchase comes from companies located in Hungary. Half of this
comes from domestic companies. Practically all the companies in the food and beverages
sector in our survey are aimed at the local Hungarian market. Therefore, this finding is in
line with our earlier statement (chapter 2) that firms that serve the host market are more
likely to develop local supply linkages than export platform plants. Most ingredients are
available all over the world. Moreover, because of the low value added in this sector, trans-
portation costs can not be covered by a somewhat lower price elsewhere. But there are
some exceptions, like for instance SCHÖLLER. They produce Mövenpick ice cream under
license. MÖVENPICK does not allow the local purchase of certain ingredients, for instance
apricots. Nevertheless SCHÖLLER has managed to get approval to buy the chocolate for
Mövenpick ice cream in Hungary (instead of Belgium). Some other companies are forced to
buy certain commodities abroad as these are not available on the Hungarian market (for
instance coffee beans).
7.2.3 Domestic Hungarian companies: linkages with foreign companies
We also studied the linkages between foreign and domestic companies from the viewpoint
of domestic companies. We distinguished between linkages with companies that have in-
vested in Hungary, and linkages with foreign companies abroad. This enables us to put the
linkages with foreign companies that are located in Hungary in perspective. Moreover, we
distinguished between all linkages (both forward and backward) and forward linkages4.
Table 7.2 Supplier or subcontracting relations of domestic companies with foreign companies
N=13 With foreign companies in Hungary With foreign companies abroad
All linkages Forward linkages  All linkages   Forward linkages
Companies (%) 85 62 85 38
From the 13 domestic companies in our survey, 12 have contacts with foreign companies
(table 7.2). It is striking that this goes not only for foreign companies that have invested in
Hungary, but to an equal extent for connections abroad. Apparently, the economic reces-
sion in both Hungary and other CEE countries and the related collapse of most export
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markets in CEE as a result of the disintegration of the CMEA, has forced domestic compa-
nies to penetrate new export markets (mainly in Western Europe, and also in CEE) and to
approach foreign companies for cooperation, supply or subcontracting.
If we consider only forward linkages of domestic companies with foreign companies, the
picture is somewhat different. They tend to occur more often with foreign companies that
have invested in Hungary. Apparently, geographical proximity is an important factor in the
formation of supply or subcontracting relations between foreign and domestic companies.
7.3 Comparative advantages of domestic Hungarian suppliers and subcontrac-
tors
After a general description of the supplier networks of foreign companies in Hungary, we
now turn to deal with the backward linkages with domestic suppliers and subcontractors in
more detail. We examine the reasons for and against the use of domestic suppliers and sub-
contractors (sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). In 7.3.3 we conclude by looking at the future expec-
tations concerning the use of domestic suppliers and subcontractors.
But let us start by looking at the opinion of foreign investors in Hungary about domestic
suppliers and subcontractors. We presented the managers with the statement: Hungarian
companies are not qualified yet to function as suppliers or subcontractors (statement ix). In general their
opinion about Hungarian companies as suppliers is positive, with managers at privatized
companies more positive than managers at greenfield companies. Of the managers at
greenfield companies 65% disagreed or fully disagreed with the statement. For privatized
companies this figure is 78%. It is striking that privatized companies, that purchase a larger
share from domestic companies, have a more positive opinion about domestic suppliers
and subcontractors. The same statement was shown to managers at domestic companies.
They all disagreed (54%) or fully disagreed (46%) to the statement.
However, we found that in individual cases there were traces of distrust towards domes-
tic suppliers, even by foreign companies that have invested in Hungary. One striking exam-
ple is that of the Hungarian FEMIPARI, a Györ-based producer of steel equipment and ma-
chinery. They had some contacts with a foreign company in Hungary. However, the foreign
company would not deal with FEMIPARI directly. Now the Hungarian company delivers to
another foreign investor in Hungary, that in its turn ships the goods to the foreign com-
pany. This way the foreign company may have covered itself against a certain risk, but they
have to pay double the price than if they buy the products from FEMIPARI directly5.
7.3.1 Reasons for using domestic Hungarian suppliers and subcontractors
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We asked the managers at foreign companies in our survey why they choose domestic
Hungarian suppliers or subcontractors and what they see as the specific assets of Hungarian
companies. More specifically we asked their opinion about the price of the products, quality
of the products and delivery time. A great many different responses were reported, indicat-
ing that foreign investors have different experiences with and opinions about domestic
suppliers. And obviously, factors that play a role in using a specific subcontractor are inter-
related. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as being indicative only. We will discuss
the opinions of the managers at foreign companies about price, quality and delivery time
separately below. Moreover, we deal with tariff barriers, which influence (the extent of) the
use of domestic supplies.
PRICE
In line with our assumption, price appeared to be one of the most favorable aspects of the
purchase from domestic Hungarian companies. For a vast number of foreign companies in
our survey this is the most important reason for local supplies. Of course, price can not be
treated as an isolated issue. Quality, and to a lesser extent delivery time, have to be at a rea-
sonable level as well. The prices offered by domestic suppliers to foreign-owned customers
might even be lower than to domestic customers. Companies with foreign capital participa-
tion in Hungary could sometimes obtain discounts from local suppliers because of their
better creditworthiness than Hungarian companies.
For some large multinational companies, the price charged by Hungarian suppliers ap-
peared not to be favorable. In some cases foreign suppliers charge lower prices and proba-
bly carry better quality products. For some large multinationals, these lower prices abroad
are a result of long-term contracts for worldwide supplies in large quantities. This enables
them to buy raw materials and semi-manufactured articles at very favorable prices. Large
multinational corporations often make use of such networks of approved suppliers for
worldwide supplies. Individual subsidiaries are often not allowed to source (domestic) sub-
contractors or suppliers themselves. Besides this, Hungarian local suppliers generally can
not offer the large quantities involved, so they have little chance of becoming an approved
supplier.
QUALITY
Our general assumption was that, seven years after the change of system6, the quality of
‘Hungarian’ products could still not compete with Western products. Indeed, as was shown
by our survey, many domestic Hungarian companies still can not meet the quality standards
set by foreign companies. But the opinions of the managers at foreign companies are very
diverse. A lot of Hungarian companies have changed for the better, and produce good
quality products now. Partly as a result of increased competition, but also because of the
assistance provided by the foreign company (see below). A minor effort to support a (po-
tential) supplier – through some technical assistance or the introduction of a quality control
system – can improve quality significantly, and turn these companies into attractive suppli-
ers.
A good example to illustrate how Hungarian companies can supply the demand for high
quality products is provided by IBM. IBM buys its reading and writing heads for its hard disk
assembly plant in Székesfehérvár from VIDEOTON. According to IBM, VIDEOTON’s quality
can compete with Japanese manufacturers in this highly competitive market. The lower
price makes the purchase in Hungary very attractive. Currently, IBM purchases $ 180 million
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a year from VIDEOTON, an amount that will probably increase significantly in the coming
years, in view of IBM’s plans to triple output.
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DELIVERY TIME
Our assumption was that delivery conditions would not be a strong point of Hungarian
companies. Fast and punctual delivery has never been an important issue during the socialist
era. We expected that an improvement in more favorable delivery conditions would be a
long-term process, especially since the developments in this area in Western countries have
progressed enormously during the last 10-20 years. These developments mainly refer to the
concept of just-in-time delivery (JIT).
But opposed to our assumption, we found that delivery time was in fact one of the posi-
tive features of domestic suppliers. This does not specifically refer to the realization of JIT,
but to the advantages of proximity. Indeed, most domestic suppliers are not familiar with
JIT, or at least they were not at the time when the business relation started. (JIT is one of
the areas in which foreign companies provide assistance to domestic companies; see below).
But the advantage of proximity results in shorter transportation times. Besides, they have
the advantage of not having to cross the border, which complicates JIT deliveries from
foreign suppliers, although the border formalities have improved considerably since the
change of system. Anyway, these observations indicate that the delivery conditions of a
great many domestic companies turn out to be better than our initial assumption.
So whether or not domestic companies are familiar with the concept of JIT, working
with local suppliers can improve flexibility, as was mentioned for example by a manager at
the Dutch AMSTEL brewery in Komárom. He pointed out that if they needed some extra
items of a specific product in a short time, only a domestic supplier could meet their order.
One can not imagine that a foreign company from for instance the Netherlands would be
willing or able to handle such a request, let alone to get the merchandise there in time.
TRADE BARRIERS
Trade barriers, both export and import, can exert a positive influence on local sourcing.
Concerning the former, the example of SUZUKI is well known. SUZUKI set up production in
Hungary first of all to serve the Hungarian and other CEE markets. As sales turned out to
be disappointing, they were forced to export to the EU. Duty-free export from Hungary to
the EU requires 60% European content. As the Hungarian subsidiary was the only produc-
tion facility of SUZUKI in all of Europe, they were forced to look for local suppliers, which
they did. Currently, SUZUKI has a European content of 64%: 27% of value added from
Hungarian local suppliers, 23% from SUZUKI itself and 14% from the rest of Europe (Ha-
vas, 1997). However, the example of SUZUKI is rather exceptional. Most Hungarian-based
exporters to the EU have some EU suppliers. Therefore, the tariffs do not count for Euro-
pean companies that have invested in Hungary. Even when they still use supplies from the
parent company or from other EU countries, or when they use a lot of Hungarian suppli-
ers, they meet the European content requirement that sets them free from import tariffs in
the EU.
Import barriers are a way to stimulate local content as well. For instance, heavy duty is
levied on the import of food products into Hungary. This forces foreign investors in Hun-
gary to look for domestic suppliers, in order to reduce production costs and to be more
competitive.
Finally we have to state that the described positive effects of tariff barriers on the local
content of foreign companies in Hungary refer not only to increased purchase at domestic
Hungarian companies, but also to foreign companies that have invested in Hungary.
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7.3.2 Factors restricting the use of domestic Hungarian suppliers and subcontractors
A number of factors restrict the use of domestic suppliers. In the preceding section we al-
ready referred to the fact that large multinational corporations often use international sup-
plier audits for worldwide supplies, and do not allowed individual subsidiaries to use other
suppliers. But also in the case of smaller companies, the parent company often decides
which suppliers or subcontractors to use. Moreover, it might be the client that deters which
supplies to use, notably when it concerns the production of specific products that are ad-
justed to the customers’ wishes.
A frequently heard restrictive factor is that there are no domestic suppliers that produce the
components or semi-manufactured articles required. Three aspects are relevant in this re-
spect. The first is that it might be that the activities of the foreign companies do not link up
to the existing production structure in Hungary. This seems especially valid for greenfield
investments. A second related factor is that this might be exacerbated by the inflexibility of
domestic companies to meet foreign investors’ need for other, or new products. Also in
industrial relations, the saying ‘the customer is always right’ has not taken root yet. Accord-
ing to one of the interviewees the situation is such, that ‘if a potential supplier does not
produce a certain product, he will not produce it if we ask him to, although he has the re-
quired knowledge and technology to do so’. A concrete example is offered by AMSTEL, a
Dutch brewery in Komárom, that finds it impossible to buy brown bottles in Hungary,
whereas green bottles are easily available. In contrast they succeeded in finding a Hungarian
company that was willing to make crown corks, a product that was not available in Hungary
thus far. This shows that the unwillingness to adapt to specific wishes of foreign investors is
not characteristic for all Hungarian companies. But it shows at least the diversity among
domestic companies in terms of their adaptation to the new market environment in their
country. A third aspect is that domestic suppliers are now foreign-owned. As such this is
not a surprising tendency, since the better Hungarian companies are often the ones to
function as suppliers for foreigners, and are for that reason potential take-over targets.
7.3.3 Future expectations of foreign and domestic companies
FOREIGN COMPANIES
In chapter 2 we stated that local sourcing usually increases the longer foreign companies are
present in a certain country. The longer they operate in a certain country, the better they
know the local economic and business environment, and the higher the chance of contact
with potential domestic suppliers. Based on this, we would expect a relatively large number
of foreign investors in Hungary that expect an increase in the outcontracting to domestic
companies, especially since most foreign companies entered the country relatively recently.
However, there are some factors that might exert a negative influence on this. We can, for
instance, think of the earlier mentioned unavailability of a large number of products in
Hungary, the still moderate quality of commodities at a number of Hungarian companies,
and the take-over of domestic suppliers by foreign investors.
Nevertheless, 68% of the foreign companies in our survey were expecting an increase in
the level of purchase at domestic companies in the two years following the interviews (fig-
ure 7.2). Four main sets of factors were given for this expectation: expansion of output,
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logistical reasons, the general tendency for outcontracting, and better quality from domestic
suppliers.
The expected increase in output and sales turned out to be an obvious but important
factor in increasing domestic supplies, either because of a higher degree of capacity utiliza-
tion or an expansion of the capacity. Concerning the latter we already concluded in chapters
5 and 6 that a large number of companies are involved in this. Along with an expansion of
production and sales, the purchase from domestic companies will increase in absolute terms
(at least if they were involved in this before).
For a number of companies the expected increase of domestic purchase is related to
logistical advantages, both related to costs and delivery. Apart from the lower price level
that can generally be found at domestic suppliers, lower transportation costs is a factor in-
fluencing domestic supplies. These savings are important for companies that are aimed at
serving the local market, and to a larger extent for export-based companies, for instance as
indicated by in a cost-benefit analysis performed by one of the firms in our survey. If the
company would produce for export in Hungary, with supplies coming from Western
Europe, the cost benefit of the investment in Hungary would be 17%. If, on the other
hand, a large share of the supplies was obtained in Hungary, the cost benefit would be 54%,
because of both lower purchasing and transport costs. Moreover, one of the reasons to
increase the share of domestic purchase is that it is easier to realize JIT. But, as we will see
below, this often requires some effort in the form of assistance given by the foreign com-
pany to the domestic company to get acquainted with this new phenomenon.
Figure 7.2 Do you expect an increase in the level of outcontracting to and purchase from domestic
Hungarian companies in the next two years?
Other companies mentioned that they were expecting an increase in domestic purchase
because of a general global trend of increased outcontracting and subcontracting. By stick-
ing to its core business, a company becomes more flexible and can better respond on
changes and fluctuations in demand. But this can only be the case with reliable subcon-
tractors that can guarantee quality and delivery.
A final reason for an expected increase of domestic purchase that emerged during the
interviews refers to increased product quality at an increasing number of domestic compa-
nies. Not surprising, foreign companies are careful in selecting their subcontractors, espe-
cially domestic companies, because there are large differences. However, as the transition
continues, and more and more domestic companies restructure their facilities, the number
of suitable Hungarian subcontractors and suppliers increases. ESKIMO, for instance, found
only 25 suitable suppliers in Hungary in 1992. The 1997 supplier audit produced more than
2,000 companies that pass the company’s quality standards7. However, when taking into
account the ISO 14000 norm, that involves environmental standards, there are only three
suppliers that pass the audit.
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Although not specifically mentioned by the managers, an underlying factor that plays a
role is obviously time, that is a crucial factor in forming a better knowledge of the local
economy and the establishment of long-term, reliable, relations with suppliers and subcon-
tractors.
Next to a vast majority of companies that expect an increase in domestic supplies, a
quarter of the firms do not foresee such an increase. A few exceptions aside, these are
companies that buy only a limited amount from domestic companies currently. One im-
portant reason, mentioned by almost half these companies, lies in the unavailability of the
required raw materials and SMAs at Hungarian companies. Other companies want to in-
crease their local sourcing, but only through increased purchases from other foreign com-
panies in Hungary.
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
In section 7.2.3 we found that the vast majority of the domestic companies have contacts
with foreign companies located in Hungary or abroad. But what about the near future?
From the 13 domestic companies in our survey, 12 are actively seeking new business rela-
tions with foreign companies, either in or outside Hungary. This refers not only to foreign
companies in Hungary and in the West, but also to companies in CEE. Within CEE, espe-
cially the Russian Republic and Ukraine were mentioned during the interviews. After all, the
collapse of the CMEA has forced these companies to re-establish former contacts and to
seek new business relations. For food processing companies the eastward orientation is
prompted by trade barriers imposed by the EU as part of the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Ten companies expected the active policy for new relations would lead to new con-
tacts with foreign companies in the two years following the interviews.
In general one can say that the companies see the importance of contacts with foreign
companies and a more international orientation, as is also shown in the managers’ re-
sponses to statement x. More than three-quarters of the manages are of the opinion that
contacts with foreign companies are of major importance for the performance of Hungar-
ian companies. The open character of the Hungarian economy nowadays, and the financial
need for cooperation with other, foreign companies are relevant in this respect.
7.4 Diffusion of modern technologies and organizational and technical know-
how
One of the positive effects of FDI in transition economies lies in the diffusion of modern
technologies and organizational and technical know-how to domestic companies. Through
this diffusion, the effects of FDI on the modernization of production can be far more
widespread than if they were to act as ‘cathedrals in the desert’.
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In chapter 2, we stated that this diffusion can be either active or passive. Passive diffu-
sion – that is the normal exchange of information, know-how, quality standards etc. that are
necessary for the establishment of a normal supplier or subcontracting relation – is difficult
to measure. Nevertheless, based on our findings in section 7.2 that dealt with the purchas-
ing behavior of foreign companies, we can conclude that passive diffusion seems important:
almost all foreign companies purchase from domestic companies and on average 28.5% of
the total purchase comes from domestic companies.
In this section, we are interested in active diffusion, because of its greater impact. Active
diffusion refers to the situation where a foreign company provides some kind of assistance
to a domestic company that goes beyond the normal exchange of information.
Just over half of the companies in our survey provide assistance to domestic companies
with which they have contacts (table 7.3). Considering only companies that buy at least 25%
of their total purchase from domestic Hungarian companies, more than 60% of the com-
panies provide assistance. In other words, foreign companies that are more integrated in the
Hungarian economy provide assistance more often. It seems, that by providing assistance,
domestic companies can become more attractive as suppliers or subcontractors (if they
were not already in the first place).
One might expect differences in these findings between companies in different sectors
and between different entry modes. However, we found hardly any difference in terms of
assistance provided when differentiating between these two variables.
Table 7.3 Technical and organizational assistance of foreign investors to domestic suppliers and
subcontractors (% of companies)
All foreign companies
(N=50)
Companies ³ 25% domestic
purchase (N=21)a
Assistance   52   62
No assistance   48   38
Total 100 100
a 20 companies reported less than 25% purchase from domestic Hungarian companies. For another 9 com-
panies the share of total purchase from domestic companies is not known (missing value).
In our survey, a wide range of assistance was found. Assistance can be classified under three
headings: technical assistance, organizational assistance and financial assistance. All three will
be discussed shortly below. Of course the results are only indicative in nature.
When discussing the issue of assistance to domestic companies in the former centrally-
planned economies, the emphasis is often solely on technical assistance. This refers to the
diffusion of modern technologies and know-how. In our survey this indeed turned out to
be one of the major kinds of assistance. Often this includes aid in the form of production
equipment for use by the domestic company. Further assistance involved training of em-
ployees at the domestic company, the Hungarian subsidiary of the foreign company, or
even the parent company of the foreign investor abroad. Another variation is that employ-
ees of the foreign investor are posted at the Hungarian supplier or subcontractor temporar-
ily.
Next to technical assistance, we found a large proportion of companies that provide
assistance in organizational know-how. In our survey, this refers to management assistance
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and consultancy, and assistance in (the implementation of) quality control and JIT. Some-
times the main aim of management assistance is to give the management self-confidence in
corporate governance. This kind of assistance, that has been given little attention thus far in
the literature, might be even more important than technical assistance. After all, moderniz-
ing the organizational structure in former SOEs is one of the important elements of trans-
formation. In addition, there is a lack of people for key positions as was found in chapter 6.
Finally, the implementation of technological modernization seems to be impossible without
the proper organizational changes and without a proper supervision of the modernization
process.
Next to this more general picture, management assistance might be required especially
for domestic companies that have performed quite well and therefore registered excessive
growth in a relatively short time. These successful companies find difficulty in or are unable
to meet the excessive growth in demand. As a result, the organizational structure of the
company (management) does not grow with the company. Giving management assistance
or consultancy to these companies keeps them on track and guarantees future cooperation
with the foreign investor.
Finally, assistance can be through financial aid as well. Since domestic companies find it
difficult to finance their investments on the capital market (under favorable conditions), a
foreign partner might provide financial assistance by securing a loan. Repayment might be
either cash or in kind. In the latter case, the loan can be seen as a prepayment for future
deliveries.
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
In section 7.2.3 we found that forward linkages of domestic companies occur more often
with foreign companies that are located in Hungary than with foreign companies abroad. So
the potential for receiving assistance is much higher for linkages with foreign companies
that are located in Hungary. Indeed, we found that the linkages with foreign companies in
Hungary are more often involved with assistance than those with companies abroad (table
7.4). However, the low number of cases forces us to interpret these findings with utmost
care.
Table 7.4 Assistance in the form of machines, know-how or organizational support from foreign
companies (forward linkages onlya)
With foreign companies in Hungary
Number of companies
With foreign companies abroad
Number of companies
Assistance 3 1
No assistance 5 4
Total 8 5
a For backward linkages we found no assistance.
When comparing our findings in table 7.4 with those in table 7.3, we see that fewer domes-
tic companies reported that they receive assistance from foreign companies in Hungary, as
opposed to assertions made by foreign companies (37.5% compared to 52%). This might
have to do with the low number of domestic companies in the survey. Another factor
might be that for domestic companies, the issue of assistance from foreign companies is
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somewhat sensitive. A number of managers at domestic companies emphasized the equality
of the relations with foreign companies. In contrast, there was one manager who admitted
that they actually required some assistance from the foreign business partner, but they were
afraid to raise the issue. He feared that if they brought up the issue, the foreign partner
would go to another (Hungarian) subcontractor.
7.5 Conclusion
In this concluding section the most important findings in this chapter are:
· Foreign companies in Hungary are well tied into the Hungarian economy. Local sourcing
in privatized companies is more than 60%. In greenfield companies this is close to 40%.
The different findings for both modes of investment is mainly due to a difference in the
purchase from other foreign companies located in Hungary, rather than from domestic
Hungarian companies.
· Taking into account the limited time that foreign companies are present in Hungary,
foreign companies actually purchase a rather high share from domestic Hungarian com-
panies. At privatized companies, close to one-third of total purchase comes from do-
mestic Hungarian companies. But especially at greenfield companies the purchase from
domestic Hungarian companies is higher than we expected (close to one-quarter). At
both privatized and greenfield companies the purchase from domestic Hungarian com-
panies is highest for supporting services and simple semi-manufactured articles. Besides,
purchase is relatively high for food and beverages and mechanical engineering compa-
nies. Overall, three-quarters of the foreign companies expect an increase in the purchase
from domestic Hungarian companies in the near future.
· Low price and favorable delivery conditions are the most important reasons for pur-
chasing from domestic companies. The differences between domestic companies are
considerable in terms of the quality of their products. The unavailability of a large range
of products was given as one of the major restrictions in increasing the purchase from
domestic Hungarian companies.
· More than half of the foreign companies provide some kind of assistance to domestic
suppliers and subcontractors, resulting in a positive effect on the diffusion of technology
and know-how. This assistance includes technical assistance, assistance in organizational
know-how, and to a lesser extent, financial assistance.
NOTES
1 As most SOEs were highly vertically integrated, these former linkages mainly refer to linkages with other
parts of the then SOEs, that are privatized to other owners, or are still in state hands.
2 The higher number of greenfield companies in this sector is even more pronounced here, as more privat-
ized companies could not differentiate between the purchase at domestic and foreign companies in Hun-
gary (and are therefore missing values).
3 See also section 7.3.
4 From the viewpoint of domestic companies these forward linkages with foreign companies coincide with
backward linkages when looked at from the viewpoint of foreign companies (see also chapter 2).
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5 A somewhat different, even more extreme example is from an Austrian producer of bakery equipment in
Hungary that was in negotiations with a domestic Russian company to deliver some bakery machines. The
Russian company was not secure about the quality the Hungarian company could provide, so the Hungar-
ian subsidiary referred to the parent company in Austria. Finally, the Russian company bought the machin-
ery at the Austrian parent company. But they ended up with a price that was much higher than when they
would have bought the machines directly from the Hungarian subsidiary, for products that were manufac-
tured in Hungary anyway.
6 That is when the interviews were taken.
7 These numbers refer to both foreign and domestic companies in Hungary.
167
Following the change of system in 1989, Hungary became an attractive destination for for-
eign direct investment (FDI). The country’s largely untapped consumer market and the low
labor costs offered opportunities for many foreign companies. On the other hand, the
Hungarian state has been very keen on attracting FDI. Lacking indigenous capital, they pre-
ferred foreign capital for the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Moreover,
foreign companies bring in Western management techniques, modern technologies and
know-how, which were new to the local economy at the onset of the transition. In other
words, FDI can play an important role in the transformation towards a more market-based
economy.
In this study we focused on the contribution of FDI toward some key elements in the
economic transformation in Hungary. The central problem definition of this study is: What
are the direct and indirect effects of foreign direct investment on the modernization of the manufacturing in-
dustry in Hungary, and what are the consequences of this modernization on the demand for labor, both in
qualitative and quantitative respects? The direct effects of FDI refer to modernization inside the
foreign plants, and the indirect effects refer to the diffusion of modern technologies and
know-how toward domestic companies.
We studied these processes in foreign manufacturing companies operating in mechanical
engineering, electrical engineering, and the food and beverages industry; sectors that have
the highest foreign involvement. Moreover, the study was restricted to companies that are
located in Budapest and its surroundings or the northwest of Hungary. These regions host
not only the highest concentration of FDI in Hungary, but in all of Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). Based on a disproportionate stratified sample, we interviewed staff at 50
foreign companies: 29 companies that invested in the privatization of SOEs, and 21 com-
panies that set up new plants from scratch, so-called greenfield investments. In order to be
able to put our findings for foreign companies in perspective, we interviewed staff at 13
domestic privatized companies.
As for the potential of host-country effects of FDI, Hungary seems to take an interme-
diate position. In contrast to developing countries, socialist Hungary was characterized by a
fairly skilled labor force, high R&D expenditure, and an extensive industrial sector. But on
the other hand, commercial, transportation and communications infrastructure were not
much better than in many middle-income countries and its industrial performance was
questionable. Besides Hungary has a much smaller level of technological, organizational and
management capabilities than was found in Germany after the Second World War. So we
could say that Hungary was maldevelloped, rather than underdeveloped.
8
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In the context of the socialist past of Hungary, the distinction between foreign privatized
and foreign greenfield companies is considered important in this research. Where privatized
companies have to cope with the legacy of the socialist system directly, greenfield compa-
nies are only confronted with this legacy in an indirect way. Related to the main themes in
this study, this means for instance that privatized companies are assumed to be saddled with
largely obsolete production equipment and excess employment, whereas greenfield compa-
nies can furnish their plants with the latest technological equipment, and exert a more posi-
tive effect on employment. On the other hand, the diffusion of modern technologies (indi-
rect effects on modernization) is expected to be higher in privatized companies because of
former linkages and a better knowledge of the local economy.
In this concluding chapter the empirical findings of this study will be used in trying to find
an answer to the question whether foreign companies contribute to bridging the gap be-
tween Hungary and Western market economies.
Looking at the processes taking place within the foreign subsidiaries we can indeed con-
clude that FDI is bridging a gap. Our findings have shown that foreign companies contribute
considerably to the modernization of the manufacturing industry and the transformation of
the labor market by implementing organizational characteristics and technological standards
similar to those in Western countries.
This study convincingly showed that FDI is of major importance for the technological
modernization in a direct way. Both privatized and greenfield companies contribute to the
technological modernization in their own specific ways. Greenfield investments use inter-
national standard and state-of-the art technology to a large extent. However, when the in-
vestment in Hungary is the result of a transfer of production capacity from Western sub-
sidiaries to low-production-cost Hungary, this often involves a physical transfer of used
equipment from these subsidiaries as well. It turned out that privatized companies indeed
have to cope with obsolete equipment to a large extent when they started their operations
in Hungary. On average, they start with more than 56% obsolete equipment. However, they
have been able to reduce this share considerably in the meantime to 28%. Moreover, this
share will further decrease, as 90% of the privatized companies have planned further in-
vestments in the near future. Although most foreign privatized companies still can not
stand up to greenfield investments in terms of their equipment and technologies used, their
contribution to the modernization of production is of vital importance. The more so, since
they carry the momentum in the Hungarian manufacturing sector.
One of the elements is related to labor. The transformation of the labor market is one of
the central elements in the transition towards a market-based economy. In this study we
studied this transformation from the viewpoint of foreign companies. Admittedly this does
not provide the whole picture, but we were of the opinion that the core of the changes on
the labor market is to be found in these foreign companies, as they are the front-runners in
the modernization process.
We conclude that foreign investments play a leading role in bridging the gap with respect
to labor, both in quantitative and qualitative respects. Foreign privatized companies have
dealt convincingly with overmanning, a typical problem in socialist countries. The layoffs
that were the result of the new foreign owners’ policies have often caused a negative effect
on employment during the first years after the investment. However, it does not seem right
to blame the foreign companies for this, especially in view of the fact that restructuring of
SOEs and improving productivity were factors that play a role in attracting FDI in the first
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place. Keeping in mind the legacy of the socialist system – characterized by largely obsolete
equipment and full employment, unemployment on-the-job and top-heavy management –
modernization of production, and a related increase in labor productivity, must inevitably
lead to job losses.
Indeed, our research showed that the employment effects of foreign companies are not
negative per se. Half of the foreign privatized companies have shown an increase in em-
ployment since the establishment, due to the setting up of new departments for instance
sales and distribution, and an expansion of production capacity. A concomitant factor lies in
the fact that not all privatized companies had to cope with overmanning to the same extent,
partly because of pre-privatization restructuring. Next to this, greenfield investments have
created new jobs for a great many people. Ongoing expansion at these greenfield sites will
continue in the years to come.
Even more important for the transformation process is the way foreign companies af-
fect the labor market in a qualitative respect. First of all foreign investors that use Hungary
as an export base are attracted not only by the low labor costs, but to a large extent the high
professional skills of Hungarian workers as well. Foreign investors appeared to be very
positive about the skills of Hungarian employees, their eagerness to learn and their adapta-
tion to the new situation in their country. Such a high level of skills made it easy for foreign
investors to get workers acquainted with the new technologies that are introduced in for-
eign companies. In this respect, they also set the direction in which the education system
(vocational training) has to be adapted for the new Hungary.
Our research showed that the mismatch between supply and demand on the labor mar-
ket is highest for staff positions, indicating the contribution of foreign companies to the
organizational modernization in their plants. Foreign companies have great difficulty in fill-
ing vacancies for key positions, especially for human resource managers, logistics managers,
(middle-level) production managers, sales and marketing managers, financial management,
chief engineers and quality control staff. The shortages are the combined result of the ab-
sence of these professions during the socialist period, the slow adjustment of the educa-
tional system, and the fact that people still have difficulty in handling responsibility in their
work. Foreign companies are bridging the gap, by taking the education in these professions
in their own hands. Besides, when they have been educated, people get the opportunity to
acquire the necessary experience inside the foreign subsidiaries. The managers at most for-
eign companies are pessimistic about a decrease in these hard-to-fill vacancies for staff po-
sitions in the near future. The strong concentration of FDI and the ongoing inflow of for-
eign capital, all looking for the same management skills, are important factors in this re-
spect.
Finally, foreign companies are important in transmitting what we might call ‘soft skills’ to
Hungarian employees – shop-floor workers and people in key positions. By soft skills we
mean tacit knowledge, team spirit and mentality. The skills that are lacking in Hungary (and
other countries in CEE) are exactly the ones that have developed in Western market
economies in the form of tacit knowledge. Our survey provided some evidence that foreign
investments play a major role in transmitting tacit knowledge to their employees. Not only
by just being there, but also because they spend a great deal of time and effort in changing
their employees’ way of thinking and working methods. This also goes for team spirit and
mentality. Teamwork appeared to be a problem for most employees, and forty years of
central planning have resulted in low work morale. Almost all the companies in our survey
are engaged in training employees in teamwork and motivation, so as to increase flexibility
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and the company’s competitiveness. These are also important elements in the transition of
the labor market.
As a result of the process described here, labor productivity has improved considerably
in practically all the foreign companies in our survey. This holds first of all for privatized
companies that generally started with terribly low productivity levels. The increase in labor
productivity is a direct result of the implementation of modern production equipment, the
training of employees, and a number of organizational changes of which staff reduction and
job combination seem to be the most important. An increase in labor productivity was also
found in greenfield companies. They had to cope with start-up problems that were high due
to the inherited features (for instance low work morale, and the lack of personal responsi-
bility) and the rapidly changing economic environment.
On the other hand, our study provided evidence that FDI has contributed to a widening gap
within the country, or at least not contributed enough to bridging the gap. The most important
point is that the gap between foreign and domestic companies has widened. Domestic privatized com-
panies in manufacturing do not only have a worse starting position than companies that
were sold to foreign owners (on average more than three-quarters of the equipment is ob-
solete at the start of their operations), but have not been able to reduce this share ever
since. The lack of good financing options was reported by the managers as a major con-
straint in the replacement of the outdated technology. However, one might question
whether this is caused by the unwillingness of banks to finance the modernization of
equipment or the high interest rates as reported by the managers. The reason might well lie
with the domestic companies themselves, as they still use largely outdated equipment and
are less engaged in modernizing the organizational structure of their companies. The latter
is indicated by our finding that, as opposed foreign companies, domestic companies did not
have problems filling vacancies for key management positions, notably in those professions
that were largely absent under socialist rule.
One indication of how foreign companies widen the gap with domestic companies is for
instance foreign investors, especially those in greenfield sites, who cream qualified workers
from domestic companies rather than take on the unemployed or school-leavers. Foreign
companies can offer higher salaries and fringe benefits, and have a better image as em-
ployer. One could speak of a brain drain from the state and domestic private sector to for-
eign companies.
What we did study in this thesis is the way in which foreign companies can contribute to
decreasing the gap with domestic companies. This was done by looking at the backward
linkages with domestic suppliers and subcontractors. These linkages are the channels of
diffusion for Western management techniques and modern technologies, especially when
these linkages are accompanied by the provision of assistance to the domestic company.
The indirect effects of FDI on the modernization of production might be much greater
than the direct effects, and might be even more important for the (transition of the) Hun-
garian economy as a whole.
Taking into account the short time that most companies have operated in Hungary, and
the rather unstable economic situation in the early transition years, we found that both pri-
vatized and greenfield companies purchase a rather high share of their total sourcing from
Hungarian domestic companies. Privatized companies buy close to one-third of their total
purchase from domestic companies and greenfield companies one-quarter. The main rea-
sons for using domestic suppliers and subcontractors are favorable prices and, surprisingly,
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delivery conditions. Although most domestic companies are not familiar with recent devel-
opments in logistics like just-in-time delivery, geographical proximity is important, both in
terms of distance and flexibility. In contrast, the major factor that prevents foreign compa-
nies from purchasing more from domestic companies is that there are no domestic Hun-
garian suppliers for a large range of products. This might be the joint result of the moderni-
zation process in Hungary that has attracted new activities to the country that are incongru-
ous with existing activities, and the fact that Hungary is not richly endowed with natural
recourses.
The linkages between foreign and domestic companies can be seen as an indicator for
the diffusion of modern technologies and know-how. More important in the case of Hun-
gary is active diffusion, where the foreign investor provides some kind of assistance to do-
mestic suppliers and subcontractors that goes beyond the normal exchange of information.
More than half of the foreign companies provide some kind of assistance. Companies that
purchase more from domestic Hungarian companies provide assistance more often. Assis-
tance mainly involves technological assistance and assistance in organizational know-how.
The latter can take many forms, like management assistance, consultancy, and assistance in
(the implementation of) quality control and just-in-time delivery. Financial assistance was
not a common form of assistance.
An industrial policy aimed at the promotion of linkages between foreign and domestic
companies is therefore not only of interest for domestic companies, but a matter of na-
tional concern. Based on the findings in this study, the purchase from domestic companies
can be increased by an improvement in (product) quality at domestic companies. A dynamic
innovation policy, for instance through the setting up of technology centers and the imple-
mentation of R&D subsidies, can be important in this respect. Nevertheless, more than
two-thirds of the foreign companies in our survey indicated that they expected an increase
in the purchase from domestic Hungarian companies in the two years following the inter-
views. These expectations were based on an expansion of the output in Hungary, logistical
reasons, a greater tendency of outcontracting in international business, and an improvement
in product quality at a growing number of domestic suppliers. But despite the relatively high
and still growing purchase volume, it has not yet paid off in major structural improvements
at domestic companies. So, the growing gap between foreign and domestic companies is a
matter of concern for the near future.
Second, the geographical concentration of FDI in Hungary has caused an increasing gap
between regions that attracted a large share of FDI (more or less the very regions central in this
study), and regions that have not, notably the eastern half of the country. Of course it is not
fair to blame FDI solely for the regional differences in Hungary. Hungary has for years been
characterized by a very uneven geographical distribution of the economy. But what we
might conclude is that the location of FDI has been a factor in further accentuating regional
differences after the change of system in 1989.
The geographical focus in this study was on those regions that have attracted the vast
majority of FDI up till now. The concentration of the Hungarian domestic manufacturing
industry in Budapest and the northwest has been an important factor in the location of
foreign companies. First, because of this concentration, most companies in the manufac-
turing industry that were put up for sale in the privatization of SOEs were located here.
Second, because of this concentration of the manufacturing industry, Budapest and the
northwest of Hungary host a large pool of well-educated, experienced workers, many of
whom became available after restructuring at these SOEs. The quality of labor has turned
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out to be an important factor for foreign greenfields to locate their premises in the north-
west and in the agglomeration ring around Budapest. Other factors are related to the geo-
graphical position in international respect in general (bordering the EU), and geographical
proximity in particular (for Austrian and German companies), better infrastructure, a higher
education level, and factors that are related to the position of Budapest as a primate city.
This study showed that the strong concentration of FDI is causing more and more
problems for foreign companies in recruiting suitable employees, especially for companies
located in Budapest, areas directly bordering Austria, and the former industrial districts of
Györ and Székesfehérvár that have managed to attract a lot of greenfield investments.
These problems force foreign companies more and more to look for locations where labor
is abundant. The eastern part of the country does not only have a large pool of unemployed
workers, wages are lower too. So, these locations might be especially attractive to compa-
nies that are in search of cheap low-skilled labor. In contrast, the education level of the la-
bor force is lower than in the northwestern part of Hungary, and the integration with the
western part of Hungary (and therefore Western Europe) is problematic.
Considering the above, we conclude that the privatization policy in Hungary that favored
the direct sale of SOEs to strategic foreign investors has turned out to be successful. Partly
as a result of these foreign investments, Hungary has been able to integrate into the West
European economy substantially, after being locked in the socialist spheres of influence for
forty years. The impact of FDI on the transition in Hungary has been substantial and largely
positive up till now.
The role of foreign companies in the transition of the labor market is substantial. Practi-
cally all the foreign companies are involved in on-the-job training and in-house education.
Their efforts are most important in the education of people for key positions for whom
there is a large shortage, and in transmitting soft skills. The transfer of these soft skills is not
only decisive in a company’s profitability, but is also a very central, though underexposed
element of foreign companies’ contribution to the transformation process. Further research
on these soft skills seems therefore appropriate.
Of course, the modernization process that is so vital for the economic transition has
thus far been largely restricted to the foreign companies themselves, and some are still in
the middle of it. Generally speaking, the foreign companies are not acting as ‘cathedrals in
the desert’. In fact, the purchase from domestic Hungarian companies is relatively high and
many companies are actively seeking to increase this further. Even considering the limited
modernization at domestic companies, foreign investors see the benefits of local purchas-
ing, and are willing to provide assistance to domestic suppliers. So, probably when studying
the diffusion of organizational and technological know-how in a later stage of the transition
process, the picture might be more positive, regarding linkages, diffusion, and the moderni-
zation process in the domestic companies.
In this study, we focused on the manufacturing industry. But, where manufacturing has
turned out to be the main destination for foreign capital, the sector as a whole is decreasing
in importance. This is partly related to the transitional recession, as well as a change from an
industrial society to a post-industrial, service-oriented society (see Barta, 1996). The study of
this process, and the role of FDI in this, opens new avenues for future research as well.
Currently, nearly ten years after the change of system, investment opportunities in the pri-
vatization of SOEs are reaching their end, as the privatization is nearly completed. This
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means that future investment has to be mainly in greenfield sites. The central question is
whether Hungary will stay an attractive destination for FDI in the future. It might well be
that the times are changing. Although many firms were attracted to the untapped domestic
market, the market potential is with just over 10 million consumers rather small. Moreover,
as one of the front-runners in the transition process, wages in Hungary are relatively high
compared to other countries in the region (for instance Romania, Ukraine, Russian Repub-
lic, Bulgaria).
However, we do not foresee a large out-migration of foreign firms from Hungary to
other countries in the region, as wages increase. Serving the local market is an important
motive for foreign companies that have invested in Hungary. For a large share of compa-
nies that have invested for cost considerations only, the education level and the skills of
Hungarian employees are important as well. Moreover, most foreign companies are exten-
sively involved in training and educating their employees, incurring expenses which can be
characterized as sunk costs, in that they are irrecoverable in the event of selling or closing
the factory. Finally, most foreign companies are extensively linked to the Hungarian econ-
omy. Local sourcing is high, especially in privatized companies (more than 60%, compared
to 39% for greenfields).
Nor do we expect that Hungary will lose its attractiveness for foreign investors that plan
to invest in the CEE region on short notice. The large inward FDI stock has created a basis
of trust among foreign companies, politically, economically and legally. But in the longer
run, along with increasing wages, Hungary will become less attractive for companies in la-
bor-intensive industries that are characterized by cheap unskilled labor. In fact, companies
in these sectors in Hungary have already started to invest abroad, in a Central European
version of the flying-geese phenomenon (UNCTAD, 1998; Meyer, 1998). The outward FDI
stock of Hungary at the end of 1997 was close to $ 1 billion.
This tendency might be accelerated by the forthcoming EU membership. Ever since the
change of system, Hungary, as the happiest barrack in centrally-planned Europe, has pro-
jected itself as a country that might take the role of a bridgehead between East and West.
Perhaps through an EU membership, Hungary can really occupy this position, and take
over part of the role that Austria has been playing up till now. In that case, Hungary might
assume a leading role in bridging the gap between the EU and other countries in CEE that
have made less progress in the transition process thus far. Consequently, Hungary might
develop as a central country on the European periphery. This might also have a positive
effect on the development of the eastern part of the country, as it becomes a more attrac-
tive location for foreign companies to establish production facilities or distribution centers.
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Buitenlandse directe investeringen in Hongarije:
Effecten op de modernisering van de industrie en de vraag naar arbeid
Na de val van de Berlijnse muur in 1989 en het verdwijnen van het socialisme werd Honga-
rije een aantrekkelijke bestemming voor buitenlandse directe investeringen (FDI). De com-
binatie van marktpotentie, lage loonkosten en een relatief liberaal investeringsklimaat sprak
veel bedrijven aan. De Hongaarse regering voerde bovendien een actief beleid. Een belang-
rijk instrument hierin was de privatisering van staatsbedrijven. De belangrijkste reden voor
het aantrekken van buitenlandse strategische investeerders is het binnenhalen van westerse
management technieken en moderne technologie en knowhow. Buitenlandse bedrijven be-
schikken niet alleen over de vereiste kennis, maar ook over de financiële middelen die nodig
zijn voor de modernisering van de productiestructuur. Daarbij kunnen buitenlandse investe-
ringen een belangrijke rol spelen in de transitie naar een markteconomie
De centrale probleemstelling van dit onderzoek is als volgt geformuleerd: Wat zijn de
directe en indirecte effecten van buitenlandse directe investeringen op de modernisering van de industrie in
Hongarije, en wat zijn de gevolgen van deze modernisering voor de vraag naar arbeid, zowel in kwantitatieve
als kwalitatieve zin?
Voor dit onderzoek is gekeken naar de drie industriële sectoren die de grootste buiten-
landse inmenging hebben: de werktuigbouwindustrie, de elektrotechnische industrie en de
voedings- en genotmiddelen industrie. Daarnaast hebben we ons beperkt tot de regio’s waar
de meeste buitenlandse investeringen te vinden zijn. Het gaat hier om Boedapest en de om-
ringende provincie Pest (samen de centrale regio) en de provincies Györ-Moson-Sopron,
Vas, Veszprém, Komárom-Esztergom en Fejér (noordwest Hongarije). In de macroregio’s
centrum en noordwest Hongarije bevindt zich overigens de grootste concentratie buiten-
landse investeringen van geheel Centraal- en Oost-Europa. Op basis van een disproporti-
neel gestratificeerde steekproef zijn in 1997 interviews afgenomen bij 50 buitenlandse be-
drijven in Hongarije: 29 met bedrijven die in het kader van de privatisering van staatsbedrij-
ven hebben geï nvesteerd en 21 met bedrijven die een nieuwe vestiging hebben opgezet,
een zogenaamde ‘greenfield’ investering. Daarnaast zijn interviews afgenomen bij 13 Hon-
gaarse geprivatiseerde bedrijven, waardoor het mogelijk wordt de onderzoeksbevindingen in
perspectief te plaatsen.
In de context van het socialistische verleden van Hongarije is de wijze van vestiging van
buitenlandse bedrijven een belangrijke verklarende variabele. Bedrijven die middels privati-
sering in Hongarije hebben geï nvesteerd hebben direct te maken met deze socialistische
erfenis. Dit houdt in dat zij veelal geconfronteerd worden met verouderde machines en
technologie, overbemensing, lage productiviteit, lange hiërarchische lijnen, inflexibele pro-
ductiemethoden en incapabel management. Daarentegen worden greenfield investeringen,
waarbij een geheel nieuwe fabriek wordt opgericht, slechts indirect geconfronteerd met deze
erfenis, bijvoorbeeld door een algeheel gebrek aan mensen met de juiste managementkwali-
teiten en een lage arbeidsmoraal. Zij kunnen de nieuwe vestiging inrichten naar de laatste
technologische inzichten en hebben een positief effect op werkgelegenheid.
DIRECTE EFFECTEN OP DE MODERNISERING
Uit het onderzoek komt duidelijk naar voren dat zowel geprivatiseerde bedrijven als green-
fields een belangrijke rol spelen in de technologische modernisering van de Hongaarse indu-
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strie in directe zin (binnen de eigen vestiging). De wijze waarop verschilt echter sterk tussen
beide typen bedrijven. Greenfield investeringen worden uitgerust met moderne machines.
Maar wanneer het gaat om een bedrijfsverplaatsing, waarbij productiecapaciteit van een
westerse vestiging omwille van loonkosten verplaatst wordt naar het goedkope Hongarije,
gaat die verplaatsing veelal samen met een fysieke verplaatsing van productielijnen, waar-
door sommige greenfields niet (uitsluitend) met nieuwe machines worden uitgerust.
Geprivatiseerde bedrijven blijken bij aanvang inderdaad geconfronteerd te worden met
een verouderd machinepark. Gemiddeld gaat het hier om 56% verouderde of sterk verou-
derde machines. Dit aandeel is in de tussentijd echter sterk afgenomen tot 28% en zal naar
verwachting nog verder dalen, aangezien in 90% van de buitenlandse geprivatiseerde bedrij-
ven verdere investering in technologische modernisering gepland is. De meeste geprivati-
seerde bedrijven volgen een snelle, maar geleidelijke moderniseringsstrategie. Daarentegen
vervangt een aantal bedrijven het gehele machinepark kort na de overname. Deze bedrijven
worden ook wel aangeduid als ‘brownfield’ investeringen. Voor deze bedrijven is alleen de
merknaam en het marktaandeel van belang in de overname, niet het bedrijf op zich.
Verder bleek dat bedrijven in arbeidsintensieve sectoren minder (snel) moderniseren,
omdat de kostenbesparingen van moderne machines hier minder zijn als gevolg van de lage
loonkosten. Dit geldt met name voor bedrijven in de werktuigbouwindustrie, waar veel
handmatig werk moeilijk te vervangen is door machines. Het gaat hier veelal om investerin-
gen waarbij het kostenmotief een belangrijke rol speelt (loonveredeling), in relatie met de
technische vakkennis van werknemers.
De Hongaarse geprivatiseerde bedrijven in ons onderzoek hebben hun positie ten op-
zichte van buitenlandse investeerders vooralsnog alleen maar zien verslechteren. Om te
beginnen hebben zij een slechtere uitgangspositie dan de buitenlandse geprivatiseerde be-
drijven. Bij de start is gemiddeld meer dan driekwart van de productielijnen verouderd of
sterk verouderd. Hongaarse bedrijven bleken tot op heden niet in staat om hierin verbete-
ring te brengen. De technologische modernisering bij Hongaarse bedrijven wordt bemoei-
lijkt door financiële restricties (hoge rentevoet in relatie tot winstverwachting) en te hoge
rstrekkers als gevolg van verouderde machines.
DE VRAAG NAAR ARBEID
De effecten van buitenlandse investeringen op de arbeidsvraag zijn aanmerkelijk, zowel in
kwantitatief als kwalitatief opzicht. Greenfield investeringen hebben vele nieuwe arbeids-
plaatsen gecreëerd. Niet alleen door het opzetten van nieuwe productievestigingen maar
met name ook door de continue uitbreiding van productiecapaciteit daarna. Deze voorzich-
tige, maar tegelijkertijd agressieve investeringspolitiek is kenmerkend voor buitenlandse in-
vesteringen in Hongarije.
De werkgelegenheidseffecten van geprivatiseerde bedrijven waren in de eerste jaren
overwegend negatief. Dit is niet zozeer het gevolg van de introductie van nieuwe technolo-
gieën maar van organisatorische aanpassingen, zoals het bestrijden van overbemensing en
het afstoten of sluiten van afdelingen en collectieve voorzieningen. Echter, uit het onder-
zoek komt naar voren dat de werkgelegenheidseffecten in geprivatiseerde bedrijven niet per
definitie negatief zijn. In de helft van de bedrijven vonden we een toename van de werkge-
legenheid tussen het moment van vestiging en de periode waarin de interviews plaatsvon-
den. Deze stijging is voornamelijk het gevolg van de oprichting van nieuwe afdelingen, zoals
bijvoorbeeld verkoop en distributie, en een toename in productiecapaciteit. Een bijkomende
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factor is dat niet alle bedrijven in dezelfde mate met overbemensing te maken kregen, bij-
voorbeeld omdat sommige deels geherstructureerd zijn voor privatisering.
Belangrijker voor het transitieproces zijn wellicht de effecten van buitenlandse bedrijven
op de arbeidsmarkt in kwalitatieve zin. De buitenlandse investeerders hebben een positief
beeld van de Hongaarse beroepsbevolking als het gaat om het opleidingsniveau, de bereid-
heid om te leren en de aanpassing aan de nieuwe economische en politieke situatie. De vak-
kundigheid van werknemers maakt het voor buitenlandse investeerders gemakkelijk om
werknemers vertrouwd te maken met de nieuwe technologieën (veelal on-the-job). Ook
hebben zij weinig problemen bij het vervullen van vacatures op de werkvloer. Het is dan
ook niet verwonderlijk, dat buitenlandse investeerders die Hongarije als een export platform
gebruiken, niet alleen op zoek zijn naar goedkope arbeidskrachten, maar veelal naar goed
opgeleide goedkope arbeidskrachten.
De mismatch tussen vraag en aanbod op de arbeidsmarkt is het grootst voor manage-
ment functies. Dit kan gezien worden als een indicatie voor de bijdrage van buitenlandse
investeringen aan de organisatorische modernisering. Buitenlandse investeerders hebben
grote problemen in het vervullen van vacatures voor sleutelposities, met name op het ter-
rein van personeelsmanagement, logistiek, productie, verkoop en marketing, financiën en
kwaliteitscontrole. De tekorten zijn het resultaat van de afwezigheid van deze functies onder
het socialistische regime, de langzame aanpassing van het onderwijssysteem, het stijgende
aantal buitenlandse bedrijven, en het feit dat Hongaren nog steeds moeite hebben met het
nemen van verantwoordelijkheid. Buitenlandse investeerders leveren een actieve bijdrage
door de opleiding van personeel in bovengenoemde werkvelden zelf ter hand te nemen. Dit
neemt niet weg dat het merendeel van de managers pessimistisch is over een verbetering in
de situatie op korte termijn.
Uit de interviews met Hongaarse bedrijven komt daarentegen naar voren dat zij geen
problemen ondervinden bij het vervullen van sleutelposities. Dit kan gezien worden als een
indicatie voor de beperkte modernisering die hier tot op heden heeft plaatsgevonden. De
problemen richten zich hier meer op het behouden van geschoolde werknemers, aangezien
buitenlandse bedrijven een voorkeur hebben voor het aanstellen van deze ervaren vakmen-
sen. Het gevolg is dat buitenlandse bedrijven – die een hoger salaris en betere secundaire
voorwaarden bieden en een beter imago als werkgever genieten – de arbeidsmarkt afromen,
in plaats van dat zij een directe bijdrage leveren aan het terugdringen van de werkloosheid.
Het opleiden van personeel is in vrijwel alle buitenlandse bedrijven belangrijk. Ten dele
zijn deze trainingen gericht op het opheffen van tekorten op de arbeidsmarkt. Verder zijn er
interne opleidingen die direct gerelateerd zijn aan de technologische modernisering. Het
gaat hier met name om training on-the-job.
Naast de functiegerelateerde opleidingen zijn buitenlandse investeringen belangrijk in het
overbrengen van ‘soft skills’ op Hongaarse werknemers. Dit geldt zowel voor werknemers
op de werkvloer als in het management. Bijna alle buitenlandse bedrijven in het onderzoek
trainen hun werknemers in teamwork (het werken in teamverband bleek een groot pro-
bleem voor de meeste werknemers) en proberen werknemers te motiveren. Buitenlandse
investeerders spelen bovendien een belangrijke rol in het overbrengen van implicatie kennis
(‘tacit knowledge’) op hun werknemers. Niet alleen door hun aanwezigheid, maar ook om-
dat zij over het algemeen veel tijd en geld steken in het veranderen van de wijze van denken
en manier van werken van hun werknemers. De trainingen in ‘soft skills’ zijn erop gericht
de flexibiliteit te verhogen en de concurrentiepositie te verbeteren. Maar het zijn tegelijker-
tijd ook belangrijke elementen in de transitie van de arbeidsmarkt.
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Arbeid is een belangrijke factor in de locatiekeuze van bedrijven. Dit is op zich niet zo
verwonderlijk, aangezien de best gekwalificeerde Hongaarse arbeidskrachten in de onder-
zochte regio’s te vinden zijn. Maar het toenemende aantal buitenlandse bedrijven zorgt in de
grote industriegebieden (Boedapest, Györ en Székesfehérvár) voor een krappe arbeids-
markt.  Het tekort aan werknemers voor managementposities is met name buiten Boeda-
pest groot.
INDIRECTE EFFECTEN OP DE MODERNISERING
De indirecte effecten van buitenlandse investeringen op de modernisering hebben betrek-
king op de diffusie van moderne technologieën en organisatorische knowhow op lokale
Hongaarse bedrijven, via de inkooprelaties met Hongaarse toeleveranciers en onderaanne-
mers (subcontractors). Middels de diffusie van de modernisering naar Hongaarse bedrijven,
zijn de vermeende positieve effecten van buitenlandse bedrijven veel groter, dan wanneer
deze beperkt blijven tot de buitenlandse vestigingen.
Rekening houdend met de relatief korte tijd dat de meeste buitenlandse bedrijven actief
zijn in Hongarije en de onduidelijke economische situatie in de eerste jaren van de transitie,
kunnen we stellen dat zowel geprivatiseerde bedrijven als greenfields een groot  aandeel van
hun totale inkoop betrekken van lokale Hongaarse bedrijven. Voor geprivatiseerde bedrij-
ven is dit een derde, voor greenfields een kwart. De belangrijkste redenen om gebruik te
maken van Hongaarse toeleveranciers zijn gunstige prijzen, en verassend leveringscondities.
Hoewel de meeste Hongaarse bedrijven niet vertrouwd zijn met recente ontwikkelingen in
toelevering zoals just-in-time, is geografische nabijheid een belangrijke factor, zowel met
betrekking tot afstand als flexibiliteit. Een belangrijke belemmerende factor in lokale toele-
vering is het gegeven dat voor een groot aantal producten geen Hongaarse toeleveranciers
te vinden zijn.
De relaties tussen buitenlandse en Hongaarse bedrijven kunnen gezien worden als een
indicator voor diffusie. Belangrijker in het geval van Hongarije is actieve diffusie, hier gede-
finieerd als het verstrekken van assistentie of hulp die niet valt onder de normale uitwisse-
ling van informatie met toeleveranciers of subcontractors. Meer dan de helft van de buiten-
landse bedrijven geeft op een of andere manier hulp, waarbij bedrijven die meer lokaal in-
kopen vaker assistentie verlenen. Deze hulp is vooral in de vorm van technische en organi-
satorische assistentie. De laatste krijgt op vele manieren gestalte, zoals bijvoorbeeld mana-
gement assistentie, consultancy, en hulp in de implementatie van kwaliteitscontrole en just-
in-time levering.
Meer dan tweederde van de buitenlandse bedrijven verwacht een toename van de inkoop
bij Hongaarse bedrijven. Deze verwachting is gebaseerd op een toename van de productie
in Hongarije, logistieke gronden, een algemene tendens van toenemende uitbesteding, en
een verbetering van de productkwaliteit bij een groeiend aantal Hongaarse bedrijven.
TOT SLOT
Buitenlandse investeringen hebben een aanzienlijke en overwegend positieve invloed op de
modernisering van de industrie en de veranderingen op de arbeidsmarkt, beide centrale
elementen in de transitie naar een markteconomie. In dit opzicht kan gesteld worden dat de
nagenoeg afgeronde privatisering succesvol is geweest. Vooralsnog blijven de modernise-
ringseffecten echter hoofdzakelijk beperkt tot de buitenlandse vestigingen, ondanks de
groeiende inbedding van buitenlandse bedrijven in de Hongaarse economie. De stijgende
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discrepantie tussen buitenlandse en Hongaarse bedrijven is dan ook een bron van zorg voor
de nabije toekomst.
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Annex 1 Questionnaire to foreign companies
This questionnaire consists of 6 parts :
1. A form in which particulars of the company should be filled out
2. Questions about the background of the investment, strategic issues and performance
3. Questions regarding production and process innovations
4. Questions with respect to labor and the organization of labor
5. Questions concerning contacts with domestic Hungarian companies
6. Some statements
1. Checklist
Name of company
Name held by interviewee
Position interviewee
Location of headquarters
Location of subsidiaries
in Hungary
Foreign owner Name: Country:
Foreign capital share
Other foreign partners
Sector
Activity
Established since 19
Number of employees
(this plant)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Annual sales (turnover)
(this plant)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
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2. Questions regarding the background of the investment, strategic issues, company
characteristics and performance
The following questions will go into the background of the investment (such as motives for
investment, entry mode, sales markets etc.), strategic issues, company characteristics and the actual
performance of the company at present.
1. How did you invest in Hungary (initial entry mode)?
à Acquisition of a state company
à Joint venture (partial acquisition of a state company)
à Joint venture (setting up a new (greenfield) plant together with a local company)
à Greenfield investment
à Other, namely, .........
2. Why was this entry mode chosen?
3. Were other entry modes considered and why were these not chosen?
4. Were any additional investments in Hungary made after initial entry, or has there been a change in your
company’s mode of investment since then?
à No
à Yes, namely, .........
5. What was the main reason for investing in Hungary?
à Market considerations (Hungarian market)
à Cost considerations (low production (labor) costs in Hungary)
à Strategic considerations, namely, .........
à Other, namely, .........
6. Please indicate in terms of percentage your company’s sales markets in the first full year after establishment in
Hungary (= 19 .....) and in 1996.
19..... 1996
Hungarian domestic market % %
Other countries in Central and Eastern Europe % %
Western Europe % %
Other, namely, ......... % %
Total 100   % 100   %
Where there has been a distinct shift in sales markets (question 6) or a shift in strategy
(question 5 & 6), i.e. market considerations combined with Western sales markets or cost
considerations combined with mainly Hungarian sales:
7. Can you explain why?
8. What sort of products does this establishment produce?
à ..... % consumer goods
à ..... % semi-manufactured articles
à ..... % production equipment, machinery
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à ..... % other, namely, .........
9. What production form(s) is your plant engaged in (as a % of output)?
à ..... % single-piece production (according to specific needs of clients)
à ..... % in batches
à ..... % mass production
 
10. Is this establishment involved in product development (the development of new products)?
à No
à Yes
11. This establishment is currently .....
à Profitable
à Breaking even
à Making a loss
12. How do you regard the present situation of your company compared to other companies in this branch in
Hungary?
à It is among the better companies
à Average
à Among the worse
3. Questions regarding production and process innovations
The following questions deal with production, production equipment, process innovations and
organization of production. The questions are restricted to the primary activities of this subsidiary,
i.e., manufacturing.
13. In terms of percentage, how would you categorize this subsidiary’s production equipment at time of entry?
à Archaic or totally obsolete ..... %
à Somewhat obsolete ..... %
à Accepted international standard ..... %
à State-of-the-art (very modern) ..... %
_____+
à Total 100 %
14. Did you invest in new production equipment (modernize production) since you established in Hungary and if yes,
how would you classify this new equipment?
à No Þ proceed to question 17
à Yes, modern compared to other equipment in this subsidiary
à Yes, modern by Hungarian standards in this sector
à Yes, accepted international standard
à Yes, state-of-the-art
15. Was this production equipment new or was it already used or written-off machinery from other (Western)
subsidiaries?
à New
à Already used or written-off, namely, .........
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16. In terms of percentage, how would you categorize this subsidiary’s production equipment at present?
à Archaic or totally obsolete ..... %
à Somewhat obsolete ..... %
à Accepted international standard ..... %
à State-of-the-art (very modern) ..... %
_____+
à Total 100 %
17. Can you indicate the average age of the core-production equipment at present?
............. years old
18. What were the most important motives to invest / restrictions not to invest (in connection with question 14) in
new production equipment?
19. Are you planning to invest in new more modern production equipment in the near future (next two years)?
à Yes, because .........
à No, because .........
20. Do you use Computer-Aided Technology in manufacturing, and if so, to what extent?
à No
à No, but we will in the near future
à Yes, ......... % of production equipment is based on Computer-Aided Technology
21. Was there a reorganization of production in this establishment after entry/investment (allnot due to the
introduction of new equipment/technology)?
à No
à Yes, namely, .........
4. Questions with respect to labor: quantitative, qualitative and organization of labor
In view of our aim to investigate the consequences of the modernization of production for the
demand for labor, both regarding employment and qualifications, we will proceed with some
questions regarding labor.
22. How important was the regional supply of labor (regional labor market) for the decision to locate in
........................ (name of town)?
à Of determining importance
à Very important
à Average importance
à Minor importance
à Negligible importance
23. If labor was not of determining importance, what then was of determining importance for your decision to locate in
..................... (name of town)?
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24. Which of the following applies to the new employees you hired last year (1996)?
à ...... school-leavers
à ...... from other local companies
à ...... from other foreign companies in Hungary
à ...... formerly unemployed
à ...... re-entrants on the labor market
à ...... other, namely, .........
____+
...... total number of employees hired in 1996
25. How do you recruit these new employees in general? Rank order: 1 is most important, 2 is second most important
etc.
à Recruitment agency
à Labor office
à Advertisement in the newspaper
à Schools/vocational training schools
à In a roundabout way, through employees
à Government job creation schemes
à Other, namely, .........
26. What characteristic in general has the highest priority in selecting new production-related employees? Please rank:
1 is most important, 2 is second most important, 3 is third most important.
à Education
à Experience
à Attitude, mentality
à Other, namely, .........
27. Are there vacancies which are difficult to fill?
à Yes, a lot
à Yes, some
à No Þ proceed to question 31
28. What kind of vacancies are these, and what are the requirements?
29. How do you cope with this problem?
30. Do you expect the problem of vacancies which are difficult to fill to change in the near future?
à Yes, because .........
à No, because .........
31. Did the supply of sufficient suitably qualified labor play any role in the decision to upgrade / not upgrade your
production equipment (check question 14)? Please explain.
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32. Do you educate or train your employees and if so, in what way?
à No Þ proceed to question 34
à Yes, through internal courses
à Yes, through courses elsewhere
à Yes, through ‘training-on-the-job’ in Hungary
à Yes, through ‘training-on-the-job’ abroad
à Other, namely, .........
33. Why do you educate or train your employees?
34. Can you give an indication of the relation between unskilled and skilled work in this production plant at the
time of establishment (entry) in Hungary and present? (Not in terms of the education of the employees, but the
kind of work they do.)
Entry Present
Unskilled   ........ % ........ %
Skilled   ........ % ........ %
Total 100  % 100   %
35. Please indicate for each of the following departments whether the number of employees has decreased (-), remained
the same (o) or has grown (+) during the last three years, and whether there was a shift in the level of work in
each department from low (unskilled) to middle level (vocational training) and from middle to high level (higher
education/university level)?
Departments Growth
-    o    +
Shift from low
level to middle
level
Shift from
middle level to
high level
No
shifts
Production (shop-floor)
Administration & Management
Support services departments
(sales, expedition, R&D etc.)
36. How many people work full-time and part-time in this plant?
à ..... % full-time
à ..... % part-time
37. Has the number of part-time workers grown over the last two years?
à Yes, significantly
à Yes, moderately
à No
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38. Did labor productivity per employee in this establishment change since your plant was established in Hungary?
à Increased significantly
à Increased moderately
à Stayed about the same
à Decreased moderately
à Decreased significantly
39. What was the main reason for this change?
40. Do you expect an increase in labor productivity per employee in the next two years?
à Yes, approximately ........%
à No, it will stay about the same
à No, it will decrease by approximately ........%
5. Contacts with other companies
A major topic in this research is the role of Western investments in the modernization of the
regional production structure in Hungary. Therefore the following questions deal with contacts with
domestic Hungarian companies.
41. Please state the activities which your company contracts out via subcontractor or supplier relations and indicate
the type of companies.
Local
Hungarian
companies
Companies in
Hungary with
foreign capital
participation
Foreign
companies
abroad
Not
applicabl
e
Raw materials
Simple semi-manufactured articles
Complicated semi-manufactured articles
Supporting services
Other, namely, .............
42. What share of your total purchase in 1996 did you obtain from domestic fully Hungarian-owned companies,
companies in Hungary with foreign capital participation and from companies abroad?
Local
Hungarian
companies
Companies in
Hungary with
foreign capital
participation
Foreign
companies
abroad
Total
% of total purchase ...... % ..... % ..... % 100 %
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43. Why do you / do you not purchase from Hungarian domestic companies?
(Catchwords: price, quality, delivery time)
44. If you use domestic suppliers or subcontractors, do you provide some assistance or support in the form of machines,
know-how, management assistance etc.? If so, why?
à No
à Yes, because .........
45. Do you expect an increase in the level of outcontracting to and purchase from domestic Hungarian companies in
the next two years?
à Yes, because .........
à No, because .........
6. Statements
46. Please give your opinion about the following statements
Fully
disagree
Disagree Agree Fully
agree
a) The general education level of the Hungarian labor force
is a hindrance to the modernization of our production.
b) The Hungarian labor force is well educated.
 
c) Hungarian employees are eager to learn
d) Hungarian employees still have difficulties with
cooperation in their work
e) Hungarian employees are fast learners and adapt to the
new situation in their country very quickly
f) It is very hard to recruit well-educated employees in
Hungary.
g) It is a necessity to educate workers yourself in Hungary.
h) The setting up of a good, efficient running production
plant in Hungary is not possible in the short term (two
years).
i) The technological level of (former) state-owned
companies in Hungary is very low.
j) Hungarian companies are not qualified yet to function as
suppliers or subcontractors.
k) Investment by way of a greenfield plant is the only way
to obtain an efficient, internationally competitive
production capacity in Hungary in the short term.
l) Investment by way of an acquisition or a joint venture is
the only way to get access or to sell on the Hungarian
market.
m) A local partner is still of vital importance for the success
of an investment in Hungary.
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Thank you very much for your time and cooperation!
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Annex 2 Questionnaire to domestic companies
The questionnaire to domestic companies largely resembles the questionnaire to foreign companies.
Therefore, only the question items which differ from the questionnaire presented in annex 1 will be
listed.
2. Questions regarding privatization, foundation, strategic issues, company characteristics
and performance
Questions 1-5 are replaced by:
1. Is this a former state-owned company or a newly established private company, a so-called greenfield investment ?
à Former state-owned company
à Newly established private company (greenfield)
2. What is the present ownership structure of this company?
à ..... % owned by employees of this company
à ..... % owned by management of this company
à ..... % owned by domestic private Hungarian companies, persons or financial institutions
à ..... % state-owned
à ..... % foreign (not higher than 10%!)
____ +
100 % Total
3. Has the ownership structure of this company changed over time and if yes in what way?
4. What was the main reason for the initial investor or private owner to establish this company?
4. Questions with respect to labor: quantitative, qualitative and organization of labor
Additional question:
25. Is there, in your opinion, competition with foreign companies in Hungary for good qualified labor?
5. Contacts with other companies
Questions 41-45 are replaced by:
41. Does this company have links or contacts with companies with foreign capital participation located in Hungary
(by way of supplying or subcontracting relations etc.)? If so, what kind of relations are they and what is the
intensity of these contacts?
à No Þ proceed to question 43
à Yes, namely, .........
42. Do you receive any assistance, support or payment in the form of machines, know-how, management-assistance
etc. from these foreign companies? What is the importance of this kind of assistance (these contacts) for your
company?
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43. Does this company have links or contacts with foreign companies located abroad (by way of supplying or
subcontracting relations etc.)? If so, what kind of relations are they and what is the intensity of these contacts?
à No Þ proceed to question 45
à Yes, namely, .........
44. Do you receive any assistance, support or payment in the form of machines, know-how, management-assistance
etc. from these foreign companies? What is the importance of this kind of assistance (these contacts) for your
company?
45. Are you actively looking for new relations or contacts with foreign companies located either within or outside
Hungary?
46. Do you expect an increase in the number and intensity of contacts with foreign companies in the next two years?
à Yes, because .........
à No, because .........
6. Statements
Statements k), l), and m) are replaced by:
Fully
disagree
Disagree Agree Fully
agree
k) Investment by way of an acquisition or a joint venture is
the only way to get access or to sell on the Hungarian
market.
l) A local partner is still of vital importance for the success
of an investment in Hungary.
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Annex 3 Statements
Statement i The lack of good financing possibilities is a major restriction to the modernization of our
production.
Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 46.2
Agree 30.8
Disagree 15.4
Fully disagree 7.7
Total 100.0
Statement ii The Hungarian labor force is well educated.
Greenfield (N=21) Privatized  (N=29) Foreign total (N=50) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 23.8 34.5 30.0 23.1
Agree 66.7 58.6 62.0 69.2
Disagree 9.5 6.9 8.0 -
Fully disagree - - - 7.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement iii Hungarian employees are eager to learn.
Greenfield (N=21) Privatized (N=28) Foreign total (N=49) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 23.8 21.4 22.4 7.7
Agree 66.7 64.3 65.3 61.5
Disagree 9.5 14.3 12.2 30.8
Fully disagree - - - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement iv Hungarian employees are fast learners and adapt to the new situation in their country very
quickly.
Greenfield (N=20) Privatized (N=27) Foreign total (N=47) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 30.0 33.3 31.9 15.4
Agree 55.0 18.1 51.1 76.9
Disagree 15.0 48.5 17.0 7.7
Fully disagree - - - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement v The general education level of the Hungarian labor force is a hindrance to the modernization of
our production.
Greenfield (N=21) Privatized (N=29) Foreign total (N=50) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree - - - -
Agree 9.5 - 4.0 -
Disagree 23.8 34.5 30.0 46.2
Fully disagree 66.7 65.5 66.0 53.8
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement vi It is very hard to recruit well-educated employees in Hungary.
Greenfield (N=20) Privatized (N=28) Foreign total (N=48) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 15.0 7.1 10.4 15.4
Agree 30.0 21.4 25.0 23.1
Disagree 50.0 46.4 47.9 53.8
Fully disagree 5.0 25.0 16.7 7.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement vii It is a necessity to educate workers yourself in Hungary.
Greenfield (N=20) Privatized (N=28) Foreign total (N=48) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 30.0 14.3 20.8 15.4
Agree 60.0 50.0 54.2 53.8
Disagree 10.0 32.1 22.9 30.8
Fully disagree - 3.6 2.1 -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement viii Hungarian employees still have difficulties with cooperation in their work.
Greenfield (N=21) Privatized (N=29) Foreign total (N=50) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 4.8 13.8 10.0 7.7
Agree 57.1 48.3 52.0 30.0
Disagree 33.3 20.7 26.0 46.2
Fully disagree 4.8 17.2 12.0 15.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement ix Hungarian companies are not qualified yet to function as suppliers or subcontractors.
Greenfield (N=20) Privatized (N=28) Foreign total (N=48) Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 5.0 - 2.1 -
Agree 30.0 21.4 25.0 -
Disagree 40.0 39.3 39.6 53.8
Fully disagree 25.0 39.3 33.3 46.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Statement x Contacts with foreign companies are of major importance for the performance of Hungarian
domestic companies.
Domestic (N=13)
Fully agree 23.1
Agree 53.8
Disagree 23.1
Fully disagree -
Total 100.0
